Fix horizontal scrolling in admin UI

Fix docker caching and correcting version in Gitea workflow
Bump version to 1.1.17-pro
2026-05-25 00:19:14 +02:00 · 2026-05-25 00:07:15 +02:00 · 2026-05-24 23:08:56 +02:00 · 2026-05-24 23:02:34 +02:00 · 2026-05-22 23:41:55 +02:00 · 2026-05-22 23:03:06 +02:00
115 changed files with 79870 additions and 32 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Copy to .env and edit. docker-compose reads it automatically.
+
+# --- Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Public domain clients connect to. hbbs advertises this as the relay address.
+RUSTDESK_DOMAIN=rd.gamecom.ch
+
+# --- Bootstrap admin ---------------------------------------------------------
+# Seeded into the users table on the FIRST startup only (when users is empty).
+# Subsequent restarts ignore these — change the password via the admin UI.
+# Without these set on first boot, you'll have no way to log in.
+
+RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
+RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=changeme
+
+# --- Optional runtime --------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Pre-shared key. "-" lets hbbs auto-generate on first run; "_" forces
+# encrypted-only mode without an explicit key.
+#RUSTDESK_KEY=-
+
+# HTTP management API / admin UI port (pro-features). Set to 0 to disable.
+#RUSTDESK_HTTP_PORT=21114
+
+# Force relay for all sessions even on LAN.
+#RUSTDESK_ALWAYS_USE_RELAY=Y
+
+# When the admin UI shows a device's unattended (per-boot) password.
+#   logged-out  only when nobody is logged in on the device (default)
+#   always      also while an interactive user is logged in
+#RUSTDESK_UNATTENDED_PWD_VISIBILITY=logged-out
+
+#RUST_LOG=info
+
+# --- Optional build source ---------------------------------------------------
+# Override the upstream repo / branch the image is built from.
+
+#RUSTDESK_GIT_URL=https://gitea.cstudio.ch/mike/rustdesk-server.git
+#RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH=pro-features
+
+# --- Database connectivity ---------------------------------------------------
+DATABASE_URL=sqlite://./db_v2.sqlite3
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+name: build
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [pro-features]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+env:
+  # Cargo.lock is lockfile v4, which requires Rust >= 1.78. Upstream's
+  # .github/workflows/build.yaml pins 1.90; mirror that here.
+  RUST_VERSION: "1.90"
+
+jobs:
+  build-amd64:
+    name: build-linux-amd64
+    # Same self-hosted runner as the rustdesk client build. provision.sh on the
+    # host installs the Rust toolchain and devscripts/debhelper used here.
+    runs-on: [self-hosted, Linux, X64, ubuntu-22.04]
+    timeout-minutes: 120
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout source
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          submodules: recursive
+
+      - name: Verify host toolchain
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          required=(git bash rustc cargo rustup pkg-config debuild dh dpkg-deb)
+          missing=()
+          for t in "${required[@]}"; do
+            if command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+              printf '%-20s %s\n' "$t" "$(command -v "$t")"
+            else
+              missing+=("$t")
+              printf '%-20s MISSING\n' "$t"
+            fi
+          done
+          if [[ ${#missing[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+            echo "Missing tools: ${missing[*]}. Install via: sudo apt install -y devscripts build-essential debhelper pkg-config"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - name: Read version from Cargo.toml
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          # Single source of truth: the top-level Cargo.toml's first `version =`
+          # line (hbbs package). debian/changelog is patched to match below so
+          # the produced .deb filenames carry the same version.
+          display=$(grep -m1 -E '^version[[:space:]]*=' Cargo.toml \
+                    | sed -E 's/^version[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*"([^"]+)".*/\1/')
+          [[ -n "$display" ]] || { echo "Could not read version from Cargo.toml"; exit 1; }
+          echo "Version : $display"
+          echo "VERSION_DISPLAY=$display" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
+      - name: Patch debian/changelog with display version
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          # The .deb filename is derived from the first changelog entry's
+          # parenthesized version, NOT from Cargo.toml. Rewrite whatever
+          # version is in the leading entry to match $VERSION_DISPLAY.
+          sed -i -E "0,/^rustdesk-server \([^)]+\)/{s/^rustdesk-server \([^)]+\)/rustdesk-server (${VERSION_DISPLAY})/}" debian/changelog
+          head -1 debian/changelog
+
+      - name: Ensure Rust toolchain configured
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          rustup toolchain install "$RUST_VERSION" --profile minimal --component rustfmt
+          rustup default "$RUST_VERSION"
+          rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+          rustc --version
+          cargo --version
+
+      - name: Build hbbs / hbbr / rustdesk-utils
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -e
+          # Native build for the runner's amd64 host. --all-features matches
+          # what upstream's GitHub workflow uses for its musl cross builds.
+          cargo build --release --all-features
+          mkdir -p debian-build/amd64/bin
+          cp -v target/release/hbbs           debian-build/amd64/bin/
+          cp -v target/release/hbbr           debian-build/amd64/bin/
+          cp -v target/release/rustdesk-utils debian-build/amd64/bin/
+          chmod -v a+x debian-build/amd64/bin/*
+
+      - name: Build .deb packages (amd64)
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -e
+          # Mirrors the deb-package job in upstream's .github/workflows/build.yaml:
+          # stage debian/ and systemd/ next to the pre-built bin/ tree, then run
+          # debuild -b so dh's auto_build step is a no-op (no source detected)
+          # and dh_install just packages the binaries listed in the .install files.
+          cp -vr debian systemd debian-build/amd64/
+          sed "s/{{ ARCH }}/amd64/" debian/control.tpl > debian-build/amd64/debian/control
+          (cd debian-build/amd64 && debuild -i -us -uc -b -aamd64)
+
+          mkdir -p ./SignOutput
+          mv -v ./debian-build/rustdesk-server-hbbs_${VERSION_DISPLAY}_amd64.deb   ./SignOutput/
+          mv -v ./debian-build/rustdesk-server-hbbr_${VERSION_DISPLAY}_amd64.deb   ./SignOutput/
+          mv -v ./debian-build/rustdesk-server-utils_${VERSION_DISPLAY}_amd64.deb  ./SignOutput/
+
+      - name: Report signing status of build artifacts
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          # .deb files are typically signed with debsign or via the apt repo
+          # signing pipeline, not the .deb itself. Just list contents for now.
+          for f in ./SignOutput/*.deb; do
+            [[ -f "$f" ]] || continue
+            size=$(stat -c%s "$f")
+            printf '[UNSIGNED] %s (%d bytes)\n' "$(basename "$f")" "$size"
+          done
+          echo "::warning title=Unsigned .deb::Wire up debsigs / repo signing before distributing."
+
+      - name: Upload artifacts
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+        with:
+          name: rustdesk-server-linux-amd64-${{ github.sha }}
+          path: SignOutput/rustdesk-server-*.deb
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 14
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 [submodule "libs/hbb_common"]
 	path = libs/hbb_common
-	url = https://github.com/rustdesk/hbb_common
+	url = https://gitea.cstudio.ch/mike/hbb_common.git
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-targets 0.52.6",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "base32"
+version = "0.5.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "022dfe9eb35f19ebbcb51e0b40a5ab759f46ad60cadf7297e0bd085afb50e076"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "base64"
 version = "0.13.0"
@@ -414,6 +420,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "toml 0.5.9",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "constant_time_eq"
+version = "0.3.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "7c74b8349d32d297c9134b8c88677813a227df8f779daa29bfc29c183fe3dca6"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "core-foundation"
 version = "0.9.4"
@@ -567,12 +579,13 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "digest"
-version = "0.10.3"
+version = "0.10.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f2fb860ca6fafa5552fb6d0e816a69c8e49f0908bf524e30a90d97c85892d506"
+checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
 dependencies = [
 "block-buffer",
 "crypto-common",
+ "subtle",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -668,6 +681,22 @@ version = "1.13.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "60b1af1c220855b6ceac025d3f6ecdd2b7c4894bfe9cd9bda4fbb4bc7c0d4cf0"

+[[package]]
+name = "email-encoding"
+version = "0.2.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a87260449b06739ee78d6281c68d2a0ff3e3af64a78df63d3a1aeb3c06997c8a"
+dependencies = [
+ "base64 0.22.1",
+ "memchr",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "email_address"
+version = "0.2.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e079f19b08ca6239f47f8ba8509c11cf3ea30095831f7fed61441475edd8c449"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "encoding_rs"
 version = "0.8.35"
@@ -1068,7 +1097,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "hbbs"
-version = "1.1.15"
+version = "1.1.17-pro"
 dependencies = [
 "async-speed-limit",
 "async-trait",
@@ -1084,15 +1113,18 @@ dependencies = [
 "hbb_common",
 "headers",
 "http",
+ "http-body",
 "ipnetwork",
 "jsonwebtoken",
 "lazy_static",
+ "lettre",
 "local-ip-address",
 "mac_address",
 "machine-uid 0.2.0",
 "minreq",
 "once_cell",
 "ping",
+ "qrcode",
 "regex",
 "reqwest",
 "rust-ini",
@@ -1101,7 +1133,11 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde_json",
 "sodiumoxide",
 "sqlx",
+ "tokio",
 "tokio-tungstenite",
+ "toml 0.7.8",
+ "totp-rs",
+ "tower",
 "tower-http",
 "tungstenite",
 "uuid",
@@ -1163,6 +1199,15 @@ version = "0.4.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7f24254aa9a54b5c858eaee2f5bccdb46aaf0e486a595ed5fd8f86ba55232a70"

+[[package]]
+name = "hmac"
+version = "0.12.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "6c49c37c09c17a53d937dfbb742eb3a961d65a994e6bcdcf37e7399d0cc8ab5e"
+dependencies = [
+ "digest",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "http"
 version = "0.2.7"
@@ -1294,6 +1339,16 @@ dependencies = [
 "unicode-normalization",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "idna"
+version = "0.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e14ddfc70884202db2244c223200c204c2bda1bc6e0998d11b5e024d657209e6"
+dependencies = [
+ "unicode-bidi",
+ "unicode-normalization",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "indexmap"
 version = "1.8.1"
@@ -1438,6 +1493,33 @@ version = "1.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "830d08ce1d1d941e6b30645f1a0eb5643013d835ce3779a5fc208261dbe10f55"

+[[package]]
+name = "lettre"
+version = "0.10.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "76bd09637ae3ec7bd605b8e135e757980b3968430ff2b1a4a94fb7769e50166d"
+dependencies = [
+ "async-trait",
+ "base64 0.21.7",
+ "email-encoding",
+ "email_address",
+ "fastrand",
+ "futures-io",
+ "futures-util",
+ "httpdate",
+ "idna 0.3.0",
+ "mime",
+ "nom 7.1.1",
+ "once_cell",
+ "quoted_printable",
+ "rustls 0.21.12",
+ "rustls-pemfile 1.0.0",
+ "socket2 0.4.4",
+ "tokio",
+ "tokio-rustls 0.24.1",
+ "webpki-roots 0.23.1",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "lexical-core"
 version = "0.7.6"
@@ -2056,6 +2138,12 @@ version = "0.4.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e9e1dcb320d6839f6edb64f7a4a59d39b30480d4d1765b56873f7c858538a5fe"

+[[package]]
+name = "qrcode"
+version = "0.14.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d68782463e408eb1e668cf6152704bd856c78c5b6417adaee3203d8f4c1fc9ec"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "quickcheck"
 version = "1.0.3"
@@ -2083,6 +2171,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2 1.0.93",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "quoted_printable"
+version = "0.4.8"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5a3866219251662ec3b26fc217e3e05bf9c4f84325234dfb96bf0bf840889e49"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rand"
 version = "0.8.5"
@@ -2404,6 +2498,16 @@ version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f87165f0995f63a9fbeea62b64d10b4d9d8e78ec6d7d51fb2125fda7bb36788f"

+[[package]]
+name = "rustls-webpki"
+version = "0.100.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5f6a5fc258f1c1276dfe3016516945546e2d5383911efc0fc4f1cdc5df3a4ae3"
+dependencies = [
+ "ring 0.16.20",
+ "untrusted 0.7.1",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rustls-webpki"
 version = "0.101.7"
@@ -2558,6 +2662,17 @@ dependencies = [
 "digest",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "sha1"
+version = "0.10.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e3bf829a2d51ab4a5ddf1352d8470c140cadc8301b2ae1789db023f01cedd6ba"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "cpufeatures",
+ "digest",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "sha2"
 version = "0.10.2"
@@ -3141,6 +3256,19 @@ dependencies = [
 "winnow",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "totp-rs"
+version = "5.7.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a2b36a9dd327e9f401320a2cb4572cc76ff43742bcfc3291f871691050f140ba"
+dependencies = [
+ "base32",
+ "constant_time_eq",
+ "hmac",
+ "sha1",
+ "sha2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "tower"
 version = "0.4.12"
@@ -3338,7 +3466,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a507c383b2d33b5fc35d1861e77e6b383d158b2da5e14fe51b83dfedf6fd578c"
 dependencies = [
 "form_urlencoded",
- "idna",
+ "idna 0.2.3",
 "matches",
 "percent-encoding",
 ]
@@ -3503,6 +3631,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "webpki",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "webpki-roots"
+version = "0.23.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b03058f88386e5ff5310d9111d53f48b17d732b401aeb83a8d5190f2ac459338"
+dependencies = [
+ "rustls-webpki 0.100.3",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "webpki-roots"
 version = "0.25.4"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "hbbs"
-version = "1.1.15"
+version = "1.1.17-pro"
 authors = ["rustdesk <info@rustdesk.com>"]
 edition = "2021"
 build = "build.rs"
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ path = "src/utils.rs"

 [dependencies]
 hbb_common = { path = "libs/hbb_common" }
+tokio = { version = "1", features = ["fs", "io-util"] }
+totp-rs = { version = "5.4", default-features = false }
+qrcode = { version = "0.14", default-features = false, features = ["svg"] }
+lettre = { version = "0.10", default-features = false, features = ["smtp-transport", "tokio1-rustls-tls", "builder"] }
+toml = "0.7"
 serde_derive = "1.0"
 serde = "1.0"
 serde_json = "1.0"
@@ -45,7 +50,9 @@ tokio-tungstenite = "0.17"
 tungstenite = "0.17"
 regex = "1.4"
 tower-http = { version = "0.3", features = ["fs", "trace", "cors"] }
+tower = { version = "0.4", features = ["util"] }
 http = "0.2"
+http-body = "0.4"
 flexi_logger = { version = "0.22", features = ["async", "use_chrono_for_offset", "dont_minimize_extra_stacks"] }
 ipnetwork = "0.20"
 local-ip-address = "0.5.1"
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8" />
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
+  <title>RustDesk &mdash; Connect</title>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/admin/connect/assets/bundle.css" />
+  <!--
+    The Rust handler at src/api/admin/pages/connect.rs replaces
+    {{CUSTOM_CONFIG}} with a JSON object the SPA reads on boot. Same
+    pattern as the deploy page and rustdesk.com/web/.
+  -->
+  <script id="custom-config" type="application/json">{{CUSTOM_CONFIG}}</script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div id="root"></div>
+  <script type="module" src="/admin/connect/assets/bundle.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="{{LANG_CODE}}" class="h-full">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8" />
+  <title>{{T_APP_TITLE}}</title>
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
+  <script src="/admin/assets/tailwindcss.js"></script>
+  <script src="/admin/assets/htmx.min.js"></script>
+  <style>
+    body { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", system-ui, sans-serif; }
+    .nav-link.active { background: rgb(15 23 42); color: rgb(125 211 252); }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body class="h-full bg-slate-950 text-slate-100">
+  <!--
+    Single-page shell. The sidebar drives navigation via HTMX:
+    each link does an `hx-get` of an HTML fragment URL that returns the
+    body of the page. The fragments live under /admin/pages/ and are
+    server-rendered Rust handlers that return Html<String>.
+    This keeps the UI a flat directory of static files plus a small
+    set of fragment endpoints — no SPA, no Node, no build step.
+  -->
+  <div class="min-h-full flex">
+    <aside class="w-56 shrink-0 bg-slate-900 border-r border-slate-800 flex flex-col">
+      <div class="px-4 py-5 border-b border-slate-800">
+        <h1 class="text-base font-semibold">{{T_APP_TITLE}}</h1>
+        <p id="me-display" class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1" hx-get="/admin/me" hx-trigger="load" hx-swap="innerHTML">…</p>
+      </div>
+      <nav class="flex-1 px-2 py-3 space-y-1">
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/users" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#users">{{T_NAV_USERS}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/devices" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#devices">{{T_NAV_DEVICES}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/groups" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#groups">{{T_NAV_GROUPS}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/strategies" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#strategies">{{T_NAV_STRATEGIES}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/address-books" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#address-books">{{T_NAV_AB}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/audit" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#audit">{{T_NAV_AUDIT}}</a>
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-300 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/deploy" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#deploy">{{T_NAV_DEPLOY}}</a>
+      </nav>
+      <div class="px-2 py-3 border-t border-slate-800 space-y-1">
+        <a class="nav-link block px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-400 hover:bg-slate-800"
+           hx-get="/admin/pages/profile" hx-target="#main" hx-push-url="#profile">{{T_NAV_PROFILE}}</a>
+        <button
+          class="w-full text-left px-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded text-slate-400 hover:bg-slate-800"
+          hx-post="/admin/logout"
+          hx-on::after-request="window.location.href = '/admin/login.html'"
+        >{{T_NAV_SIGNOUT}}</button>
+        <div class="pt-2">
+          <label class="block text-[10px] uppercase tracking-wide text-slate-600 px-3 mb-1">{{T_LANGUAGE}}</label>
+          <select
+            class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1 text-xs text-slate-300"
+            onchange="document.cookie='admin_lang='+this.value+'; path=/; max-age=31536000; samesite=strict'; window.location.reload();"
+          >
+            <option value="en"{{LANG_SEL_EN}}>English</option>
+            <option value="de"{{LANG_SEL_DE}}>Deutsch</option>
+            <option value="es"{{LANG_SEL_ES}}>Español</option>
+            <option value="fr"{{LANG_SEL_FR}}>Français</option>
+            <option value="ro"{{LANG_SEL_RO}}>Română</option>
+          </select>
+        </div>
+        <p class="text-[10px] text-slate-600 text-center pt-2">v{{APP_VERSION}}</p>
+      </div>
+    </aside>
+
+    <main id="main" class="flex-1 p-6 overflow-x-hidden">
+      <div class="text-slate-500 text-sm">{{T_LOADING}}</div>
+    </main>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- Toast container used by all admin handlers via hx-trigger="load delay:1s" -->
+  <div id="toast"
+       class="fixed bottom-4 right-4 max-w-sm space-y-2 pointer-events-none"></div>
+
+  <!-- Load fragment + highlight active link based on the URL hash.
