Brings the rustdesk-server up to feature parity with RustDesk Server Pro for
the API surface the desktop client expects (CONSOLE_API.md). Implemented as
an in-process axum router mounted by hbbs alongside its existing
rendezvous + relay TCP/UDP/WS listeners; everything persists in the existing
SQLx + SQLite database via additional CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS migrations.
================================================================================
M1 — Auth foundation + heartbeat + sysinfo
================================================================================
- New tables: users, tokens, device_sysinfo.
- Endpoints: HEAD+GET /api/login-options, POST /api/login, POST /api/logout,
POST /api/currentUser, POST /api/heartbeat, POST /api/sysinfo_ver,
POST /api/sysinfo.
- Bearer-token auth: tokens are 32 random bytes (base64url); only the
sha256 of the token is stored. `tokens.last_used_at`/`expires_at` slide
forward on every authenticated request (30-day TTL by default).
- Bcrypt-cost-10 password hashing, always wrapped in
tokio::task::spawn_blocking to keep the runtime responsive.
- New CLI flags --http-port, --bootstrap-admin-username,
--bootstrap-admin-password.
- Heartbeat returns the `sysinfo: true` flag on first contact and after
cfg.sysinfo_ver bumps; sysinfo upload returns the bare-string body
("SYSINFO_UPDATED" / "ID_NOT_FOUND") the client expects.
================================================================================
M2 — Address book, device groups, accessible peers
================================================================================
- New tables: address_books, address_book_shares, address_book_peers,
address_book_tags, address_book_peer_tags, device_groups,
device_group_members. Soft-ALTER adds device_sysinfo.user_id (the
binding from a device to its enrolled user, set by /api/login).
- Endpoints: POST /api/ab/settings, POST /api/ab/personal,
POST /api/ab/shared/profiles, POST /api/ab/peers, POST /api/ab/tags/{guid},
POST /api/ab/peer/add/{guid}, PUT /api/ab/peer/update/{guid},
DELETE /api/ab/peer/{guid}, POST /api/ab/tag/add/{guid},
PUT /api/ab/tag/rename/{guid}, PUT /api/ab/tag/update/{guid},
DELETE /api/ab/tag/{guid}, GET+POST /api/ab (legacy single-blob fallback),
GET /api/device-group/accessible, GET /api/users, GET /api/peers.
- Share-rule enforcement (1=read, 2=read/write, 3=full) at the top of every
AB mutation. Owners are full; other rules come from
address_book_shares (direct or via device_group). Rejection is HTTP 200 +
{"error":"read-only"} so the client doesn't yank the session.
- New CLI flags --ab-legacy-mode, --ab-max-peers-per-book.
- Action endpoints (peer add/update/delete, tag CRUD) return HTTP 200 with
EMPTY body on success — matches the Flutter _jsonDecodeActionResp at
ab_model.dart:2002 which treats {} as the literal error string "null".
================================================================================
M3 — Audit, recording, strategy push
================================================================================
- New tables: audit_conn (PK guid echoed back to client),
audit_file, audit_alarm, recordings, strategies, strategy_assignments,
heartbeat_commands.
- Endpoints: POST /api/audit/conn (returns {"guid":"..."}),
POST /api/audit/file, POST /api/audit/alarm, PUT /api/audit (note update),
POST /api/record?type={new|part|tail|remove}.
- Recording uploader: filesystem state machine under --recording-dir;
filenames sanitized to a single Normal path component to block traversal;
`tail` writes the first ≤1024 bytes at offset 0 after all `part` chunks.
- Heartbeat extended to:
* resolve a per-peer strategy (peer > device-group > user, highest
priority wins) and emit `strategy.config_options` + `extra` +
`modified_at`.
* read-and-delete heartbeat_commands rows so an admin can queue
`disconnect: [conn_id]` or force `sysinfo: true` via SQL and have it
delivered on the next 15-second tick.
- New CLI flags --recording-dir (default ./recordings),
--recording-max-size-mb, --audit-retention-days.
================================================================================
secure_tcp on the rendezvous TCP listener (M3 polish)
================================================================================
A logged-in client conditionally calls secure_tcp() on its TCP rendezvous
connection (src/client.rs:427-431, gated on `key && token` both non-empty).
OSS hbbs had no KeyExchange handler at all on TCP rendezvous, so the
client's secure_tcp_impl read timed out with "Failed to secure tcp:
deadline has elapsed". Added:
- A try_secure_tcp_handshake helper that, on every accepted TCP connection,
generates an ephemeral box keypair, signs the box public key with the
server's Ed25519 sk (already loaded for relay-response signing), sends
KeyExchange, then waits 5s for the client's reply.
- Reply is KeyExchange[client_box_pk, sealed_sym_key] -> decrypt the
sealed key, install Encrypt on both halves of the stream.
- Reply is any other RendezvousMessage -> buffer it and replay through
the normal handle_tcp dispatcher (plain-mode clients filter unsolicited
KeyExchange via get_next_nonkeyexchange_msg, so our preceding KX is
harmless).
- Reply never comes (timeout) -> fall through to plain mode.
- Sink::TcpStream now carries an Option<Encrypt>; outgoing writes are
sealed when keyed. Symmetric Encrypt is cloned for inbound (`dec`) and
outbound (`enc`) so the two directions track independent counters.