+       Sub-routes like #users/new map to dedicated fragment URLs but
+       keep the parent section's nav-link highlighted. -->
+  <script>
+    // Hash → fragment URL for routes that aren't owned by a sidebar
+    // nav-link (e.g. forms on their own page). The first path segment
+    // also tells us which nav-link to highlight.
+    const SUB_ROUTES = {
+      '#users/new': '/admin/pages/users/new',
+    };
+    function topLevelHash(hash) {
+      const slash = hash.indexOf('/');
+      return slash === -1 ? hash : hash.slice(0, slash);
+    }
+    function linkForHash() {
+      const hash = location.hash || '#users';
+      const top = topLevelHash(hash);
+      return document.querySelector('.nav-link[hx-push-url="' + top + '"]')
+          || document.querySelector('.nav-link[hx-push-url="#users"]');
+    }
+    function refreshActive() {
+      const active = linkForHash();
+      document.querySelectorAll('.nav-link').forEach(a => {
+        a.classList.toggle('active', a === active);
+      });
+    }
+    // Dynamic deep-links: `#devices/<id>` and `#devices/<id>/exec`.
+    // The detail / exec fragments are designed to swap into the
+    // devices index page's `#devices-region` section, so when we
+    // land here from a page refresh we have to chain two ajax calls:
+    // first render the parent page (which provides `#devices-region`),
+    // then swap the fragment into it. htmx.ajax has returned a Promise
+    // since 1.9.4, so the `.then` chain is safe at our pinned 1.9.10.
+    const DEEP_LINK_PATTERNS = [
+      {
+        re: /^#devices\/([^/]+)\/exec$/,
+        parent: '/admin/pages/devices',
+        fragment: id => `/admin/pages/devices/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/exec`,
+      },
+      {
+        re: /^#devices\/([^/]+)$/,
+        parent: '/admin/pages/devices',
+        fragment: id => `/admin/pages/devices/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/detail`,
+      },
+    ];
+    function loadDeepLink(hash) {
+      for (const p of DEEP_LINK_PATTERNS) {
+        const m = hash.match(p.re);
+        if (!m) continue;
+        const id = decodeURIComponent(m[1]);
+        Promise.resolve(
+          htmx.ajax('GET', p.parent, { target: '#main', swap: 'innerHTML' })
+        ).then(() =>
+          htmx.ajax('GET', p.fragment(id), {
+            target: '#devices-region',
+            swap: 'innerHTML',
+          })
+        );
+        return true;
+      }
+      return false;
+    }
+    function loadFromHash() {
+      const hash = location.hash || '#users';
+      if (loadDeepLink(hash)) {
+        refreshActive();
+        return;
+      }
+      const subUrl = SUB_ROUTES[hash];
+      if (subUrl) {
+        htmx.ajax('GET', subUrl, { target: '#main', swap: 'innerHTML' });
+      } else {
+        const link = linkForHash();
+        if (link) {
+          htmx.ajax('GET', link.getAttribute('hx-get'),
+                    { target: '#main', swap: 'innerHTML' });
+        }
+      }
+      refreshActive();
+    }
+    window.addEventListener('hashchange', loadFromHash);
+    document.body.addEventListener('htmx:afterSwap', refreshActive);
+    loadFromHash();
+
+    // Bounce to login if any HTMX request comes back 401.
+    document.body.addEventListener('htmx:responseError', (evt) => {
+      if (evt.detail.xhr.status === 401) {
+        window.location.href = '/admin/login.html';
+      }
+    });
+
+    // Plain-link confirmation prompt. HTMX has hx-confirm for its own
+    // requests; this is the equivalent for raw `<a href>` anchors that
+    // can't go through HTMX (e.g. "Connect (web client)", which opens
+    // a new tab and triggers a popup on the controlled machine — easy
+    // to fire by accident from the row action menu). Use:
+    //
+    //   <a href="..." data-confirm="..." onclick="return confirmFromDataAttr(this)">
+    //
+    // The message lives in the data-attribute (only HTML-escaped, no
+    // JS-string escaping) which keeps the server-side renderer simple.
+    function confirmFromDataAttr(el) {
+      const msg = el && el.dataset ? el.dataset.confirm : '';
+      return !msg || window.confirm(msg);
+    }
+    window.confirmFromDataAttr = confirmFromDataAttr;
+
+    // Close any open per-row action popover when a click happens outside it.
+    // The action dropdowns are <details class="... relative"> with an
+    // absolutely-positioned panel; the deploy page uses <details> too but
+    // without `relative`, so the selector is specific to the popover style.
+    document.addEventListener('click', (e) => {
+      document.querySelectorAll('details.relative[open]').forEach(d => {
+        if (!d.contains(e.target)) d.removeAttribute('open');
+      });
+    });
+
+    // Read the current value of the users-search input (if present).
+    // Used by usersColumnToggle/usersPageSize so a column or page-size
+    // change preserves the active filter.
+    function usersSearchValue() {
+      const el = document.getElementById('users-search');
+      return el ? el.value : '';
+    }
+
+    // Users table column-visibility toggle. The popover in the page header
+    // emits checkboxes with onchange="usersColumnToggle(this)" — we POST
+    // the new state to the server (which persists it in user_prefs) and
+    // swap in the re-rendered table so the popover stays open.
+    function usersColumnToggle(input) {
+      const col = input.dataset.col;
+      if (!col) return;
+      htmx.ajax('POST', '/admin/pages/users/columns', {
+        target: '#users-region',
+        swap: 'innerHTML',
+        values: {
+          col: col,
+          visible: input.checked ? '1' : '0',
+          q: usersSearchValue(),
+        },
+      });
+    }
+    window.usersColumnToggle = usersColumnToggle;
+
+    // Users table per-page selector. Driven by the <select> in the
+    // pagination footer — POSTs to persist the choice and re-renders the
+    // table at page 1 (size change shifts which rows are on which page).
+    function usersPageSize(size) {
+      htmx.ajax('POST', '/admin/pages/users/page-size', {
+        target: '#users-region',
+        swap: 'innerHTML',
+        values: { size: size, q: usersSearchValue() },
+      });
+    }
+    window.usersPageSize = usersPageSize;
+
+    // Devices table — mirrors the users helpers above. Same persistence
+    // model (per-user prefs in `user_prefs`) and the same fragment-swap
+    // approach so the columns popover and search input stay put while
+    // pagination/columns/page-size all preserve the active filter.
+    function devicesSearchValue() {
+      const el = document.getElementById('devices-search');
+      return el ? el.value : '';
+    }
+    function devicesColumnToggle(input) {
+      const col = input.dataset.col;
+      if (!col) return;
+      htmx.ajax('POST', '/admin/pages/devices/columns', {
+        target: '#devices-region',
+        swap: 'innerHTML',
+        values: {
+          col: col,
+          visible: input.checked ? '1' : '0',
+          q: devicesSearchValue(),
+        },
+      });
+    }
+    window.devicesColumnToggle = devicesColumnToggle;
+    function devicesPageSize(size) {
+      htmx.ajax('POST', '/admin/pages/devices/page-size', {
+        target: '#devices-region',
+        swap: 'innerHTML',
+        values: { size: size, q: devicesSearchValue() },
+      });
+    }
+    window.devicesPageSize = devicesPageSize;
+
+    // The devices table lives inside an `overflow-x-auto` wrapper so wide
+    // column sets get a horizontal scrollbar instead of pushing the page
+    // out. CSS forces overflow-y to auto on the same axis, which would
+    // clip the per-row action popover (a `<details>` > `<div>` inside a
+    // <td>). On toggle we flip the popover to `position: fixed` and pin
+    // it to the summary's viewport rect so it escapes the scroll context.
+    // Inline `ontoggle=` is preserved across htmx swaps without re-binding.
+    function actionMenuToggle(details) {
+      const popover = details.querySelector('[data-action-menu]');
+      if (!popover) return;
+      if (!details.open) {
+        popover.style.position = '';
+        popover.style.top = '';
+        popover.style.left = '';
+        popover.style.right = '';
+        return;
+      }
+      const summary = details.querySelector('summary');
+      if (!summary) return;
+      const rect = summary.getBoundingClientRect();
+      popover.style.position = 'fixed';
+      popover.style.top = rect.bottom + 4 + 'px';
+      popover.style.right = (window.innerWidth - rect.right - 8) + 'px';
+      popover.style.left = 'auto';
+    }
+    window.actionMenuToggle = actionMenuToggle;
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="{{LANG_CODE}}" class="h-full">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8" />
+  <title>{{T_SIGNIN}} — {{T_TITLE}}</title>
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
+  <script src="/admin/assets/tailwindcss.js"></script>
+  <script src="/admin/assets/htmx.min.js"></script>
+  <style>
+    body { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", system-ui, sans-serif; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body class="h-full bg-slate-950 text-slate-100 flex items-center justify-center">
+  <main class="w-full max-w-sm px-6">
+    <div class="text-center mb-8">
+      <h1 class="text-2xl font-semibold">{{T_TITLE}}</h1>
+      <p class="text-slate-400 text-sm mt-1">{{T_SUBTITLE}}</p>
+    </div>
+
+    <form
+      class="space-y-4 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-800 rounded-lg p-6 shadow-xl"
+      hx-post="/admin/login"
+      hx-target="#err"
+      hx-swap="innerHTML"
+      hx-on::before-swap="
+        /* The auth handler returns 401 with an HTML error fragment for
+           bad credentials / disabled / not-admin / bad-TOTP. HTMX skips
+           the swap on 4xx by default, so force it back on. */
+        if (event.detail.xhr.status >= 400 && event.detail.xhr.status < 500) {
+          event.detail.shouldSwap = true;
+          event.detail.isError = false;
+        }
+      "
+      hx-on::after-request="
+        const xhr = event.detail.xhr;
+        if (event.detail.successful && (xhr.responseText || '').trim() === '') {
+          /* Empty 2xx body = real login. The TOTP-required path returns 2xx
+             with an HTML prompt fragment, which we MUST NOT redirect away
+             from. */
+          window.location.href = '/admin/';
+        }
+      "
+    >
+      <div>
+        <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="username">{{T_USERNAME}}</label>
+        <input
+          id="username" name="username" type="text" required autocomplete="username"
+          class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500"
+        />
+      </div>
+
+      <div>
+        <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="password">{{T_PASSWORD}}</label>
+        <input
+          id="password" name="password" type="password" required autocomplete="current-password"
+          class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500"
+        />
+      </div>
+
+      <div id="tfa-section" class="hidden">
+        <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="tfaCode">{{T_TOTP_LABEL}}</label>
+        <input
+          id="tfaCode" name="tfaCode" type="text" inputmode="numeric" pattern="[0-9]{6}" maxlength="6" autocomplete="one-time-code"
+          class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm tracking-widest text-center focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500"
+        />
+        <input id="secret" name="secret" type="hidden" />
+      </div>
+
+      <button
+        type="submit"
+        class="w-full bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 text-white text-sm font-medium rounded px-4 py-2 transition"
+      >
+        {{T_SIGNIN}}
+      </button>
+
+      <div id="err" class="text-sm text-rose-400 min-h-[1.25em]"></div>
+    </form>
+
+    <!-- OIDC providers (rendered only when /admin/oidc/providers is non-empty) -->
+    <div id="oidc-block" class="mt-6 hidden">
+      <div class="flex items-center gap-3 mb-3">
+        <div class="flex-1 h-px bg-slate-800"></div>
+        <span class="text-xs text-slate-500">{{T_OR}}</span>
+        <div class="flex-1 h-px bg-slate-800"></div>
+      </div>
+      <div id="oidc-buttons" class="space-y-2"></div>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="mt-6 text-center">
+      <label class="text-[10px] uppercase tracking-wide text-slate-600 mr-2">{{T_LANGUAGE}}</label>
+      <select
+        class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1 text-xs text-slate-300"
+        onchange="document.cookie='admin_lang='+this.value+'; path=/; max-age=31536000; samesite=strict'; window.location.reload();"
+      >
+        <option value="en"{{LANG_SEL_EN}}>English</option>
+        <option value="de"{{LANG_SEL_DE}}>Deutsch</option>
+        <option value="es"{{LANG_SEL_ES}}>Español</option>
+        <option value="fr"{{LANG_SEL_FR}}>Français</option>
+        <option value="ro"{{LANG_SEL_RO}}>Română</option>
+      </select>
+    </div>
+    <p class="mt-4 text-center text-[10px] text-slate-600">v{{APP_VERSION}}</p>
+  </main>
+
+  <script>
+    // Fetch enabled providers and render one button each. The button just
+    // navigates to /admin/login/oidc/<name>, which 302s the browser to the
+    // IdP. After the IdP redirects to /oidc/callback, the server sets our
+    // session cookie and redirects to /admin/.
+    var SIGNIN_WITH = {{T_SIGNIN_WITH_JSON}};
+    fetch('/admin/oidc/providers').then(r => r.json()).then(list => {
+      if (!Array.isArray(list) || list.length === 0) return;
+      const block = document.getElementById('oidc-block');
+      const root  = document.getElementById('oidc-buttons');
+      list.forEach(p => {
+        const a = document.createElement('a');
+        a.href = '/admin/login/oidc/' + encodeURIComponent(p.name);
+        a.className = 'block w-full text-center bg-slate-800 hover:bg-slate-700 border border-slate-700 text-sm rounded px-4 py-2 transition';
+        a.textContent = SIGNIN_WITH + ' ' + (p.display_name || p.name);
+        root.appendChild(a);
+      });
+      block.classList.remove('hidden');
+    }).catch(() => { /* silently hide block on any error */ });
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-rustdesk-server (1.1.15) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+rustdesk-server (1.1.17-pro) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Fix: 127.0.0.1 is not loopback (#515)
  * Higher default bandwidth
@@ -1,21 +1,72 @@
-version: '3'
+# Builds a minimal debian image that, on every container start, pulls the
+# hbbs/hbbr/utils .deb from a Gitea Actions artifact and installs it before
+# launching the binary. Both services share the same image; only the command
+# differs.
+#
+# The .deb is fetched at runtime (not build time), so `docker compose up`
+# always picks up the newest successful run on $GITEA_BRANCH. To pin a
+# specific zip and skip auto-discovery, set ARTIFACT_URL in your shell or
+# .env, e.g.:
+#   ARTIFACT_URL=https://gitea.cstudio.ch/mike/rustdesk-server/actions/runs/173/artifacts/rustdesk-server-linux-amd64-1e961cdd929f7af97148b76d9de79998a89402a3 \
+#     docker compose up -d
+#

 networks:
  rustdesk-net:
    external: false

+# The image only needs to bundle curl/jq/unzip/tini/dpkg + the fetch scripts —
+# no build args required. The actual .deb download happens at container start
+# (see docker/entrypoint.sh), driven by the env vars in x-rustdesk-env below.
+x-rustdesk-build: &rustdesk-build
+  context: ./docker
+  dockerfile: Dockerfile.deb
+
+# Runtime env. Two groups:
+#   1) Artifact-fetch config consumed by entrypoint.sh on every container
+#      start — set ARTIFACT_URL to pin a specific zip, otherwise the script
+#      picks the newest successful run on $GITEA_BRANCH.
+#   2) hbbs/hbbr knobs. Most settings (relay, bootstrap admin, key, http
+#      port) are passed via CLI flags below — the binary's env-var
+#      convention transforms `--foo-bar` into `FOO-BAR` (literal dashes,
+#      uppercase), which is awkward in YAML, so flags are clearer.
+x-rustdesk-env: &rustdesk-env
+  GITEA_URL: "${GITEA_URL:-https://gitea.cstudio.ch}"
+  GITEA_OWNER: "${GITEA_OWNER:-mike}"
+  GITEA_REPO: "${GITEA_REPO:-rustdesk-server}"
+  GITEA_BRANCH: "${GITEA_BRANCH:-pro-features}"
+  ARTIFACT_URL: "${ARTIFACT_URL:-}"
+  RUST_LOG: "${RUST_LOG:-info}"
+  # Force relay for all sessions even on LAN. Uncomment to enable.
+  # ALWAYS_USE_RELAY: "Y"
+  # Override DB path. Default: ./db_v2.sqlite3 in WORKDIR
+  # (= /var/lib/rustdesk-server/db_v2.sqlite3 in this image).
+  # DB_URL: "/var/lib/rustdesk-server/db_v2.sqlite3"
+
 services:
  hbbs:
    container_name: hbbs
+    build: *rustdesk-build
+    image: rustdesk-server-cst:latest
+    platform: linux/amd64
+    command:
+      - hbbs
+      - --bootstrap-admin-username=${RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME:-admin}
+      - --bootstrap-admin-password=${RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-changeme}
+      # - --key=-                # "-" auto-generates a key; "_" forces encrypted-only with no explicit key
+      # - --http-port=21114      # admin HTTP API/UI port; 0 disables
+      # When the admin UI shows a device's unattended password.
+      # logged-out (default) = only when nobody is logged in; always = also while a user is logged in.
+      - --unattended-pwd-visibility=${RUSTDESK_UNATTENDED_PWD_VISIBILITY:-logged-out}
+    environment: *rustdesk-env
    ports:
+      - 21114:21114
      - 21115:21115
      - 21116:21116
      - 21116:21116/udp
      - 21118:21118
-    image: rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest
-    command: hbbs -r rustdesk.example.com:21117
    volumes:
-      - ./data:/root
+      - ./data:/var/lib/rustdesk-server
    networks:
      - rustdesk-net
    depends_on:
@@ -24,13 +75,19 @@ services:

  hbbr:
    container_name: hbbr
+    # Same build + image tag as hbbs — compose builds once and both reuse it.