================================================================================
M4 — Advanced auth (TOTP, email-code, OIDC), CLI assign, plugin signing
================================================================================
- New tables: user_totp_secrets, pending_tfa_challenges,
pending_email_codes, oidc_providers, oidc_sessions. Soft-ALTER adds
users.oidc_subject.
- /api/login extended:
* type:"account" (existing) — issues an `tfa_check` challenge (5-min
nonce in `secret`) when the user has TOTP enrolled.
* type:"tfa_code" — verifies the nonce + the 6-digit TOTP code against
user_totp_secrets.secret_b32.
* type:"email_code" — passwordless. First leg mints a 6-digit code and
sends it via SMTP (or logs to stdout when --smtp-host is empty);
second leg verifies. Brute-force capped at 5 attempts per code, then
the row is purged.
- /api/oidc/auth + GET /oidc/callback + GET /api/oidc/auth-query implement
the standard OAuth2 authorization-code flow with userinfo. Discovery via
<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration with an in-memory cache.
--oidc-config TOML upserts providers at startup; --public-base-url builds
the redirect_uri.
- New endpoints: POST /api/2fa/enroll (admin-only, returns secret_b32 +
otpauth_url), POST /api/2fa/unenroll, POST /api/devices/cli (used by
`rustdesk --assign`; binds device to user, ensures device-group, adds
AB entry, attaches peer-scoped strategy), POST /lic/web/api/plugin-sign
(Ed25519 over the request body using the same id_ed25519 secret).
- /api/login-options is now dynamic: returns ["account"], plus "email_code"
when SMTP or ALLOW_DEV_EMAIL_CODE is set, plus an "oidc/<name>" entry
per enabled provider in oidc_providers.
- New CLI flags --smtp-host, --smtp-port, --smtp-user, --smtp-pass,
--smtp-from, --smtp-tls, --public-base-url, --oidc-config.
- New crate deps: tokio (fs/io-util features), totp-rs, lettre (rustls +
builder + smtp-transport, no defaults), toml.
================================================================================
Code organization
================================================================================
- src/api/ axum router + shared state + error envelope
├── ab/ address book endpoints (settings/profiles/peers/
│ tags/legacy/rules)
├── audit/ conn/file/alarm/note
├── oidc/ providers/discovery/auth/callback/poll
├── record/ storage state machine + handler
├── strategy/ resolver wrapper around DB
├── auth.rs login/logout/currentUser
├── devices_cli.rs /api/devices/cli
├── email.rs SMTP transport (lettre) + dev-mode stdout fallback
├── error.rs ApiError enum -> HTTP 200/401/403/404 + JSON envelope
├── groups.rs /api/device-group/accessible
├── heartbeat.rs /api/heartbeat
├── middleware.rs AuthedUser extractor (Bearer -> sha256 -> token row)
├── pagination.rs Page<T> + PageQuery
├── peers.rs /api/peers
├── plugin_sign.rs /lic/web/api/plugin-sign
├── state.rs AppState + ApiConfig (incl. EmailConfig)
├── sysinfo.rs /api/sysinfo, /api/sysinfo_ver
├── twofa.rs /api/2fa/enroll, /unenroll
└── users.rs UserPayload + /api/users + bcrypt helpers
================================================================================
Conventions enforced throughout
================================================================================
- All new SQL uses the runtime sqlx::query("...") form (NOT the query!
macro) so first-time builds don't require DATABASE_URL to point at a DB
containing the new tables.
- Soft-ALTER helper (try_alter) swallows "duplicate column name" errors so
schema migrations are idempotent across re-runs and existing-DB upgrades.
- Bcrypt compares always via spawn_blocking.
- Tokens (Bearer access_token, TFA challenge nonce, OIDC poll handle) are
always 24-32 random bytes from sodiumoxide::randombytes; the Bearer is
stored only as its sha256.
- Constant-time hash comparison for email codes.
- Action endpoints return HTTP 200 with empty body on success; HTTP 200 +
{"error": "..."} for business errors so the client doesn't get logged
out; 401 only from the auth middleware.
Tested end-to-end via curl + a stock RustDesk client (M1-M2 verified
against two laptops; M3 verified against the strategy-push and
force-disconnect paths; M4 verified via direct flow tests + a mock IdP for
OIDC). Stock client connect now works whether the user is signed in or
not (the secure_tcp regression that blocked logged-in connect is fixed).
The remaining piece on the M4 plan — HttpProxyRequest, the TCP-over-
rendezvous fallback for clients with OPTION_USE_RAW_TCP_FOR_API=Y — is
gated on bumping the OSS server's vendored hbb_common to a commit that
includes proto tags 27 and 28. That work lives on a separate branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* debian/changelog more like the first two
Added "Who and When" lines, added empty lines as separator.
The time stamps where retrieved from the git commit log.
All entries look now like:
rustdesk-server (1.1.7) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
* ipv6 support
-- rustdesk <info@rustdesk.com> Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:27:00 +0800
rustdesk-server (1.1.6) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
* Initial release
-- open-trade <info@rustdesk.com> Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:27:27 +0200
* debian/changelog: reformat a date stamp
The "wrong format" was discovered by Lintian.
* Update README.md
* make hbbs first everywhere
* Update README.md
* Fix link
* dockerhub to Docker Hub; Suggest user use ghcr if can't access Docker Hub
* Add `
* Add Debian 12