+    build: *rustdesk-build
+    image: rustdesk-server-cst:latest
+    platform: linux/amd64
+    command:
+      - hbbr
+      # - --key=-                # match the key set on hbbs (if any)
+    environment: *rustdesk-env
    ports:
      - 21117:21117
      - 21119:21119
-    image: rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest
-    command: hbbr
    volumes:
-      - ./data:/root
+      - ./data:/var/lib/rustdesk-server
    networks:
      - rustdesk-net
    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Minimal debian image with the tooling needed to download + install the
+# hbbs/hbbr/rustdesk-utils .deb at *container start* (not build time).
+# The actual fetch happens in /usr/local/sbin/entrypoint.sh, which calls
+# fetch-artifact.sh on every start — see docker-compose.yml for the runtime
+# env vars (GITEA_URL, GITEA_OWNER, GITEA_REPO, GITEA_BRANCH, ARTIFACT_URL).
+#
+# The Gitea workflow only produces amd64 .debs, so pin the image platform.
+# On non-amd64 hosts (e.g. Apple Silicon) Docker will emulate via qemu.
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 debian:bookworm-slim
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        ca-certificates curl jq unzip tini \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+COPY fetch-artifact.sh /usr/local/sbin/fetch-artifact.sh
+COPY entrypoint.sh     /usr/local/sbin/entrypoint.sh
+RUN chmod +x /usr/local/sbin/fetch-artifact.sh /usr/local/sbin/entrypoint.sh
+
+WORKDIR /var/lib/rustdesk-server
+
+# 21114 admin http, 21115 nat test, 21116/tcp+udp signal, 21117 relay,
+# 21118 web socket signal, 21119 web socket relay.
+EXPOSE 21114 21115 21116 21116/udp 21117 21118 21119
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/tini", "--", "/usr/local/sbin/entrypoint.sh"]
+CMD ["hbbs"]
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Multi-stage build: clones rustdesk-server from a Git remote and builds the
+# hbbs / hbbr / rustdesk-utils binaries from source.
+#
+# Build args:
+#   RUSTDESK_GIT_URL    Git URL to clone (default: gitea.cstudio.ch fork)
+#   RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH Branch / tag / ref to check out (default: pro-features)
+#   RUST_VERSION        Rust toolchain image tag (default: 1-bookworm)
+
+ARG RUST_VERSION=1-bookworm
+
+FROM rust:${RUST_VERSION} AS builder
+
+ARG RUSTDESK_GIT_URL=https://gitea.cstudio.ch/mike/rustdesk-server.git
+ARG RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH=pro-features
+# sqlx::query! macros verify SQL at compile time against the checked-in
+# db_v2.sqlite3. Override only if you point cargo at a different DB.
+ARG DATABASE_URL=
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates pkg-config cmake \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+WORKDIR /src
+
+RUN git clone --recurse-submodules --shallow-submodules \
+        --branch "${RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH}" --single-branch \
+        "${RUSTDESK_GIT_URL}" .
+
+RUN if [ -n "${DATABASE_URL}" ]; then export DATABASE_URL="${DATABASE_URL}"; fi \
+ && cargo build --release --bins
+
+# Runtime stage
+FROM debian:bookworm-slim
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates tini \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+COPY --from=builder /src/target/release/hbbs           /usr/local/bin/hbbs
+COPY --from=builder /src/target/release/hbbr           /usr/local/bin/hbbr
+COPY --from=builder /src/target/release/rustdesk-utils /usr/local/bin/rustdesk-utils
+COPY --from=builder /src/admin_ui                       /opt/rustdesk/admin_ui
+
+WORKDIR /root
+EXPOSE 21114 21115 21116 21116/udp 21117 21118 21119
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/tini", "--"]
+CMD ["hbbs"]
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runtime entrypoint: pulls the latest .deb artifact from Gitea Actions and
+# installs it on every container start, then execs the CMD (hbbs / hbbr).
+#
+# Configuration comes from the environment — see docker-compose.yml:
+#   ARTIFACT_URL    pinned zip URL; if unset the script discovers the newest
+#                   successful run on GITEA_BRANCH
+#   GITEA_URL, GITEA_OWNER, GITEA_REPO, GITEA_BRANCH
+#                   required when ARTIFACT_URL is unset
+#
+# Container fails to start if the fetch fails — that's intentional: we always
+# want a fresh artifact, never a stale one.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+/usr/local/sbin/fetch-artifact.sh
+
+exec "$@"
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Fetches a Gitea Actions artifact zip and installs every .deb inside.
+#
+# Two modes:
+#   1. $ARTIFACT_URL is set → download that zip directly.
+#   2. Otherwise → discover the newest successful run on $GITEA_BRANCH via the
+#      `/api/v1/.../actions/tasks` endpoint and download
+#      `<run.url>/artifacts/<ARTIFACT_PREFIX><head_sha>`. We use the web
+#      download URL rather than `/api/v1/.../actions/artifacts`, which on this
+#      Gitea instance returns an empty list even when uploads have succeeded.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ARTIFACT_URL="${ARTIFACT_URL:-}"
+ARTIFACT_PREFIX="${ARTIFACT_PREFIX:-rustdesk-server-linux-amd64-}"
+
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
+
+if [[ -n "$ARTIFACT_URL" ]]; then
+  zip_url="$ARTIFACT_URL"
+  echo "==> Using pinned ARTIFACT_URL: $zip_url"
+else
+  : "${GITEA_URL:?GITEA_URL required when ARTIFACT_URL is unset}"
+  : "${GITEA_OWNER:?GITEA_OWNER required when ARTIFACT_URL is unset}"
+  : "${GITEA_REPO:?GITEA_REPO required when ARTIFACT_URL is unset}"
+  : "${GITEA_BRANCH:?GITEA_BRANCH required when ARTIFACT_URL is unset}"
+
+  api="${GITEA_URL%/}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_OWNER}/${GITEA_REPO}"
+  echo "==> Listing workflow runs at $api/actions/tasks (branch=$GITEA_BRANCH)"
+  list="$(curl -fsSL "$api/actions/tasks?limit=20")"
+
+  # Newest successful run on $GITEA_BRANCH. The .url field is the html run
+  # page (e.g. .../actions/runs/173) — append /artifacts/<name> for the zip.
+  read -r run_url head_sha < <(jq -r --arg branch "$GITEA_BRANCH" '
+    .workflow_runs
+    | map(select(.head_branch == $branch and .status == "success"))
+    | sort_by(.updated_at)
+    | last
+    | if . == null then "" else "\(.url) \(.head_sha)" end
+  ' <<<"$list")
+
+  if [[ -z "${run_url:-}" || "$run_url" == "null" ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: no successful run on branch '$GITEA_BRANCH'." >&2
+    jq -r '.workflow_runs[] | "  url=\(.url) branch=\(.head_branch) status=\(.status) updated=\(.updated_at)"' <<<"$list" >&2 || true
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  zip_url="$run_url/artifacts/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}${head_sha}"
+  echo "==> Discovered $zip_url"
+fi
+
+echo "==> Downloading $zip_url"
+curl -fsSL -o "$work/artifact.zip" "$zip_url"
+
+mkdir -p "$work/deb"
+unzip -o "$work/artifact.zip" -d "$work/deb"
+mapfile -t debs < <(find "$work/deb" -type f -name '*.deb' | sort)
+if [[ ${#debs[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+  echo "ERROR: artifact zip contained no .deb files" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+printf '   - %s\n' "${debs[@]}"
+
+# Postinst scripts call deb-systemd-invoke/systemctl; block them from starting
+# anything while we're inside a build layer.
+echo '#!/bin/sh' >/usr/sbin/policy-rc.d
+echo 'exit 101'  >>/usr/sbin/policy-rc.d
+chmod +x /usr/sbin/policy-rc.d
+
+# The .debs declare "Depends: systemd", which would drag full systemd into the
+# image. The binaries themselves don't need it at runtime — only the bundled
+# .service files reference it — so install with --force-depends.
+dpkg -i --force-depends "${debs[@]}"
+
+rm -f /usr/sbin/policy-rc.d
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+# Agent API authentication
+
+Reference for the per-device signature gate on the agent-facing HTTP
+API. Seven endpoints are gated:
+
+- `POST /api/heartbeat`
+- `POST /api/sysinfo`
+- `POST /api/unattended-password`
+- `POST /api/agent/exec-result` — managed-only (no legacy/unsigned path)
+- `POST /api/agent/login-event` — user-logon / logoff events observed
+  by the agent. Same TOFU lifecycle as heartbeat / sysinfo: stock
+  RustDesk doesn't post here at all, so in practice every caller is a
+  managed agent; the legacy/unsigned path is kept for symmetry.
+- `POST /api/agent/metrics` — continuous CPU / memory / top-process
+  samples (≈1 / minute). Surfaced on the admin Devices detail page as
+  a 24 h sparkline + live snapshot card.
+- `POST /api/agent/perf-events` — sparse Windows-event-log entries
+  flagged by `Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-Performance/Operational`,
+  `Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-Detector/Operational`, and
+  hand-picked `System` IDs (41 / 6008 / 1001 — unexpected reboot /
+  dirty shutdown / BSOD). Server dedups via UNIQUE (peer_id, provider,
+  record_id).
+
+For the operator workflow — turning it on, the dashboard toggle, what
+happens when a managed agent is uninstalled — see the matching section
+in [CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md).
+
+## Why this exists
+
+All three endpoints originally accepted any caller who supplied an `id`
+and `uuid` in the JSON body. Knowing those two values (plaintext on the
+device, sent over the rendezvous wire) was enough to inject arbitrary
+inventory or heartbeat state for that device — including BIOS serials,
+BitLocker recovery keys, the active console user, network interfaces,
+connection lists, and the per-boot unattended-access password the
+admin UI surfaces to support staff.
+
+The fix reuses the Ed25519 keypair that the agent **already** generates
+on first run and registers with the rendezvous server via `RegisterPk`.
+Every signed HTTP request is verified against the public key the
+rendezvous handshake stored in `peer.pk`, so the trust root is the same
+one the relay encryption already depends on. No new credential to
+provision, no new secret to leak.
+
+## Trust root
+
+```
+First run                Rendezvous (port 21116, TCP/protobuf)
+  agent generates sk,pk  ───── RegisterPk(id, pk) ─────►  server stores
+  in hello-agent.toml                                      peer.pk
+
+Every subsequent request                HTTP API (port 21114)
+  agent signs body                                         server verifies sig
+  with sk     ───── POST /api/heartbeat            ─────►  against peer.pk
+              ───── POST /api/sysinfo              ─────►  (when peer.managed=1)
+              ───── POST /api/unattended-password  ─────►
+              ───── POST /api/agent/exec-result    ─────►  (always required)
+```
+
+The same secret key signs both the rendezvous identity proof and the
+HTTP-API payload — there's only one credential per device.
+
+## Per-peer `managed` flag
+
+The gate is per-device, controlled by the `peer.managed` column
+(`INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`, added by a soft `ALTER` at startup).
+
+| `managed` | Server behaviour                                                                 |
+|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `0`       | Legacy path. Signed requests are still verified if present, but absence is OK.   |
+| `1`       | Signature required. Any unsigned request claiming this `id` returns 401.         |
+
+How the flag transitions:
+
+- **TOFU promote (0 → 1).** The first request that arrives with a valid
+  signature flips `managed` to 1. Hello-agent signs from boot one, so
+  the first heartbeat after a hello-agent install transparently locks
+  the peer down. No admin action required.
+- **Admin promote (0 → 1).** `PUT /api/peers/:id/managed {"managed":true}`
+  or the **Require signed API** action in the dashboard's Devices row
+  menu. Useful for pre-enrolling a peer record before the agent has
+  posted anything.
+- **Admin downgrade (1 → 0).** Same endpoint, `{"managed":false}`, or
+  **Allow unsigned API** in the dashboard. Use when the managed agent
+  has been replaced with stock RustDesk on that device. The dashboard
+  toggle requires a confirm because the operation reopens the
+  spoofing surface.
+- **Never auto-downgraded.** A failed signature on a `managed=1` peer
+  is a 401, full stop — there is no "fall back to unsigned" path.
+- **Invalid sig on a `managed=0` peer is also 401**, never silently
+  treated as legacy. This prevents an attacker from probing for the
+  legacy path by deliberately sending a broken signature.
+
+## Wire format
+
+A signed agent request carries two headers in addition to the JSON body:
+
+```
+X-RD-Device-Id: <id>
+X-RD-Signature: v1.<unix_ts>.<base64(ed25519_sig)>
+```
+
+The signed message is the byte concatenation:
+
+```
+"rd-api-v1\n" || METHOD || "\n" || PATH || "\n" || TS || "\n" || sha256(BODY)
+```
+
+Where:
+
+- `METHOD` is the uppercase HTTP method (`POST`).
+- `PATH` is the request path with leading slash and no query string
+  (`/api/heartbeat`, `/api/sysinfo`, `/api/unattended-password`).
+- `TS` is the same decimal Unix timestamp that appears in the header.
+- `sha256(BODY)` is the raw 32-byte SHA-256 of the request body — *not*
+  hex-encoded, *not* base64-encoded. It is concatenated as binary.
+- The signature is detached Ed25519 over that 32-byte-plus-prefix
+  message, base64-encoded with the standard alphabet and no
+  URL-safe substitutions.
+
+The `v1.` prefix on the header value reserves a rotation point. The
+server rejects any other version string.
+
+### Why this shape
+
+- **Domain separator (`rd-api-v1\n`)** prevents the same `sk` being
+  tricked into signing data interpretable as another protocol.
+- **Method + path** stop a captured `POST /api/sysinfo` signature from
+  being replayed as some future `POST /api/disconnect`.
+- **`sha256(body)`** lets us sign without holding the body twice in
+  memory on the verify side, and survives any future proxy
+  re-chunking.
+- **Timestamp in both the header and the signed message** makes the
+  skew check trivial without re-parsing the signature value.
+
+## Server-side verification
+
+The extractor [`api::device_auth::verify`](../src/api/device_auth.rs)
+runs before each agent handler:
+
+1. **Parse headers.** Both `X-RD-Device-Id` and `X-RD-Signature` must
+   be present, or both absent. Mixed states are 401.
+2. **Validate the signature envelope.** Version must be `v1`. The
+   timestamp must be within ±300 seconds of the server's clock. The
+   base64 decode must succeed.
+3. **Replay-check.** A keyed-by-`(id, ts, sig-prefix)` LRU cache (size
+   16 384, sliding 600-second TTL, sweep-on-insert) rejects exact
+   replays inside the window. If the cache is full, we accept and skip
+   the cache — DoS-by-cache-exhaustion is uninteresting compared to
+   the rest of the surface.
+4. **Look up `peer.pk` and `peer.managed`** in one query.
+5. **Verify the detached Ed25519 signature** against the canonical
+   signed-message bytes (see *Wire format* above).
+6. **TOFU promote.** A valid signature on a `managed=0` peer flips the
+   flag to 1 in the same request. The promote is best-effort — if the
+   DB write fails, the original request is still served, the next
+   heartbeat will retry.
+7. **Bind the trusted id to the body.** After the handler parses JSON,
+   the body's `id` field must match the header's `X-RD-Device-Id`.
+   Mismatch is 401 — this is the gate that stops a signed request from
+   being repurposed to write to a different peer's row.
+
+If no signature headers are present and the peer is `managed=0`, the
+verifier returns `LegacyUnsigned`; the handler then calls
+`enforce_managed_for_id(body.id)` after parsing the body, which still
+rejects unsigned requests for any *other* peer that has since become
+managed.
+
+## Agent-side signing
+
+The signer is one small module: [`vendor/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/sign.rs`](https://example.invalid/sign.rs)
+in the hello-agent vendor tree. It reads the existing
+`Config::get_key_pair()` (returns `(sk, pk)` from `hello-agent.toml`)
+and the existing `Config::get_id()`, builds the canonical message, and
+calls `sodiumoxide::crypto::sign::sign_detached`. Returns the two
+header lines joined by `\n`, ready for the multi-header parser in
+`common.rs::post_request_`.
+
+The agent always tries to sign. If the keypair hasn't been generated
+yet (extremely early boot, before rendezvous has run), the signer
+returns `None`, the request goes out unsigned, and:
+
+- If `peer.managed=0`: server accepts it (legacy path).
+- If `peer.managed=1`: server returns 401, the agent's next heartbeat
+  retries.
+
+This is the only condition under which a hello-agent build sends an
+unsigned request, and it self-resolves on the next sync tick.
+
+## Operational gotchas
+
+- **Stock RustDesk clients keep working** because they post unsigned
+  and their peer rows stay at `managed=0`. The first time you install
+  hello-agent on a device, the existing `peer.pk` row gets reused (the
+  agent re-generated a keypair iff `hello-agent.toml` was wiped). The
+  first signed heartbeat then promotes the row.
+- **`hello-agent --uninstall` preserves the keypair.** A reinstall is
+  transparent — signing keeps working.
+- **Wiping `hello-agent.toml` between sessions** does mean the next
+  boot generates a new keypair. The rendezvous server will treat that
+  as a key roll (`register_pk of … due to key not confirmed`) and
+  store the new `pk`. The signed HTTP API picks up the new key as soon
+  as that rendezvous step completes — usually within a few seconds.
+  See [the stale-key recovery note in hello-agent's README](https://example.invalid/README.md)
+  for the supporter-side symptoms of a key drift.
+- **Clock skew over ±5 minutes** will reject signatures. If your
+  fleet shows scattered 401s on heartbeat, check NTP on the affected
+  hosts. The server side is the canonical clock.
+- **Replay cache survives only inside a single hbbs process.** A
+  restart clears it. Combined with the 300-second skew window this
+  means a captured signature is replayable across a restart if and
+  only if both restarts happen inside that window — an acceptable
+  trade-off for keeping the cache in-memory.
+- **One server, mixed fleet.** Stock clients and hello-agent clients
+  can target the same hbbs without any flag-level config. The gate is
+  per-peer.
+
+## Failure modes & log lines
+
+| Symptom                                                                 | Likely cause                                                                                  |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Heartbeats from a known peer suddenly return 401                        | Peer was just promoted (TOFU or admin) and the agent build doesn't sign yet → upgrade agent.  |
+| Heartbeats fail intermittently with 401                                 | Clock skew > 5 min, or NAT churn replaying a captured request inside the window.              |
+| `peer X TOFU-promoted to managed=1` in hbbs log                         | Normal — first valid signature from a previously-unsigned peer.                               |
+| `admin <user> set peer X managed=<bool> via dashboard`                  | Normal — operator used the Devices toggle.                                                    |
+| `peer_set_managed(X) failed: …`                                         | DB write failed during TOFU promote. The request was still served; next request will retry.   |
+| Admin row shows **Unsigned** for a peer running hello-agent             | Agent hasn't completed its first signed POST yet (keypair race), or it's running a build      |
+|                                                                         | that pre-dates the signing patch — check `vendor/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/sign.rs` is present.  |
+
+## Remote PowerShell exec
+
+Layered on top of the signature gate. An admin in the dashboard sends a
+script to a peer; the agent runs it as its service account; output and
+exit code come back into the dashboard within ~1 s (the heartbeat
+interval).
+
+### Three independent gates
+
+A dispatch must pass **all three** server-side checks before a row is
+queued — the agent never sees a script it shouldn't have:
+
+1. **`AuthedUser.is_admin`** — only admins can dispatch.
+2. **`peer.managed = 1`** — the same flag the signed-API gate uses.
+   This means TOFU has already promoted the peer (or an admin explicitly
+   flipped it). Stock RustDesk clients are uninvited.
+3. **Strategy `enable-remote-exec = "Y"`** — the resolved strategy for
+   the peer must explicitly opt in. Defaults to off. Set it on a strategy,
+   assign the strategy to the peer (or its group / owner), exec is now
+   live for that scope. *Server-side only — the key is never pushed to
+   the client.* See [STRATEGIES.md](STRATEGIES.md).
+
+### Wire path
+
+```
+Admin UI ──POST /admin/pages/devices/:id/exec──► Server inserts exec_history(status='queued')
+                                                              │
+                                                              ▼
+                              Agent's next heartbeat reply carries `exec: [{cmd_id, script, max_secs, max_bytes}]`;
+                              the server flips the row to 'running' atomically (exec_pop_queued_for_peer).
+                                                              │
+                                                              ▼
+                              Agent runs `powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command -`,
+                              writes the script to stdin, captures stdout+stderr up to 1 MiB, kills on 5-minute wall clock.
+                                                              │
+                                                              ▼
+Admin UI ◄──poll /admin/pages/devices/:id/exec/:cmd_id/poll── Server ◄──POST /api/agent/exec-result (signed)── Agent
+```
+
+### Limits
+
+| Setting        | Default | Where                                                      |
+|----------------|--------:|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Script size    | 32 KiB  | `src/api/admin/pages/exec.rs::MAX_SCRIPT_BYTES`            |
+| Wall-clock     |   300 s | `src/api/heartbeat.rs::EXEC_MAX_SECS` (sent to agent)      |
+| Output capture |  1 MiB  | `src/api/heartbeat.rs::EXEC_MAX_BYTES` (sent to agent)     |
+| In-flight/peer |       1 | `exec_in_flight_count > 0` blocks new dispatch             |
+
+The agent enforces wall-clock and output-capture locally — server caps
+are advisory unless you also harden the agent. If you don't trust your
+own agent build, the server caps still bound storage and replay-cost.
+
+### Result POST authentication
+
+`POST /api/agent/exec-result` is the only agent endpoint that **always**
+requires a signature, even when the peer happens to be `managed=0`.
+There's no legacy compatibility story for exec — if the agent can't
+sign, the result POST is rejected outright and the row sits in `running`
+until an admin notices. Reason: an attacker who can spoof `(id, uuid)`
+shouldn't be able to forge "I executed your command and here's the
+output" for a device they don't actually control.
+
+### Operational notes
+
+- **The dispatch row stays `running` until the agent posts a result.**
+  If the agent crashes mid-script there's no automatic timeout cleanup
+  yet (planned: a hourly task that flips long-stuck `running` rows to
+  `errored`). Admins can dispatch a fresh command after the in-flight
+  one ages past 5 minutes by waiting; the in-flight check is wall-clock
+  based on `issued_at`.
+- **Output may contain secrets.** A `Get-Content` of a credential file
+  goes straight into the `exec_history` table and the admin UI. The
+  current schema has no per-row access control beyond "is_admin"; if
+  you need finer scoping, audit log retention plus your `users` table
+  ACL is the only knob.
+- **No interactive REPL yet.** Each dispatch is one shot: write script,
+  run, read result. Multi-command sessions or interactive prompts
+  (Read-Host, sudo-style passwords) will hang and time out. This is by
+  design for v1 — Option B in the original architecture discussion.
+
+## File map
+
+Server:
+
+| Path                                      | Purpose                                                          |
+|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `src/api/device_auth.rs`                  | The verifier (extractor + replay cache + TOFU promote).          |
+| `src/api/heartbeat.rs`, `src/api/sysinfo.rs`, `src/api/unattended.rs` | Wired to call `verify` then `enforce_managed_for_id`.    |
+| `src/api/agent_exec.rs`                   | `POST /api/agent/exec-result` (sig-required, no legacy path).    |
+| `src/api/peers.rs::set_managed`           | `PUT /api/peers/:id/managed` admin endpoint.                     |
+| `src/api/admin/pages/devices.rs::toggle_managed` | Dashboard action handler.                                 |
+| `src/api/admin/pages/exec.rs`             | Per-device exec page (form + history + HTMX poll fragment).      |
+| `src/api/strategy/mod.rs::allows_remote_exec` | Resolves the per-peer strategy and reads `enable-remote-exec`. |
+| `src/database.rs::M2_SOFT_ALTERS`         | `ALTER TABLE peer ADD COLUMN managed`.                           |
+| `src/database.rs::M5_SCHEMA`              | `CREATE TABLE exec_history` + indexes.                           |
+| `src/database.rs::peer_get_auth, peer_set_managed` | DB helpers (untyped `sqlx::query` so they survive the no-DB-migrated dev build). |
+| `src/database.rs::exec_create, exec_pop_queued_for_peer, exec_finish, exec_get_by_cmd_id, exec_in_flight_count, exec_list_for_peer` | Exec lifecycle helpers. |
+
+Agent — hello-agent vendor tree:
+
+| Path                                                       | Purpose                                                       |
+|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `vendor/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/sign.rs`                    | The signer.                                                   |
+| `vendor/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/sync.rs` (call sites + `EXEC_SENDER`) | Heartbeat + sysinfo POSTs sign; heartbeat reply forwards queued `exec` requests to the broadcast channel. |
+| `vendor/rustdesk/src/common.rs::post_request_, parse_simple_header` | Header parser now accepts `\n`-separated `Name: Value` pairs (backward-compatible). |
+| `vendor/rustdesk/src/lib.rs`                               | `pub mod hbbs_http` — required so hello-agent can reach both `::sign` and `::sync::exec_signal_receiver`. |
+
+Agent — hello-agent crate (outside the vendor tree):
+
+| Path                                | Purpose                                                                                 |
+|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `src/unattended_password.rs::try_report` | Reports the per-boot password to `/api/unattended-password`; signs the POST.       |
+| `src/exec.rs`                       | PowerShell runner. Subscribes to the sync layer's broadcast channel, spawns `powershell.exe`, captures stdout/stderr with caps, signs and POSTs the result to `/api/agent/exec-result`. Started from `run_server()` in main.rs. |
+
+## Out of scope
+
+Other agent / management endpoints exist on the same server. They are
+deliberately *not* covered by this gate because their trust model is
+different:
+
+| Endpoint                       | Why it isn't signature-gated                                                                              |
+|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `POST /api/devices/cli`        | Enrollment via `rustdesk --assign --token <T> …`. Already authenticated by a user/admin bearer session; the operator's job is to *supply* an arbitrary `(id, uuid)` for binding. Requiring the device's `sk` would defeat the use case. |
+| `GET  /api/sysinfo_ver`        | Returns a single public version string. No body, no DB write — no spoof surface to gate.                  |
+| `POST /api/record`             | Session-recording upload. Disabled by default in the OSS uploader; managed builds use it under a separate auth model. Out of scope for the current sweep. |
+| `POST /api/login`, `/api/login-options`, `/api/currentUser`, `/api/logout` | User session management — separate auth model (password + TOTP / OIDC). |
+| Everything under `/api/ab/*`, `/api/audit/*`, `/api/peers*`, `/api/2fa/*`, `/api/oidc/*`, `/admin/*` | Already gated by `AuthedUser` (cookie or bearer). |
@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+# RustDesk Server (hbbs) — Configuration Guide
+
+This document covers the runtime flags exposed by `hbbs`, the file formats
+it reads (notably `oidc.toml`), and the operator workflows that string
+those together — bootstrap admin, OIDC sign-in, TOTP, address books,
+strategies, recordings, the admin dashboard.
+
+The matching desktop-client API surface is documented separately in the
+`rustdesk` repo at `docs/CONSOLE_API.md`.
+
+---
+
+## CLI flags
+
+Pass flags directly on the command line. There is no config file for
+hbbs itself (only the optional `oidc.toml` referenced from a flag).
+
+### Networking & rendezvous
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--port=<NUM>` | `21116` | TCP/UDP rendezvous port. |
+| `--rendezvous-servers=<HOSTS>` | unset | Peer rendezvous servers (comma-separated). |
+| `--relay-servers=<HOSTS>` | unset | Default relay hosts handed to clients. |
+| `--rmem=<BYTES>` | platform default | UDP recv buffer size. Bump along with `net.core.rmem_max`. |
+| `--mask=<CIDR>` | unset | LAN mask (e.g. `192.168.0.0/16`) used to flag local connections. |
+| `--key=<B64>` | derived from `id_ed25519` | Force a specific public key; clients must match. Leave unset to auto-load `id_ed25519` next to the binary. |
+
+### HTTP API & dashboard
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--http-port=<NUM>` | `21114` | HTTP API port (`/api/*`) and admin dashboard (`/admin/*`). `0` disables both. |
+| `--http-listen=<HOST>` | wildcard | Bind address for `--http-port`. Set to `127.0.0.1` (or `::1`) when nginx/Caddy fronts this port for TLS so the reverse proxy can claim the public port without colliding. See "TLS deployment with nginx" below. |
+| `--ws-listen=<HOST>` | wildcard | Bind address for the browser-facing WebSocket rendezvous port (`port + 2`, default 21118). Same usage pattern as `--http-listen`. The plain TCP/UDP rendezvous ports (21115/21116) intentionally stay on the wildcard — desktop clients don't go through the reverse proxy. |
+| `--admin-ui-dir=<PATH>` | `./admin_ui` | Hint at where the dashboard's static HTML lives. The HTML is *embedded* in the binary; this flag is informational. Setting it to empty (`--admin-ui-dir=`) disables the dashboard entirely. |
+| `--public-base-url=<URL>` | unset | The externally-reachable HTTP base of this server, e.g. `https://rustdesk.example.com:21114`. **Required when OIDC is enabled** — used to build `/oidc/callback` redirect URIs. |
+
+The matching flag on **hbbr** is `--ws-listen=<HOST>` (binds the relay's WS port, default 21119). hbbr's plain TCP relay port (21117) stays on the wildcard for desktop clients. See `./hbbr --help` for the full list.
+
+### Bootstrap admin
+
+| Flag | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `--bootstrap-admin-username=<USER>` | On first startup, if the `users` table is empty *and* both flags are set, insert one admin user. Subsequent restarts ignore these flags (no overwrite). |
+| `--bootstrap-admin-password=<PASS>` | Same. Bcrypt-hashed at insert time. |
+
+If you forget to bootstrap, hbbs logs a warning at startup ("no users in users table"); recover by either restarting with the flags or `INSERT INTO users` directly via `sqlite3`.
+
+### Address books
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--ab-legacy-mode=<on\|off>` | `off` | When `on`, `/api/ab/personal` returns 404. Forces clients into the legacy single-blob AB mode. |
+| `--ab-max-peers-per-book=<NUM>` | `100` | Surfaced via `/api/ab/settings.max_peer_one_ab`. Soft cap; the client uses it for UI hints. |
+
+### Recordings
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--recording-dir=<PATH>` | `./recordings` | Root for `/api/record` uploads. One subdirectory per peer. |
+| `--recording-max-size-mb=<NUM>` | unset (=unlimited) | Per-file ceiling. Aborts oversized parts. |
+
+> **Note:** Stock OSS RustDesk clients **do not upload** recordings to `/api/record` — the uploader's `ENABLE` flag at `src/hbbs_http/record_upload.rs` has no setter in OSS source. Server-side recording requires a custom client build that flips that flag. The `Recordings` admin tab will stay empty for stock clients; the endpoint is provided for wire parity with Pro clients.
+
+### Audit retention
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--audit-retention-days=<NUM>` | `0` (=keep forever) | Hourly task deletes `audit_conn` / `audit_file` / `audit_alarm` rows older than N days. |
+
+### Email-code login (`/api/login` with `type:"email_code"`)
+
+| Flag | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--smtp-host=<HOST>` | unset | If unset, codes are *logged to stdout* (dev mode) instead of mailed. The `email_code` login option is also dropped from `/api/login-options` until SMTP is configured. |
+| `--smtp-port=<NUM>` | `587` | |
+| `--smtp-user=<USER>` | unset | Omit for unauthenticated relays. |
+| `--smtp-pass=<PASS>` | unset | |
+| `--smtp-from=<ADDR>` | `noreply@<smtp-host>` | From: header. |
+| `--smtp-tls=<on\|off>` | `on` | STARTTLS on the SMTP transport. |
+
+### OIDC
+
+| Flag | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `--oidc-config=<PATH>` | TOML file (see below). Providers are upserted into `oidc_providers` at startup. Re-run with a different file to change providers; rows missing from the new file remain in the DB but can be `enabled=0`'d via SQL. |
+| `--public-base-url=<URL>` | **Required** if any provider is configured. Determines the redirect URI registered with the IdP. |
+
+---
+
+## OIDC integration
+
+The server speaks standard OIDC Authorization Code flow with discovery
+(`/.well-known/openid-configuration`). Tested against Zitadel; should work
+with any standards-compliant IdP (Keycloak, Auth0, Google, Okta, Authelia,
+Dex, etc.).
+
+Two entry points are wired:
+
+1. **Desktop client** — `/api/login-options` advertises `oidc/<name>` per enabled provider. The Flutter login dialog renders a button per advertised name. Clicking starts the device-flow polling cycle (`/api/oidc/auth` → browser → `/oidc/callback` → `/api/oidc/auth-query` poll).
+2. **Admin dashboard** — `/admin/login.html` fetches `/admin/oidc/providers` and renders a "Sign in with X" button per provider. Clicking jumps the browser to `/admin/login/oidc/<name>` which 302-redirects to the IdP. After the IdP returns to `/oidc/callback`, the server detects the admin-flow sentinel and finishes by setting the dashboard session cookie + redirecting to `/admin/`.
+
+### `oidc.toml` schema
+
+Pass via `--oidc-config /path/to/oidc.toml`.
+
+```toml
+[[providers]]
+# Slug used in URLs (`/admin/login/oidc/<name>`, `/api/login-options`
+# advertises `oidc/<name>`). Lowercase, no spaces.
+name          = "zitadel"
+
+# Display label on the sign-in button.
+display_name  = "Sign in with Zitadel"
+
+# Optional. Square icon URL shown next to the label (not used yet by all
+# UIs; reserved for future button rendering).
+# icon_url    = "https://example.com/zitadel.svg"
+
+# OIDC issuer. The server fetches `<issuer_url>/.well-known/openid-configuration`
+# and caches the discovery doc in-process. Trailing slash is stripped.
+issuer_url    = "https://idp.example.com"
+
+# Application credentials from the IdP.
+client_id     = "..."
+client_secret = "..."
+
+# Scopes requested at the authorization endpoint. Most setups want
+# "openid email profile". Zitadel additionally needs the project audience
+# scope to receive role claims (see Role-based admin sync below).
+scopes        = "openid email profile"
+
+# Optional. If unset, computed as `<--public-base-url>/oidc/callback`.
+# Override only when you reverse-proxy under a different host.
+# redirect_url = "https://rustdesk.example.com/oidc/callback"
+
+# Optional. Defaults to true.
+enabled       = true
+
+# --- Role-based admin sync (optional) ---
+# When `admin_role` is set, every successful sign-in via this provider
+# evaluates the userinfo claim at `roles_claim` and forces the local
+# user's `is_admin` to (role present in claim). Promotion AND demotion
+# at the IdP propagate. Leave both unset to manage admin status manually
+# from the dashboard.
+# admin_role  = "admin"
+# roles_claim = "roles"   # or e.g. "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles"
+```
+
+`oidc.toml` may contain multiple `[[providers]]` blocks for multi-IdP setups.
+
+### Walk-through: Zitadel
+
+#### In Zitadel
+
+1. **Project → New project** (or pick an existing one).
+2. **New application** under the project:
+   - Type: **Web**
+   - Authentication flow: **Code** (Authorization Code with client secret)
+   - Auth method: **Basic** *or* **Post** (server sends `client_id` + `client_secret` in the form body — both modes accept that)
+   - **Redirect URIs**: `<public-base-url>/oidc/callback` — character-exact, including scheme. Zitadel rejects `http://` redirects on non-localhost unless dev mode is on, so use TLS in production.
+3. **Authorizations** — assign the project's roles to whichever users you want to be admins.
+4. **Project → General**: turn on **"Assert Roles On Authentication"** so roles flow into the userinfo response.
+5. Copy **Client ID** and **Client Secret** from the application's overview page.
+
+#### `oidc.toml`
+
+```toml
+[[providers]]
+name          = "zitadel"
+display_name  = "Sign in with Zitadel"
+issuer_url    = "https://your-instance.zitadel.cloud"
+client_id     = "PASTE_FROM_ZITADEL"
+client_secret = "PASTE_FROM_ZITADEL"
+# `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:id:zitadel:aud` is required for the project's
+# roles to be included in the userinfo response.
+scopes        = "openid email profile urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:id:zitadel:aud"
+admin_role    = "admin"
+roles_claim   = "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles"
+```
+
+#### `hbbs` flags
+
+```sh
+./hbbs --http-port 21114 \
+       --public-base-url 'https://rustdesk.example.com:21114' \
+       --oidc-config /etc/rustdesk/oidc.toml
+```
+
+#### Verify
+
+After hbbs starts, look for:
+
+```
+oidc: provider "zitadel" configured
+oidc: loaded 1 providers from /etc/rustdesk/oidc.toml
+```
+
+Then:
+
+```sh
+# 1. Provider visible to the desktop client
+curl -s http://127.0.0.1:21114/api/login-options
+#   expect a list including "oidc/zitadel"
+
+# 2. Provider visible to the admin dashboard
+curl -s http://127.0.0.1:21114/admin/oidc/providers
+#   expect [{"name":"zitadel","display_name":"Sign in with Zitadel",...}]
+
+# 3. Discovery is reachable (IdP-side)
+curl -s https://your-instance.zitadel.cloud/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .issuer
+```
+
+### Role-based admin sync
+
+When `admin_role` is set on a provider, every successful sign-in evaluates
+the userinfo claim at `roles_claim` (defaults to `"roles"` if unset) and
+forces `users.is_admin` accordingly. **Promotion and demotion at the IdP
+propagate on the next login.**
+
+Two claim shapes are supported:
+
+- **Object** (Zitadel default at `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles`): role names are keys.
+  ```json
+  "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles": {
+      "admin": {"123": "myorg"},
+      "user":  {"123": "myorg"}
+  }
+  ```
+- **Array of strings** (generic, common with Keycloak, Auth0 custom claims):
+  ```json
+  "roles": ["admin", "user"]
+  ```
+
+Set `admin_role = "admin"` and either set `roles_claim` to the exact claim
+name (Zitadel) or omit it to default to `"roles"` (generic).
+
+> **Sharp edge:** when role-sync is configured, manually-granted admin
+> rights in the dashboard get **revoked** on the next OIDC login if the
+> role isn't present at the IdP. This is the correct contract for a
+> single source of truth, but surprising if you forget. Manage admin
+> status in *one* place at a time.
+
+### Troubleshooting OIDC
+
+- **"Sign-in complete" page in browser but desktop client stays at "Waiting account auth"**: usually a state mismatch between server and client. Check `hbbs.log` — the poll endpoint logs every tick at INFO. If you see `status=success` lines that don't stop, suspect a wire-shape mismatch. (This was a real bug we hit and fixed; see git log for `oidc envelope`.)
+- **Browser shows "identity provider returned an error"**: check `oidc_sessions.error` for the row that just failed. Most common: `redirect_uri` mismatch between Zitadel and `--public-base-url`.
+- **No "Sign in with X" button in the dashboard or desktop client**: check `oidc_provider_list_enabled()` returns rows. If `--public-base-url` is empty, `/admin/oidc/providers` and `/api/login-options` both suppress OIDC entries (the redirect URI would be unbuildable).
+- **Admin landing on the "no admin access" error after first OIDC sign-in**: expected if `admin_role` isn't configured. Either configure role-sync (preferred), or have the user sign in once to create their row, then promote them on the Users page. The next OIDC sign-in resolves to that row.
+
+---
+
+## TOTP / 2FA
+
+TOTP enrollment is **self-service**: each user enables it for their own
+account from the dashboard's "My profile" page. The flow is two-step
+with QR confirmation, so no secret is stored until the user proves they
+have a working authenticator:
+
+1. Sign in to the dashboard → **My profile** (sidebar) → **Enroll TOTP**.
+2. Server generates a fresh secret and renders an inline SVG QR code +
+   the base32 secret for manual entry. Nothing is written to
+   `user_totp_secrets` at this point.
+3. User scans the QR into an authenticator (1Password, Authy, Google
+   Authenticator, etc.) and submits the 6-digit code shown.
+4. Server verifies the code against the pending secret. On match, the
+   secret lands in `user_totp_secrets`. Wrong code re-renders the same
+   QR with an error notice — no need to re-scan.
+5. Removing TOTP requires the user's current password.
+
+Admins can disable a user's TOTP from the **Users** page action menu
+(useful when a user lost their authenticator), but **cannot enroll it
+on someone else's behalf** — the user has to do that themselves so the
+secret never travels through admin hands. OIDC-linked accounts skip
+local TOTP entirely; their MFA lives at the IdP.
+
+After enrollment, the next desktop-client login flow is:
+
+1. Username + password → server returns `{"type":"email_check","tfa_type":"tfa_check","secret":<nonce>}`.
+2. Client opens its verification-code dialog → user enters the 6-digit code → re-POSTs `/api/login` with `type:"email_code"` (yes, that's what the desktop client sends for both email and TOTP second legs), `tfaCode` set, `secret` echoed back.
+3. Server verifies the code against `user_totp_secrets`, mints an access token, returns `{"type":"access_token", ...}`.
+
+For dashboard logins, the inline form at `/admin/login.html` shows the TOTP field after the first password submit returns the prompt fragment.
+
+---
+
+## Strategies (server-pushed config)
+
+Strategies push `config_options` to peers via heartbeat replies. They are
+managed entirely from the dashboard's **Strategies** page. Resolution
+order per peer:
+
+1. Direct peer-scoped assignment (`strategy_assignments.peer_id`)
+2. Device-group assignment via the peer's owner
+3. User assignment
+
+The peer's `Config::get_option` calls reflect the resolved values within
+~15 s of any change to `modified_at` on the strategy row.
+
+See [STRATEGIES.md](STRATEGIES.md) for the full list of `config_options`
+keys and what each one does.
+
+---
+
+## Remote PowerShell exec (per-peer, strategy-gated)
+
+Admins can dispatch a PowerShell script to a managed device from the
+dashboard's **Run command…** action (Devices page row menu, or directly
+via `/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec`). The agent runs the script as
+its service account — typically LocalSystem on Windows — and the
+output streams back into the dashboard within ~1 s.
+
+This feature is **disabled by default**. To enable it for a peer (or
+fleet):
+
+1. Edit (or create) a strategy on the **Strategies** page with the JSON:
+   ```json
+   { "enable-remote-exec": "Y" }
+   ```
+   (mix with whatever other strategy options you already push)
+2. Assign that strategy to the peer, its device group, or its owner.
+3. The peer's `Auth` column must show **Signed** — exec is refused on
+   `peer.managed=0` peers. See [AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md).
+
+All three gates (admin role, managed=1, strategy opt-in) are enforced
+server-side at dispatch time. The strategy key is never pushed to the
+client — it's checked on the server only and serves purely as the
+authorization toggle.
+
+Caps (defaults; live in `src/api/heartbeat.rs` and
+`src/api/admin/pages/exec.rs`):
+
+- Script size: **32 KiB** per dispatch.
+- Wall clock: **5 minutes** per command; the agent kills the process
+  on timeout and marks the row `timed_out`.
+- Output capture: **1 MiB** combined stdout+stderr; further bytes are
+  drained and discarded, the row gets `truncated=true`.
+- One in-flight exec per peer at a time.
+
+See [AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md) for the wire format,
+authentication, and threat model. Result POSTs are mandatory-signed —
+there's no legacy/unsigned path for the exec result endpoint.
+
+---
+
+## Agent API signing (per-peer)
+
+`POST /api/heartbeat`, `POST /api/sysinfo`, and
+`POST /api/unattended-password` are the three agent-facing endpoints
+that write per-device state. Stock RustDesk and managed builds
+(hello-agent) both call the first two; only managed builds use the
+third. Each peer row has a `managed` flag that gates whether the
+server requires a per-request Ed25519 signature on these endpoints;
+everything else (`/api/peers`, `/api/ab/*`, audit, recordings, OIDC,
+etc.) is unaffected. See [AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md) for
+the full out-of-scope list.
+
+| `peer.managed` | Heartbeat / sysinfo behaviour                                                          |
+|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `0` (default)  | Unsigned posts accepted (stock-client compatible). Signed posts still verified.        |
+| `1`            | Signature required; unsigned posts return 401. First valid sig auto-promoted to here.  |
+
+Default is `0` after the migration, so **stock RustDesk clients are not
+affected by the rollout** — they keep posting unsigned, the server keeps
+accepting. The first valid signature the server sees from a peer is the
+TOFU promote: that peer's `managed` flips to `1` for good, and unsigned
+requests claiming that `id` are rejected from then on.
+
+The wire format and verification details live in
+[AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md). What you need to know to operate:
+
+### Dashboard
+
+The Devices page has a per-row **Auth** column:
+
+- *Signed* (emerald badge) — `peer.managed = 1`. The peer's heartbeat
+  and sysinfo posts must carry a valid signature; spoofed unsigned
+  requests are rejected.
+- *Unsigned* (slate badge) — `peer.managed = 0`. Legacy path. Anyone
+  who knows the id+uuid can post inventory and heartbeats as this
+  device.
+
+The row's action menu has two new entries (mutually exclusive based on
+current state):
+
+- **Require signed API** — flips `managed` to 1 (no confirm — it
+  strengthens security). Useful for pre-enrolling a peer record
+  before the agent has booted, or for force-locking a peer if you
+  want to fail fast when an agent is not signing yet.
+- **Allow unsigned API** — flips `managed` to 0 (confirm dialog,
+  because this reopens the spoofing surface). Use when a managed
+  agent has been uninstalled and replaced with stock RustDesk on the
+  same hardware.
+
+### API
+
+`PUT /api/peers/:id/managed` with body `{"managed": true|false}`, gated
+on the `is_admin` flag of the calling session, returns
+`{"ok":true,"managed":<bool>}`. Same effect as the dashboard toggle —
+the dashboard handler just calls this internally after reading the
+current value to avoid stale-toggle races.
+
+### Operational notes
+
+- **Mixed fleets are fine.** Stock and hello-agent clients can target
+  the same hbbs. The gate is per-peer, not per-deployment.
+- **Replacing hello-agent with stock RustDesk on a device.** The
+  device's `peer.managed` is stuck at 1; the stock client doesn't
+  sign and will start getting 401s. Either re-deploy a signing build
+  *or* flip the peer back to Unsigned in the dashboard.
+- **TLS still recommended.** Signing protects against id+uuid spoof,
+  not against the unsigned-by-default endpoint surface elsewhere
+  (`/api/login`, `/api/record`, dashboard) — those still rely on
+  whatever TLS termination is in front of hbbs. See *TLS deployment*
+  earlier in this doc.
+- **Clock skew tolerance is ±5 minutes.** If a host's clock drifts
+  past that, heartbeat starts failing 401. Keep NTP healthy on
+  managed peers; the server's clock is the canonical one.
+- **The replay cache lives in-memory only.** A hbbs restart clears
+  it. The 5-minute timestamp window bounds the worst-case replay
+  exposure across restarts.
+
+---
+
+## Address books
+
+- **Personal books** are owned per-user and managed from the user's desktop client. The dashboard surfaces them read-only.
+- **Shared books** are server-side artifacts. Create from the dashboard's **Address books** page → "Manage shares" → grant per-user `read` / `read+write` / `full` access. Clients pick up shared books on their next AB sync (~30 s).
+
+If you set `--ab-legacy-mode=on`, `/api/ab/personal` 404s and clients fall back to the single-blob `/api/ab` path. Use only if a stock client misbehaves on the modern path.
+
+---
+
+## Admin dashboard URLs
+
+| Path | Auth | What |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/admin/`, `/admin/index.html` | none (login page redirects in JS) | Single-page shell |
+| `/admin/login.html` | none | Sign-in form (password / TOTP / OIDC buttons) |
+| `/admin/login` | none (POST form) | Password+TOTP submit → sets `rd_admin_session` cookie |
+| `/admin/logout` | cookie | Clears cookie |
+| `/admin/me` | cookie | Sidebar's logged-in-as widget |
+| `/admin/assets/tailwindcss.js` | none | Vendored Tailwind 3.4.16 Play CDN. Long-cache. |
+| `/admin/assets/htmx.min.js` | none | Vendored htmx.org 1.9.10. Long-cache. |
+| `/admin/oidc/providers` | none | JSON list of enabled providers, used by login.html |
+| `/admin/login/oidc/:name` | none | Starts admin OIDC flow (302s to IdP) |
+| `/admin/pages/users` | cookie + admin | Users page fragment (incl. inline edit-profile / password-reset / TOTP-disable per row) |
+| `/admin/pages/devices` | cookie + admin | Devices (incl. delete, force-disconnect, force-sysinfo, toggle managed-auth — see [AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md)) |
+| `/admin/pages/groups` | cookie + admin | Device groups |
+| `/admin/pages/strategies` | cookie + admin | Strategy management |
+| `/admin/pages/address-books` | cookie + admin | Personal + shared books |
+| `/admin/pages/oidc` | cookie + admin | Read-only OIDC provider listing |
+| `/admin/pages/audit` | cookie + admin | Audit log browser |
+| `/admin/pages/recordings` | cookie + admin | Recording file listing |
+| `/admin/pages/deploy` | cookie + admin | `--config` blob + renamed-installer generator |
+| `/admin/pages/profile` | cookie | Self-service profile (display name, email, password, TOTP enroll/remove). Available to all signed-in users — no admin gate. |
+| `/admin/pages/profile/update-info` | cookie (POST) | Display name + email update |
+| `/admin/pages/profile/change-password` | cookie (POST) | Requires current password; refused for OIDC-linked accounts |
+| `/admin/pages/profile/totp/{start,confirm,remove}` | cookie (POST) | Two-step QR enroll, plus password-gated removal |
+| `/admin/connect/:peer_id` | cookie + admin | Web-client SPA shell — opens a browser-based remote-control session in a new tab |
+| `/admin/connect/assets/bundle.{js,css}` | cookie + admin | Compiled web-client SPA bundle |
+
+The session cookie (`rd_admin_session`) is HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict.
+The middleware accepts the same cookie *or* `Authorization: Bearer …`,
+so the same auth covers `/api/*` for the desktop client and `/admin/*`
+for the dashboard with no separate session model.
+
+---
+
+## Web client
+
+Admins can remote-control any peer directly from the browser — no desktop
+RustDesk install required. The Devices page row dropdown surfaces a
+**Connect** button that opens `/admin/connect/<peer_id>` in a new tab.
+The page is a TypeScript SPA bundled into hbbs (`include_bytes!` from
+`web_client/dist/`), so there's no separate process or service to run.
+
+### Routes
+
+| Route | Auth | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/admin/connect/:peer_id` | cookie + admin | Server-rendered HTML wrapper that injects per-request config (rendezvous host, relay host, server pk, peer id, admin display name) into a `<script id="custom-config">` tag, then loads `bundle.js`. |
+| `/admin/connect/assets/bundle.js` | cookie + admin | The compiled SPA. ~535 KB, ~75 KB gzipped. |
+| `/admin/connect/assets/bundle.css` | cookie + admin | Minimal dark theme + reconnect overlay. |
+
+### How it talks to peers
+
+The browser opens **WebSockets directly** to the existing rendezvous
+(`hbbs:21118`, the `ws_port`) and relay (`hbbr:21119`, `port + 2`)
+sockets. The wire shape — protobuf `RendezvousMessage` + secretbox-
+encrypted `Message` stream — is identical to what the desktop client
+uses; the SPA is just a from-scratch reimplementation of the protocol
+talking through WS frames instead of TCP.
+
+Browsers can't do UDP NAT-punching, so the SPA always sets `force_relay
+= true` in `PunchHoleRequest` and follows the `RelayResponse` branch
+unconditionally. **Direct peer-to-peer is never attempted.**
+
+### Browser requirements
+
+- **Secure context** — page must be served over HTTPS or `http://localhost`. WebCodecs `VideoDecoder` / `AudioDecoder` are gated to secure contexts. Plain `http://lan-ip:21114` will fail; either use TLS in front of hbbs or do `ssh -L 21114:localhost:21114 hbbs-host` and connect via `http://localhost:21114`.
+- **Browser version** — Chrome 94+, Edge 94+, Firefox 130+, Safari 16.4+. Older browsers lack WebCodecs and will throw "VideoDecoder unavailable" on session start.
+- **Clipboard permission** — Firefox refuses `navigator.clipboard.readText()` by default, so admin → host paste is silently no-op there. Host → admin paste works (it uses `writeText`, which only needs a recent click). Chrome/Safari prompt once.
+
+### Network requirements
+
+- The **relay host** advertised to clients (`--relay-servers=<HOSTS>` on hbbs) must resolve and be reachable from the end-user's browser on port 21119. The relay is what carries the actual session bytes — if a user's browser can't open `ws://<relay-host>:21119/`, the session dies after the rendezvous step. A common gotcha: setting `--relay-servers=hbbr-internal.local` works for desktop clients on the LAN but breaks for browsers off-LAN.
+- Audit rows are written under the admin's cookie via the existing `/api/audit/conn` endpoint; no new server endpoint.
+
+### TLS deployment with nginx
+
+The dashboard and the two browser-facing WebSocket ports (21118 = rendezvous, 21119 = relay) all need TLS in front of them when accessed from a browser, since the page is served over HTTPS and mixed-content `ws://` is blocked. nginx is the canonical setup; Caddy works similarly with much less ceremony.
+
+#### Port plan
+
+| Public port | TLS terminator | Backed by |
+|---|---|---|
+| 443/tcp | nginx | `127.0.0.1:21114` (hbbs HTTP API + dashboard) |
+| 21118/tcp | nginx | `127.0.0.1:21118` (hbbs WS rendezvous) |
+| 21119/tcp | nginx | `127.0.0.1:21119` (hbbr WS relay) |
+| 21115/tcp | — | hbbs (NAT test, plain TCP, desktop clients only) |
+| 21116/tcp+udp | — | hbbs (main rendezvous, desktop clients only) |
+| 21117/tcp | — | hbbr (relay for desktop clients, plain TCP) |
+
+Desktop clients use plain TCP/UDP on 21115 / 21116 / 21117 and bring their own framing + secretbox encryption — no TLS needed. Only browsers go through nginx.
+
+#### Pin hbbs / hbbr to localhost
+
+By default both binaries bind every port to the wildcard (`[::]`), which collides with nginx wanting to take the same public port. Use the bind flags so nginx can claim the public port and forward to localhost:
+
+```sh
+# hbbs — desktop-client ports stay on the wildcard, browser ports go local
+./hbbs --port 21116 \
+       --http-port 21114 --http-listen 127.0.0.1 \
+       --ws-listen 127.0.0.1 \
+       --relay-servers rd.example.com \
+       --public-base-url https://rd.example.com \
+       # ... rest of your flags
+
+# hbbr — TCP relay (21117) stays public, WS relay (21119) goes local
+./hbbr --port 21117 --ws-listen 127.0.0.1
+```
+
+After restart, `ss -tlnp` should show:
+
+```
+LISTEN 127.0.0.1:21114   <-- hbbs HTTP, fronted by nginx 443
+LISTEN 127.0.0.1:21118   <-- hbbs WS, fronted by nginx 21118
+LISTEN 127.0.0.1:21119   <-- hbbr WS, fronted by nginx 21119
+LISTEN 0.0.0.0:21115     <-- hbbs NAT test (public)
+LISTEN 0.0.0.0:21116     <-- hbbs rendezvous tcp (public)
+LISTEN 0.0.0.0:21117     <-- hbbr relay tcp (public)
+# plus 0.0.0.0:21116/udp
+```
+
+#### nginx site config
+
+Three `server { }` blocks. The dashboard one is normal HTTP/2 + reverse-proxy; the two WS blocks need the `Upgrade`/`Connection` headers and a long `proxy_read_timeout` so idle web sessions don't get severed mid-screen-share.
+
+```nginx
+# /etc/nginx/sites-available/rustdesk
+
+# Helper for WS upgrade — referenced by both WS blocks below.
+map $http_upgrade $connection_upgrade {
+    default upgrade;
+    ''      close;
+}
+
+# 1. Dashboard + admin API on 443
+server {
+    listen 443 ssl http2;
+    listen [::]:443 ssl http2;
+    server_name rd.example.com;
+
+    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/fullchain.pem;
+    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/privkey.pem;
+
+    # The dashboard streams audit logs / device events via plain HTTP today
+    # but we still need WS-upgrade pass-through here for the /admin/connect/
+    # SPA's own asset requests are HTTP, but if you ever proxy ws under
+    # /ws/* in the future, this stays correct.
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:21114;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host              $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For   $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP         $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header Upgrade           $http_upgrade;
+        proxy_set_header Connection        $connection_upgrade;
+        proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
+    }
+}
+
+# Force HTTPS — drop this block if you don't need port 80 at all.
+server {
+    listen 80;
+    listen [::]:80;
+    server_name rd.example.com;
+    return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
+}
+
+# 2. WSS rendezvous on 21118
+server {
+    listen 21118 ssl http2;
+    listen [::]:21118 ssl http2;
+    server_name rd.example.com;
+
+    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/fullchain.pem;
+    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/privkey.pem;
+
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:21118;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host       $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header Upgrade    $http_upgrade;
+        proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
+        # Web sessions can sit idle on the rendezvous WS; bump the read
+        # timeout so nginx doesn't reset the connection before the relay
+        # leg finishes negotiating.
+        proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
+        proxy_send_timeout 3600s;
+    }
+}
+
+# 3. WSS relay on 21119
+server {
+    listen 21119 ssl http2;
+    listen [::]:21119 ssl http2;
+    server_name rd.example.com;
+
+    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/fullchain.pem;
+    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/rd.example.com/privkey.pem;
+
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:21119;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host       $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header Upgrade    $http_upgrade;
+        proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
+        # Relay carries the live session for as long as the user is
+        # remote-controlling. Pick a value larger than the longest
+        # session you expect (24h here).
+        proxy_read_timeout 86400s;
+        proxy_send_timeout 86400s;
+    }
+}
+```
+
+The Let's Encrypt cert covers all three ports — same hostname, just different listen ports. With certbot's nginx plugin the cert was already obtained for the 443 block; the other two blocks just point at the same files.
+
+Open the firewall for **80, 443, 21115, 21116, 21117, 21118, 21119** (TCP) and **21116** (UDP). Everything else can stay closed.
+
+Verify after reload: in DevTools → Network, `wss://rd.example.com:21118/` and `wss://rd.example.com:21119/` should each show status `101 Switching Protocols`.
+
+Common failure modes:
+
+- **`ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR`** on 21118 or 21119 — nginx isn't terminating TLS on that port. Check the listener block + cert paths.
+- **`ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED`** — firewall is blocking the public port, OR nginx itself isn't listening on it (check `ss -tlnp`).
+- **`502 Bad Gateway`** at the dashboard — hbbs isn't running, or `--http-listen` doesn't match what nginx is `proxy_pass`ing to.
+- **WS upgrade hangs / 200 instead of 101** — `Upgrade` / `Connection` headers aren't being forwarded. The `$connection_upgrade` map at the top of the config is what makes this work; without it, `proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"` would also work but breaks plain HTTP requests.
+
+### Features
+
+| Feature | Status |
+|---|---|
+| Video (VP8 / VP9 / H.264) | ✅ — preference is VP8 (lightest software encoder; H.264 path also implemented for hosts with hwcodec) |
+| Audio (Opus) | ✅ |
+| Mouse + keyboard input | ✅ — Legacy keyboard mode; Translate mode silently drops Unicode/ControlKey payloads on the host |
+| Text clipboard sync (both directions) | ✅ — handles both single-format `Clipboard` and `MultiClipboards` (peers ≥ 1.3.0) |
+| Multi-monitor switching | ✅ — `SwitchDisplay` + `CaptureDisplays` two-message dance for hosts ≥ 1.2.4; mouse coords offset by display's virtual-desktop origin |
+| Image quality presets (Low/Balanced/Best) | ✅ |
+| Custom FPS (15/30/60) | ✅ — host caps at 30 unless `allow_more_fps` is advertised |
+| Mute toggle | ✅ — also tells host to stop encoding audio (saves CPU + relay bandwidth) |
+| Ctrl+Alt+Del | ✅ — Windows hosts only (server-side `#[cfg(windows)]`) |
+| Auto-reconnect on transient drops | ✅ — up to 10 attempts, exponential backoff 1s → 30s, dim overlay during retry, user options re-applied on success |
+| File transfer | ❌ deferred — separate `FileAction` family, double the surface area |
+| AV1 / H.265 decode | ❌ deferred — VP8/VP9/H.264 covers the common cases |
+| IME / compose input | ❌ deferred — needs `compositionend` + `KeyEvent.seq` |
+| Touch gestures | ❌ deferred |
+| Cursor sprite rendering | ❌ deferred — host-side cursor visible in the video; we don't draw a separate one |
+
+### Codec selection
+
+The SPA advertises VP8/VP9/H.264 decode and prefers VP8. The host's
+codec picker (`libs/scrap/src/common/codec.rs`) honours the preference
+when the host has the matching encoder available, else falls back to
+its "auto" path (H.265 → H.264 → AV1/VP9/VP8).
+
+VP8 is the default because it's the cheapest software encoder; on a
+host without hwcodec, VP9 software-encode caps screen sharing at single
+digits FPS, while VP8 keeps headroom for the screen-capture pipeline.
+On a host *with* hwcodec H.264 (nvenc/qsv on most Windows boxes), flip
+the preference in `web_client/src/transport/session.ts` to
+`PreferCodec.H264` — the SPA's H.264 path parses SPS to derive the
+correct `avc1.PPCCLL` codec string for WebCodecs.
+
+### Performance gotchas
+
+The HUD shows three live numbers: `recv` (frames/sec arriving from the
+relay), `dec` (frames/sec the browser decoded), `draw` (frames/sec
+painted to canvas). Use them to localise FPS issues:
+
+- All three low → host is encoding slowly. Either CPU-bound (no
+  hwcodec, VP9 chosen) or QoS-throttled by host based on `TestDelay`
+  RTT measurements.
+- `recv` high, `dec` low → browser fell back to software decode. Check
+  the codec string at the end of the HUD line; mismatched profile/level
+  (e.g. `avc1.42E01E` for a high-profile stream) forces software.
+- `dec` high, `draw` low → main thread is overwhelmed (very rare with
+  hardware decode).
+
+### Building the bundle
+
+The bundle is committed under `web_client/dist/` so a Cargo build
+doesn't need a Node toolchain. To regenerate after editing the SPA:
+
+```sh
+cd web_client
+npm install        # one-time
+npm run build      # → dist/bundle.{js,css}
+git add dist/
+cd .. && cargo build --release -p hbbs
+```
+
+To regenerate protobuf bindings after a `libs/hbb_common/protos/*.proto`
+change:
+
+```sh
+cd web_client && npm run protogen
+```
+
+---
+
+## Database
+
+SQLite, file `db_v2.sqlite3` in hbbs's working directory. Tables created
+at startup with `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`; column additions use
+`ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN` guarded by a duplicate-column-name swallower
+(SQLite < 3.35 lacks `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`).
+
+Backup is a plain file copy while hbbs is stopped, or `sqlite3
+db_v2.sqlite3 .dump > backup.sql` while running. There is no
+multi-instance HA; run a single hbbs against a single SQLite file.
+
+---
+
+## Security checklist before exposing to the internet
+
+- TLS in front of `--http-port` and the WebSocket ports (Caddy / nginx / Traefik). Required for OIDC redirect URIs and for the web client (browsers block mixed `ws://`). See "TLS deployment with nginx" for a worked config.
+- Pin browser-facing ports to localhost when a reverse proxy is in front: `--http-listen=127.0.0.1` on hbbs, `--ws-listen=127.0.0.1` on both hbbs and hbbr. Keeps the plain-HTTP / plain-ws surface unreachable from the public internet — the proxy is the only path in.
+- `--public-base-url` set to the *externally* reachable URL, including the scheme.
+- `--bootstrap-admin-password` rotated immediately after first login (Users page → reset password, or via the admin's own "My profile" page).
+- `--key` / `id_ed25519` not committed to source control. Treat the private key as a deploy secret.
+- Audit retention (`--audit-retention-days`) set to a value that matches your data-retention policy.
+- If running behind a reverse proxy: forward the original `Host:` header so OIDC redirect-URI validation matches, and forward `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` so the dashboard generates `wss://` URLs.
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# RustDesk Server — Docker Compose Deployment
+
+The repo ships a `docker-compose.yml` that **builds the server from source**
+(this fork's `pro-features` branch) and runs `hbbs` + `hbbr` as two
+containers. No prebuilt image is pulled — every `docker compose build`
+clones the configured Git URL and runs `cargo build --release` inside the
+build stage.
+
+For the runtime flag reference (CLI options accepted by `hbbs` itself), see
+[CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md). This document only covers the Compose
+glue.
+
+---
+
+## Quick start
+
+```bash
+cp .env.example .env
+# edit .env — at minimum set RUSTDESK_DOMAIN, and change
+# RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD before the first boot
+docker compose up -d --build
+```
+
+The bootstrap admin (default `admin` / `changeme`) is seeded into the
+`users` table on the **first** boot only — once the row exists, those
+flags are ignored. If you boot with the default password and forget to
+change it, rotate it via the admin UI; if you forget the password
+entirely, delete `./data/db_v2.sqlite3` (loses all server-side state) or
+edit the `users` row with `sqlite3` directly.
+
+First build pulls the Rust toolchain image and compiles the workspace; expect
+several minutes. Subsequent builds reuse the cargo cache layer unless the
+Git ref or build args change.
+
+After it boots:
+
+| Endpoint                                 | Port    | Purpose                                  |
+|------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------------------------|
+| `tcp://<domain>:21115`                   | 21115   | NAT test                                 |
+| `tcp+udp://<domain>:21116`               | 21116   | ID / rendezvous (desktop clients)        |
+| `tcp://<domain>:21117`                   | 21117   | Relay (hbbr)                             |
+| `ws://<domain>:21118`                    | 21118   | Browser-facing rendezvous WebSocket      |
+| `ws://<domain>:21119`                    | 21119   | Browser-facing relay WebSocket           |
+| `http://<domain>:21114/admin/`           | 21114   | Admin dashboard (pro-features)           |
+| `http://<domain>:21114/api/*`            | 21114   | Management API (pro-features)            |
+
+Persistent state — including the auto-generated `id_ed25519` keypair and the
+SQLite database — lives in `./data/` (bind-mounted to `/root` in both
+containers).
+
+---
+
+## Files
+
+| File                        | Role                                                                                  |
+|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `docker-compose.yml`        | Two services (`hbbs`, `hbbr`) sharing one image built from `docker/Dockerfile.source`.|
+| `docker/Dockerfile.source`  | Multi-stage build: clones the repo, runs `cargo build --release`, copies binaries into a `debian:bookworm-slim` runtime. |
+| `.env.example`              | Documented template; copy to `.env`.                                                  |
+| `data/`                     | Created on first run. Contains keypair + SQLite DB. **Back this up.**                 |
+
+The legacy single-stage `docker/Dockerfile` (busybox + s6-overlay, expects
+prebuilt binaries) and `docker-classic/Dockerfile` are unrelated to this
+flow and unused by `docker-compose.yml`.
+
+---
+
+## Environment variables
+
+These are read by `docker-compose.yml` from `.env`. Compose ships them
+through to the container as command-line flags or `environment:` entries,
+not as raw process env (with the exception of `RUST_LOG` and
+`ALWAYS_USE_RELAY`, which `hbbs` reads from env directly).
+
+### Runtime
+
+| Variable                       | Default         | Effect                                                                                                |
+|--------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `RUSTDESK_DOMAIN`                    | **required**     | Public hostname clients connect to. Passed as `hbbs -r ${RUSTDESK_DOMAIN}:21117`.                     |
+| `RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME`  | `admin`          | Seeded as the initial admin on **first boot only** (when the `users` table is empty). Ignored on subsequent restarts. Empty disables the bootstrap. |
+| `RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`  | `changeme`       | Same — bcrypt-hashed at insert. Change this in `.env` before the first `up`, or rotate via the admin UI immediately after.                          |
+| `RUSTDESK_KEY`                       | `-`              | Pre-shared key. `-` = auto-generate on first boot (written to `./data/id_ed25519{,.pub}`); `_` = encrypted-only with auto-key; or paste a base64 public key to pin it. Applied to **both** `hbbs` and `hbbr` via `-k`. |
+| `RUSTDESK_HTTP_PORT`                 | `21114`          | Pro-features admin API + dashboard port. Set to `0` to disable HTTP entirely. The host port published is the same value. |
+| `RUSTDESK_ALWAYS_USE_RELAY`          | `N`              | Force every session through the relay even on LAN. Read from env by hbbs (any non-empty/non-`N` value enables). |
+| `RUST_LOG`                           | `info`           | Log filter. e.g. `debug`, `hbbs=debug,sqlx=warn`.                                                     |
+
+### Build source
+
+| Variable               | Default                                                       | Effect                                                                                  |
+|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `RUSTDESK_GIT_URL`     | `https://gitea.cstudio.ch/mike/rustdesk-server.git`           | Repo cloned inside the builder stage.                                                   |
+| `RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH`  | `pro-features`                                                | Branch / tag / commit to check out (`--branch` so it must be a ref name, not a SHA).    |
+| `DATABASE_URL`         | unset (uses the cloned repo's `.env`)                         | Overrides the `DATABASE_URL` sqlx reads at compile time. Rarely needed — see below.     |
+
+Build-arg changes only take effect when the image is rebuilt:
+`docker compose build --no-cache hbbs` (or `up -d --build`).
+
+---
+
+## Why `DATABASE_URL` is a build-time concern
+
+`hbbs` uses `sqlx::query!` macros, which verify SQL **at compile time** by
+running the queries against a real SQLite database. The repo includes a
+checked-in `db_v2.sqlite3` with the schema pre-applied, and a tracked `.env`
+file pointing at it (`DATABASE_URL=sqlite://./db_v2.sqlite3`).
+
+Cargo automatically reads `.env` from the project root, so `cargo build`
+inside the builder stage Just Works without any explicit configuration.
+
+You only need to set `DATABASE_URL` in the Compose `.env` if you fork the
+schema or want to point the compile-time check at a different SQLite file.
+At **runtime** the binary opens its own DB under `/root/` (your `./data/`
+bind mount) — that path is not configurable via this variable.
+
+---
+
+## Adding extra `hbbs` flags
+
+`docker-compose.yml` only wires the most common flags. To pass others
+(SMTP, OIDC, recording dir, audit retention, …), edit the `command:`
+block of the `hbbs` service. Example — enable SMTP and set the public
+base URL needed for OIDC callbacks:
+
+```yaml
+    command: >
+      hbbs
+      -r ${RUSTDESK_DOMAIN:?...}:21117
+      -k ${RUSTDESK_KEY:--}
+      --http-port ${RUSTDESK_HTTP_PORT:-21114}
+      --admin-ui-dir /opt/rustdesk/admin_ui
+      --bootstrap-admin-username=${RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME:-}
+      --bootstrap-admin-password=${RUSTDESK_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-}
+      --public-base-url https://${RUSTDESK_DOMAIN}:${RUSTDESK_HTTP_PORT:-21114}
+      --smtp-host ${SMTP_HOST}
+      --smtp-user ${SMTP_USER}
+      --smtp-pass ${SMTP_PASS}
+      --smtp-from ${SMTP_FROM}
+```
+
+Then add the matching variables to `.env`. The full flag list lives in
+[CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md).
+
+If you mount an `oidc.toml`, drop it into `./data/` and pass
+`--oidc-config /root/oidc.toml`.
+
+---
+
+## Operational notes
+
+**Upgrading.** Pull the latest commit on `pro-features` and rebuild:
+
+```bash
+docker compose build --pull --no-cache
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+The `--pull` refreshes the Rust toolchain base image; `--no-cache` forces a
+fresh `git clone` (otherwise Docker will reuse the cached clone layer).
+Alternatively, bump `RUSTDESK_GIT_BRANCH` to a tag and rebuild — the changed
+build arg invalidates the clone layer automatically.
+
+**Logs.** `docker compose logs -f hbbs` (or `hbbr`). Both containers run
+the binary in the foreground.
+
+**Persistence.** Everything that matters is in `./data/`:
+`id_ed25519{,.pub}` (the server keypair — losing this invalidates every
+existing client) and `db_v2.sqlite3` (users, address books, audit, etc.).
+Back up the whole directory.
+
+**TLS.** The server itself speaks plain HTTP on 21114 and plain WebSocket
+on 21118 / 21119. Front it with nginx or Caddy for TLS — see the "TLS
+deployment" section in `CONFIGURATION.md`. When you do, set
+`--http-listen=127.0.0.1` and `--ws-listen=127.0.0.1` in the `command:`
+block so the reverse proxy can claim the public ports.
+
+**Building behind a proxy.** Pass `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` build args
+through Compose:
+
+```yaml
+    build:
+      <<: *rustdesk-build
+      args:
+        HTTP_PROXY: http://proxy.internal:3128
+        HTTPS_PROXY: http://proxy.internal:3128
+```
+
+**Resource hint.** Cold compile takes ~3–5 GB of RAM for the linker step
+(LTO + `codegen-units = 1`). On a small VPS, build the image on a beefier
+machine, push to a registry, and pull from the VPS instead — set the
+`image:` field to a registry tag and drop the `build:` block.
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+# Strategies — server-pushed client config
+
+Strategies let an admin push client configuration to peers centrally,
+without touching each device. They are managed from the dashboard's
+**Strategies** page (`/admin/#strategies`).
+
+---
+
+## How it works
+
+1. **Storage.** A strategy is a row with a name and a `config_options`
+   JSON object (plus an `extra` object, reserved — currently always
+   `{}`). The Strategies page validates only that `config_options` is a
+   valid JSON **object**; it does **not** validate the keys inside it.
+2. **Delivery.** On each peer heartbeat the server resolves the
+   applicable strategy and embeds it in the reply as
+   `strategy.config_options`. Changes propagate within ~15 s of the
+   strategy row's `modified_at` changing.
+3. **Apply.** The client merges every key/value straight into its own
+   options map (the same store behind "advanced settings" and the
+   `--config` deploy blob). A strategy key is therefore *any* key the
+   RustDesk client reads via `Config::get_option`.
+
+### Resolution order (per peer)
+
+The first match wins:
+
+1. Direct peer-scoped assignment (`strategy_assignments.peer_id`)
+2. Device-group assignment, via the peer's owner
+3. User assignment
+
+If nothing matches, an empty config is pushed.
+
+### Value conventions
+
+- **All values are strings**, even numbers (`"30"`, not `30`).
+- **Boolean keys** use `"Y"` (on) / `"N"` (off). Most default to off
+  when unset.
+- **An empty string `""`** removes the override and lets the client
+  fall back to its built-in default. (If a built-in default settings
+  blob is present, an empty value instead keeps the key present.)
+- Keys the client version doesn't recognize are stored, pushed, and
+  silently ignored — there is **no error feedback for typos**. Verify
+  against the `keys` module in `libs/hbb_common/src/config.rs` of the
+  client version you deploy.
+
+### Example
+
+```json
+{
+  "enable-keyboard": "N",
+  "enable-file-transfer": "N",
+  "access-mode": "view",
+  "image_quality": "best",
+  "whitelist": "192.168.1.0/24,10.0.0.0/8",
+  "verification-method": "use-permanent-password"
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Known config keys
+
+The keys below are the complete set defined in the client's `keys`
+module (`libs/hbb_common/src/config.rs`). Not all are equally useful in
+a server-managed strategy — UI-state keys (peer tabs, toolbar, floating
+window) are listed for completeness but are normally per-user.
+
+### Access control & permissions
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `access-mode` | `full` / `view` / `custom` | Overall permission preset for incoming sessions |
+| `enable-keyboard` | `Y`/`N` | Allow remote keyboard input |
+| `enable-clipboard` | `Y`/`N` | Allow clipboard sync |
+| `enable-file-transfer` | `Y`/`N` | Allow file transfer |
+| `enable-camera` | `Y`/`N` | Allow camera access |
+| `enable-terminal` | `Y`/`N` | Allow terminal access |
+| `terminal-persistent` | `Y`/`N` | Keep terminal sessions persistent |
+| `enable-audio` | `Y`/`N` | Allow audio |
+| `enable-tunnel` | `Y`/`N` | Allow TCP tunnelling |
+| `enable-remote-restart` | `Y`/`N` | Allow remote restart of the host |
+| `enable-record-session` | `Y`/`N` | Allow session recording |
+| `enable-block-input` | `Y`/`N` | Allow blocking local input |
+| `enable-privacy-mode` | `Y`/`N` | Allow privacy mode |
+| `enable-perm-change-in-accept-window` | `Y`/`N` | Allow changing permissions in the accept dialog |
+| `allow-remote-config-modification` | `Y`/`N` | Allow remote side to change this host's config |
+| `allow-numeric-one-time-password` | `Y`/`N` | Permit numeric one-time passwords |
+| `approve-mode` | `password` / `click` / `password-click` | How incoming connections are approved |
+| `verification-method` | `use-temporary-password` / `use-permanent-password` / `use-both-passwords` | Password verification mode |
+| `temporary-password-length` | `6` / `8` / `10` | Length of generated one-time passwords |
+| `allow-only-conn-window-open` | `Y`/`N` | Only accept connections while the connection window is open |
+| `allow-auto-disconnect` | `Y`/`N` | Auto-disconnect idle sessions |
+| `auto-disconnect-timeout` | minutes | Idle timeout for auto-disconnect |
+| `approve-mode` | see above | (alias note: stored as `approve-mode`) |
+| `enable-trusted-devices` | `Y`/`N` | Enable the trusted-devices feature |
+| `allow-logon-screen-password` | `Y`/`N` | Allow password entry on the logon screen |
+| `disable-change-permanent-password` | `Y`/`N` | Prevent the user changing the permanent password |
+| `disable-change-id` | `Y`/`N` | Prevent the user changing the device ID |
+| `disable-unlock-pin` | `Y`/`N` | Disable the unlock PIN feature |
+| `enable-remote-exec` | `Y`/`N` | Allow admins to dispatch PowerShell scripts to this peer via the dashboard's **Run command** action. Server-side only — the value is checked at dispatch time, never pushed to the client. See [AGENT-API-AUTH.md](AGENT-API-AUTH.md) for the auth model. Off by default; only effective on `peer.managed=1` peers. |
+
+### Network & connectivity
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `custom-rendezvous-server` | host | ID/rendezvous server address |
+| `relay-server` | host | Relay server address |
+| `api-server` | URL | API server address |
+| `key` | string | Server public key |
+| `ice-servers` | string | ICE servers for WebRTC |
+| `direct-server` | `Y`/`N` | Enable direct IP access listener |
+| `direct-access-port` | port | Port for direct IP access |
+| `enable-udp-punch` | `Y`/`N` | Enable UDP hole punching |
+| `enable-ipv6-punch` | `Y`/`N` | Enable IPv6 hole punching |
+| `disable-udp` | `Y`/`N` | Disable UDP (force TCP) |
+| `allow-websocket` | `Y`/`N` | Allow WebSocket transport |
+| `allow-insecure-tls-fallback` | `Y`/`N` | Allow falling back to insecure TLS |
+| `enable-lan-discovery` | `Y`/`N` | Allow discovery on the local network |
+| `whitelist` | IPs/CIDRs | Comma/space/`;`-separated allow-list; empty = allow all |
+| `allow-https-21114` | `Y`/`N` | Use HTTPS on port 21114 |
+| `use-raw-tcp-for-api` | `Y`/`N` | Use raw TCP for the API connection |
+| `allow-hostname-as-id` | `Y`/`N` | Allow using the hostname as device ID |
+| `proxy-url` | URL | Proxy server URL |
+| `proxy-username` | string | Proxy username |
+| `proxy-password` | string | Proxy password |
+
+### Display, codec & quality
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `view_style` | `original` / `adaptive` | Remote display scaling |
+| `scroll_style` | `scrollauto` / `scrollbar` | Scroll behaviour |
+| `image_quality` | `best` / `balanced` / `low` / `custom` | Image quality preset |
+| `custom_image_quality` | `10`–`4095` | Custom quality value |
+| `custom-fps` | `5`–`120` | Custom frame rate |
+| `codec-preference` | `auto` / `vp8` / `vp9` / `av1` / `h264` / `h265` | Preferred video codec |
+| `enable-hwcodec` | `Y`/`N` | Enable hardware codec |
+| `enable-abr` | `Y`/`N` | Enable adaptive bitrate |
+| `i444` | `Y`/`N` | Use YUV 4:4:4 (true colour) |
+| `av1-test` | `Y`/`N` | Enable AV1 test path |
+| `zoom-cursor` | `Y`/`N` | Zoom the remote cursor |
+| `show_remote_cursor` | `Y`/`N` | Show the remote cursor |
+| `follow_remote_cursor` | `Y`/`N` | Follow the remote cursor |
+| `follow_remote_window` | `Y`/`N` | Follow the remote active window |
+| `show_quality_monitor` | `Y`/`N` | Show the quality monitor overlay |
+| `show_monitors_toolbar` | `Y`/`N` | Show the monitors toolbar |
+| `collapse_toolbar` | `Y`/`N` | Start with the toolbar collapsed |
+| `view_only` | `Y`/`N` | Open sessions view-only by default |
+| `touch-mode` | `Y`/`N` | Enable touch mode |
+| `displays_as_individual_windows` | `Y`/`N` | Show each remote display in its own window |
+| `use_all_my_displays_for_the_remote_session` | `Y`/`N` | Use all local displays for the session |
+| `use-texture-render` | `Y`/`N` | Use texture rendering |
+| `allow-d3d-render` | `Y`/`N` | Allow Direct3D rendering |
+| `enable-directx-capture` | `Y`/`N` | Use DirectX for screen capture |
+| `allow-always-software-render` | `Y`/`N` | Force software rendering |
+| `allow-linux-headless` | `Y`/`N` | Allow headless mode on Linux |
+
+### Input
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `reverse_mouse_wheel` | `Y`/`N` | Reverse mouse-wheel direction |
+| `swap-left-right-mouse` | `Y`/`N` | Swap mouse buttons |
+| `trackpad-speed` | `10`–`1000` | Trackpad speed (percent) |
+| `edge-scroll-edge-thickness` | `20`–`150` | Edge-scroll trigger thickness |
+
+### Recording, files & clipboard
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `allow-auto-record-incoming` | `Y`/`N` | Auto-record incoming sessions |
+| `allow-auto-record-outgoing` | `Y`/`N` | Auto-record outgoing sessions |
+| `video-save-directory` | path | Directory for recordings |
+| `enable-file-copy-paste` | `Y`/`N` | Allow file copy/paste |
+| `file-transfer-max-files` | number | Max files per transfer request |
+| `one-way-file-transfer` | `Y`/`N` | Restrict file transfer to one direction |
+| `sync-init-clipboard` | `Y`/`N` | Sync clipboard at session start |
+| `disable_clipboard` | `Y`/`N` | Disable clipboard |
+| `disable_audio` | `Y`/`N` | Disable audio |
+| `one-way-clipboard-redirection` | `Y`/`N` | One-way clipboard redirection |
+| `lock_after_session_end` | `Y`/`N` | Lock the host after a session ends |
+| `privacy_mode` | `Y`/`N` | Enable privacy mode for the session |
+
+### Printer
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `enable-remote-printer` | `Y`/`N` | Enable remote printing |
+| `printer-incomming-job-action` | string | Action for incoming print jobs (note: key is spelled `incomming`) |
+| `allow-printer-auto-print` | `Y`/`N` | Allow automatic printing |
+| `printer-selected-name` | string | Selected printer name |
+
+### Update behaviour
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `enable-check-update` | `Y`/`N` | Check for updates |
+| `allow-auto-update` | `Y`/`N` | Allow automatic updates |
+
+### Power & session
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `keep-screen-on` | string | Keep the screen on |
+| `keep-awake-during-incoming-sessions` | `Y`/`N` | Keep host awake during incoming sessions |
+| `keep-awake-during-outgoing-sessions` | `Y`/`N` | Keep client awake during outgoing sessions |
+| `allow-ask-for-note` | `Y`/`N` | Prompt for a session note |
+| `pre-elevate-service` | `Y`/`N` | Pre-elevate the service |
+| `register-device` | `Y`/`N` | Register the device with the API server |
+
+### UI visibility / branding lockdown
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `hide-security-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the Security settings tab |
+| `hide-network-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the Network settings tab |
+| `hide-server-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the Server settings tab |
+| `hide-proxy-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the Proxy settings tab |
+| `hide-remote-printer-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide remote-printer settings |
+| `hide-websocket-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Hide WebSocket settings |
+| `hide-stop-service` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the "stop service" control |
+| `hide-tray` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the system-tray icon |
+| `hide-powered-by-me` | `Y`/`N` | Hide "powered by" branding |
+| `hide-username-on-card` | `Y`/`N` | Hide username on peer cards |
+| `hide-help-cards` | `Y`/`N` | Hide help cards |
+| `hideAbTagsPanel` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the address-book tags panel |
+| `main-window-always-on-top` | `Y`/`N` | Keep the main window on top |
+| `theme` | `light` / `dark` / `system` | UI theme |
+| `lang` | language code | UI language |
+| `remote-menubar-drag-left` | `Y`/`N` | Allow dragging the left remote menubar |
+| `remote-menubar-drag-right` | `Y`/`N` | Allow dragging the right remote menubar |
+| `enable-confirm-closing-tabs` | `Y`/`N` | Confirm before closing tabs |
+| `enable-open-new-connections-in-tabs` | `Y`/`N` | Open new connections in tabs |
+| `disable-group-panel` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the group panel |
+| `disable-discovery-panel` | `Y`/`N` | Hide the discovery panel |
+
+### Address book
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `sync-ab-with-recent-sessions` | `Y`/`N` | Sync address book with recent sessions |
+| `sync-ab-tags` | `Y`/`N` | Sync address-book tags |
+| `filter-ab-by-intersection` | `Y`/`N` | Filter address book by tag intersection |
+
+### Deep links
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `allow-deep-link-password` | `Y`/`N` | Allow passwords in deep links |
+| `allow-deep-link-server-settings` | `Y`/`N` | Allow server settings in deep links |
+
+### Preset values (deploy/provisioning)
+
+These pre-fill fields during enrollment/deploy rather than gating behaviour.
+
+| Key | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| `display-name` | Device display name |
+| `avatar` | Device avatar |
+| `default-connect-password` | Default connection password |
+| `remove-preset-password-warning` | Suppress the preset-password warning |
+| `preset-user-name` | Pre-fill username |
+| `preset-strategy-name` | Pre-fill strategy name |
+| `preset-device-group-name` | Pre-fill device group |
+| `preset-device-username` | Pre-fill device username |
+| `preset-device-name` | Pre-fill device name |
+| `preset-note` | Pre-fill session note |
+| `preset-address-book-name` | Pre-fill address-book name |
+| `preset-address-book-tag` | Pre-fill address-book tag |
+| `preset-address-book-alias` | Pre-fill address-book alias |
+| `preset-address-book-password` | Pre-fill address-book password |
+| `preset-address-book-note` | Pre-fill address-book note |
+
+### Android / mobile
+
+| Key | Values | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `show-virtual-mouse` | `Y`/`N` | Show the virtual mouse |
+| `show-virtual-joystick` | `Y`/`N` | Show the virtual joystick (also set `show-virtual-mouse`) |
+| `disable-floating-window` | `Y`/`N` | Disable the floating window |
+| `floating-window-size` | string | Floating-window size |
+| `floating-window-untouchable` | `Y`/`N` | Make the floating window non-interactive |
+| `floating-window-transparency` | number | Floating-window transparency |
+| `floating-window-svg` | string | Floating-window SVG icon |
+| `enable-android-software-encoding-half-scale` | `Y`/`N` | Half-scale Android software encoding |
+
+### UI state (normally per-user — listed for completeness)
+
+`remoteMenubarState`, `peer-sorting`, `peer-tab-index`, `peer-tab-order`,
+`peer-tab-visible`, `peer-card-ui-type`, `current-ab-name`,
+`enable-flutter-http-on-rust`, `allow-remote-cm-modification`.
+
+---
+
+## Notes & caveats
+
+- The list above reflects the client `keys` module at documentation
+  time. Newer clients may add keys; older clients will ignore keys they
+  don't know. There is no negotiation — match the doc to the client
+  version you actually deploy.
+- Some keys also exist as hbbs/hbbr command-line flags
+  (`custom-rendezvous-server`, `relay-server`, `key`, …). Pushing them
+  via a strategy overrides the client's local value; it does not change
+  the server.
+- The `extra` object on a strategy row is reserved and currently always
+  `{}` — there is no UI to populate it.
+- For the overall configuration picture see
+  [CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md#strategies-server-pushed-config).
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+//! End-to-end smoke test for the HttpProxyRequest fallback.
+//!
+//! Mirrors what a logged-in client does when `OPTION_USE_RAW_TCP_FOR_API=Y`:
+//!   1. Open TCP to hbbs's rendezvous port.
+//!   2. Read the server-initiated `KeyExchange`.
+//!   3. Verify the signature with the server's published Ed25519 pubkey.
+//!   4. Reply with `KeyExchange { keys: [client_box_pk, sealed_sym_key] }`.
+//!   5. Send `HttpProxyRequest { method, path, headers, body }`.
+//!   6. Receive `HttpProxyResponse` and print status + body.
+//!
+//! Run from the same dir as hbbs's `id_ed25519.pub`:
+//!   cargo run --example http_proxy_test -- 127.0.0.1:21116
+
+use hbb_common::bytes::Bytes;
+use hbb_common::protobuf::Message as _;
+use hbb_common::rendezvous_proto::{
+    rendezvous_message, HttpProxyRequest, KeyExchange, RendezvousMessage,
+};
+use hbb_common::tcp::FramedStream;
+use hbb_common::tokio;
+use sodiumoxide::crypto::{box_, secretbox, sign};
+
+#[tokio::main(flavor = "current_thread")]
+async fn main() {
+    let addr_arg = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or_else(|| "127.0.0.1:21116".into());
+    let pubkey_path = std::env::args()
+        .nth(2)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "id_ed25519.pub".into());
+
+    // 1. Connect.
+    let addr: std::net::SocketAddr = addr_arg.parse().expect("bad addr");
+    let raw = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.expect("connect");
+    let mut fs = FramedStream::from(raw, addr);
+
+    // 2. Read the server-pushed KeyExchange.
+    let bytes = fs
+        .next()
+        .await
+        .expect("server closed")
+        .expect("read err");
+    let msg = RendezvousMessage::parse_from_bytes(&bytes).expect("parse first frame");
+    let kx_in = match msg.union {
+        Some(rendezvous_message::Union::KeyExchange(ex)) => ex,
+        other => panic!(
+            "expected KeyExchange as first frame, got {:?}",
+            other.map(|_| "<some other variant>")
+        ),
+    };
+    assert_eq!(
+        kx_in.keys.len(),
+        1,
+        "server KX must carry exactly one signed pubkey"
+    );
+
+    // 3. Verify the signature.
+    let pk_b64 = std::fs::read_to_string(&pubkey_path)
+        .expect("read pubkey")
+        .trim()
+        .to_string();
+    let pk_bytes = base64::decode(&pk_b64).expect("base64 pubkey");
+    assert_eq!(pk_bytes.len(), 32, "Ed25519 pubkey must be 32 bytes");
+    let rs_pk = sign::PublicKey::from_slice(&pk_bytes).expect("pubkey");
+    let their_box_pk_bytes =
+        sign::verify(&kx_in.keys[0], &rs_pk).expect("KX signature mismatch");
+    assert_eq!(their_box_pk_bytes.len(), 32, "box pk must be 32 bytes");
+    let their_box_pk =
+        box_::PublicKey::from_slice(&their_box_pk_bytes).expect("box pk shape");
+
+    // 4. Generate ephemeral keypair + sym key, seal the sym key with NaCl box,
+    //    send back KX.
+    let (our_box_pk, our_box_sk) = box_::gen_keypair();
+    let sym_key = secretbox::gen_key();
+    let nonce = box_::Nonce([0u8; 24]);
+    let sealed = box_::seal(&sym_key.0, &nonce, &their_box_pk, &our_box_sk);
+
+    let mut out = RendezvousMessage::new();
+    out.set_key_exchange(KeyExchange {
+        keys: vec![Bytes::from(our_box_pk.0.to_vec()), Bytes::from(sealed)],
+        ..Default::default()
+    });
+    fs.send(&out).await.expect("send KX");
+    fs.set_key(sym_key);
+    println!("[ok] secure_tcp handshake complete");
+
+    // 5. HttpProxyRequest — exercise an unauthenticated route first.
+    let mut req_msg = RendezvousMessage::new();
+    req_msg.set_http_proxy_request(HttpProxyRequest {
+        method: "GET".into(),
+        path: "/api/login-options".into(),
+        headers: vec![],
+        body: Bytes::new(),
+        ..Default::default()
+    });
+    fs.send(&req_msg).await.expect("send HttpProxyRequest");
+    println!("[ok] sent HttpProxyRequest GET /api/login-options");
+
+    // 6. Receive HttpProxyResponse.
+    let bytes = fs
+        .next()
+        .await
+        .expect("server closed mid-response")
+        .expect("read err");
+    let resp_msg =
+        RendezvousMessage::parse_from_bytes(&bytes).expect("parse response");
+    match resp_msg.union {
+        Some(rendezvous_message::Union::HttpProxyResponse(r)) => {
+            println!("[ok] response status = {}", r.status);
+            println!(
+                "[ok] response body   = {}",
+                std::str::from_utf8(&r.body).unwrap_or("<non-utf8>")
+            );
+            for h in &r.headers {
+                println!("       {}: {}", h.name, h.value);
+            }
+            assert_eq!(r.status, 200, "expected HTTP 200 from /api/login-options");
+            assert!(
+                std::str::from_utf8(&r.body)
+                    .map(|s| s.contains("account"))
+                    .unwrap_or(false),
+                "body should mention `account`"
+            );
+            println!("[pass] full HTTP-over-rendezvous round trip verified");
+        }
+        other => panic!("expected HttpProxyResponse, got {:?}", other.is_some()),
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+//! Legacy single-blob address book — `GET /api/ab` and `POST /api/ab`.
+//!
+//! Activated when the operator sets `--ab-legacy-mode=on` (which makes
+//! `/api/ab/personal` 404 — the documented signal in CONSOLE_API.md §4.2).
+//! The wire shape is a JSON-string field `data` whose contents are a second
+//! JSON object: `{tags, peers, tag_colors}`. We translate to/from the
+//! normalized M2 schema on the personal AB.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::AbPeerRow;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde_json::{json, Map, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub async fn get(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    let guid = state
+        .db
+        .ab_get_or_create_personal(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    // Pull all peers and all tags. Page size 1000 is fine — legacy clients
+    // expected a single blob anyway.
+    let (_total, peers) = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_peers(&guid, 0, 10_000)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let tags = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_tags(&guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let mut tag_colors = Map::new();
+    let tag_names: Vec<&str> = tags.iter().map(|t| t.name.as_str()).collect();
+    for t in &tags {
+        tag_colors.insert(t.name.clone(), Value::from(t.color));
+    }
+    let peer_arr: Vec<Value> = peers
+        .iter()
+        .map(|p| {
+            json!({
+                "id":       p.id,
+                "alias":    p.alias,
+                "tags":     p.tags,
+                "username": p.username,
+                "hostname": p.hostname,
+                "platform": p.platform,
+                "hash":     p.hash,
+            })
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let inner = json!({
+        "tags":       tag_names,
+        "peers":      peer_arr,
+        "tag_colors": Value::String(serde_json::to_string(&tag_colors).unwrap_or_default()),
+    });
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "data": inner.to_string() })))
+}
+
+#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct LegacyPostBody {
+    pub data: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn put(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Json(body): Json<LegacyPostBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    let guid = state
+        .db
+        .ab_get_or_create_personal(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let inner: Value = serde_json::from_str(&body.data)
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::BadRequest(format!("data is not valid json: {}", e)))?;
+    // Tag colors are stored as a JSON-encoded string field (Flutter wraps
+    // the map in another JSON layer). Tolerate either an inline map or the
+    // doubly-encoded form.
+    let tag_colors_map: Map<String, Value> = match inner.get("tag_colors") {
+        Some(Value::String(s)) => serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap_or_default(),
+        Some(Value::Object(m)) => m.clone(),
+        _ => Map::new(),
+    };
+    let tag_names: Vec<String> = inner
+        .get("tags")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
+        .map(|arr| {
+            arr.iter()
+                .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(|s| s.to_string()))
+                .collect()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let tags: Vec<(String, i64)> = tag_names
+        .iter()
+        .map(|n| {
+            let color = tag_colors_map
+                .get(n)
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_i64())
+                .unwrap_or(0);
+            (n.clone(), color)
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let peer_arr = inner
+        .get("peers")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
+        .cloned()
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let mut peers: Vec<AbPeerRow> = Vec::with_capacity(peer_arr.len());
+    for p in peer_arr {
+        let id = p
+            .get("id")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+            .to_string();
+        if id.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let tags = p
+            .get("tags")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
+            .map(|arr| {
+                arr.iter()
+                    .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(|s| s.to_string()))
+                    .collect()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        peers.push(AbPeerRow {
+            id,
+            alias: get_str(&p, "alias"),
+            note: String::new(),
+            password: String::new(),
+            hash: get_str(&p, "hash"),
+            username: get_str(&p, "username"),
+            hostname: get_str(&p, "hostname"),
+            platform: get_str(&p, "platform"),
+            tags,
+        });
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_legacy_replace(&guid, &tags, &peers)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+fn get_str(v: &Value, k: &str) -> String {
+    v.get(k)
+        .and_then(|x| x.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+        .to_string()
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+pub mod legacy;
+pub mod peers;
+pub mod profiles;
+pub mod rules;
+pub mod settings;
+pub mod tags;
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+use crate::api::ab::rules::{enforce, Rule};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::pagination::Page;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::AbPeerInsert;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// `serde_urlencoded` (axum's query decoder) does not honour
+/// `#[serde(flatten)]`, so the pagination fields are spelled out inline.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AbQuery {
+    /// guid sent in the query string for `/api/ab/peers?ab=<guid>`.
+    pub ab: String,
+    #[serde(default = "default_current")]
+    pub current: i64,
+    #[serde(default = "default_page_size", rename = "pageSize")]
+    pub page_size: i64,
+}
+
+fn default_current() -> i64 {
+    1
+}
+fn default_page_size() -> i64 {
+    100
+}
+
+impl AbQuery {
+    fn offset(&self) -> i64 {
+        (self.current.max(1) - 1) * self.limit()
+    }
+    fn limit(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.page_size.clamp(1, 1000)
+    }
+}
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/peers?ab=<guid>` — paginated peer list inside an AB.
+/// Wire shape matches the Flutter `Peer` decoder; only fields documented in
+/// CONSOLE_API.md §4.4 are surfaced.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+struct PeerOut {
+    id: String,
+    alias: String,
+    tags: Vec<String>,
+    note: String,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
+    password: String,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
+    hash: String,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
+    username: String,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
+    hostname: String,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
+    platform: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn list(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Query(q): Query<AbQuery>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &q.ab, Rule::Read).await?;
+    let (total, rows) = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_peers(&q.ab, q.offset(), q.limit())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let data: Vec<PeerOut> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| PeerOut {
+            id: r.id,
+            alias: r.alias,
+            tags: r.tags,
+            note: r.note,
+            password: r.password,
+            hash: r.hash,
+            username: r.username,
+            hostname: r.hostname,
+            platform: r.platform,
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(Page { total, data })))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PeerAddBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub alias: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub note: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub hash: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub hostname: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub platform: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/peer/add/{guid}` — insert one peer. **Returns HTTP 200
+/// with an empty body on success**, or `{"error":"..."}` JSON body on failure
+/// (also HTTP 200). The Flutter `_jsonDecodeActionResp` at
+/// flutter/lib/models/ab_model.dart:2002 treats *any* non-empty success body
+/// as an error to surface — including `{}` (which produces the literal string
+/// "null"), so action endpoints must reply with truly empty bodies.
+pub async fn add(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<PeerAddBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    if body.id.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id required".into()));
+    }
+    let max = state.cfg.ab_max_peers_per_book;
+    let count = state
+        .db
+        .ab_count_peers(&guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if count >= max {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("exceed_max_devices".into()));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_peer_insert(
+            &guid,
+            AbPeerInsert {
+                id: &body.id,
+                alias: body.alias.as_deref(),
+                note: body.note.as_deref(),
+                password: body.password.as_deref(),
+                hash: body.hash.as_deref(),
+                username: body.username.as_deref(),
+                hostname: body.hostname.as_deref(),
+                platform: body.platform.as_deref(),
+            },
+            body.tags.as_deref(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+/// `PUT /api/ab/peer/update/{guid}` — partial update. Body always carries
+/// `id`, plus any subset of mutable fields. Empty success body, see `add`.
+pub async fn update(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<Value>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    let id = body
+        .get("id")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("id required".into()))?;
+    let updated = state
+        .db
+        .ab_peer_partial_update(&guid, id, &body)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if !updated {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("peer not found".into()));
+    }
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+/// `DELETE /api/ab/peer/{guid}` — body is a JSON array of peer IDs. Empty
+/// success body, see `add`.
+pub async fn delete(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(ids): Json<Vec<String>>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_peers_delete(&guid, &ids)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::pagination::{Page, PageQuery};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Serialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/personal` — returns the caller's personal AB GUID, creating
+/// it if missing. When `--ab-legacy-mode=on` is configured, returns 404 to
+/// signal "this server speaks the legacy single-blob protocol" (the client
+/// then falls back to GET/POST /api/ab).
+pub async fn personal(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if state.cfg.ab_legacy_mode {
+        return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
+    }
+    let guid = state
+        .db
+        .ab_get_or_create_personal(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "guid": guid })))
+}
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/shared/profiles` — paginated list of shared address books
+/// the caller can see. Wire shape matches the Flutter `AbProfile` decoder at
+/// flutter/lib/common/hbbs/hbbs.dart:258.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+struct AbProfileOut {
+    guid: String,
+    name: String,
+    owner: String,
+    note: String,
+    rule: i64,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    info: Option<Value>,
+}
+
+pub async fn shared_profiles(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Query(page): Query<PageQuery>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, ApiError> {
+    let (total, rows) = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_shared_for_user(user.user_id, page.offset(), page.limit())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let data = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| AbProfileOut {
+            guid: r.guid,
+            name: r.name,
+            owner: r.owner,
+            note: r.note,
+            rule: r.rule,
+            info: r
+                .info_json
+                .as_deref()
+                .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str(s).ok()),
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(Page { total, data })))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+
+/// Share-rule levels for a shared address book. Wire integers match the
+/// Flutter client's `ShareRule` enum at flutter/lib/common/hbbs/hbbs.dart:210.
+#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+pub enum Rule {
+    Read = 1,
+    ReadWrite = 2,
+    Full = 3,
+}
+
+impl Rule {
+    pub fn from_i64(v: i64) -> Option<Self> {
+        match v {
+            1 => Some(Rule::Read),
+            2 => Some(Rule::ReadWrite),
+            3 => Some(Rule::Full),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Enforce that `caller` has at least `needed` access on `ab_guid`. Used at
+/// the top of every AB handler. Resolution lives in
+/// `Database::ab_resolve_rule` and considers (a) AB ownership and (b) the
+/// largest matching rule across direct and device-group shares.
+pub async fn enforce(
+    state: &AppState,
+    caller_user_id: i64,
+    ab_guid: &str,
+    needed: Rule,
+) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    let resolved = state
+        .db
+        .ab_resolve_rule(caller_user_id, ab_guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let Some(have) = resolved.and_then(Rule::from_i64) else {
+        // Either the AB doesn't exist or the caller has no relationship with
+        // it. Surface as "not allowed" so we don't leak existence.
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("not allowed".into()));
+    };
+    if have >= needed {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(ApiError::Forbidden("read-only".into()))
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/settings` — capability/limit probe. The Flutter client
+/// (ab_model.dart:230-258) calls this once per pull cycle to learn
+/// `max_peer_one_ab`. Auth is required even though there is no body.
+pub async fn settings(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    _user: AuthedUser,
+) -> Json<Value> {
+    Json(json!({ "max_peer_one_ab": state.cfg.ab_max_peers_per_book }))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+use crate::api::ab::rules::{enforce, Rule};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// `POST /api/ab/tags/{guid}` — list tags. Wire shape is a bare JSON array
+/// `[{name, color}]`, NOT the `Page<T>` envelope.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+struct TagOut {
+    name: String,
+    color: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn list(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::Read).await?;
+    let rows = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_tags(&guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let out: Vec<TagOut> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|t| TagOut {
+            name: t.name,
+            color: t.color,
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(out)))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TagAddBody {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub color: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn add(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<TagAddBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    if body.name.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("name required".into()));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_tag_insert(&guid, &body.name, body.color)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TagRenameBody {
+    #[serde(rename = "old")]
+    pub old_name: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "new")]
+    pub new_name: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn rename(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<TagRenameBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_tag_rename(&guid, &body.old_name, &body.new_name)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TagUpdateBody {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub color: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn update(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<TagUpdateBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_tag_update_color(&guid, &body.name, body.color)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
+
+pub async fn delete(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Json(names): Json<Vec<String>>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    enforce(&state, user.user_id, &guid, Rule::ReadWrite).await?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_tags_delete(&guid, &names)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+//! `/admin/login` (POST form) and `/admin/logout` (POST). On success login
+//! sets an HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict cookie containing the freshly-minted
+//! Bearer token; the browser carries it on every subsequent request to
+//! `/admin/*` and `/api/*`. The middleware in `api::middleware` already
+//! accepts both `Authorization: Bearer …` and the cookie.
+
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, Lang};
+use crate::api::auth::mint_token;
+use crate::api::middleware::{sha256_token, SESSION_COOKIE};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::users::verify_password;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form};
+use axum::http::header::{COOKIE, SET_COOKIE};
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
+use axum::response::{Html, IntoResponse, Response};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct LoginForm {
+    pub username: String,
+    pub password: String,
+    /// 6-digit TOTP code, present on the second leg when the first leg
+    /// returned `tfa_check`. The HTML input is `name="tfaCode"` (camelCase)
+    /// to match the rest of the dashboard's form conventions, so we rename
+    /// the wire field rather than renaming the input.
+    #[serde(default, rename = "tfaCode")]
+    pub tfa_code: String,
+    /// Echo of the TOTP nonce the first-leg response set on the form.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub secret: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn login(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<LoginForm>,
+) -> Response {
+    // First leg: password verify. Same DB call paths as `/api/login` —
+    // we re-use the existing helpers so the dashboard can't accidentally
+    // diverge from the API's auth contract.
+    let user = match state.db.user_find_by_username(&form.username).await {
+        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
+        Ok(None) => return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.bad_credentials")),
+        Err(e) => return error_fragment(&format!("internal: {}", e)),
+    };
+    let pw_ok = match verify_password(user.password_hash.clone(), form.password.clone()).await {
+        Ok(b) => b,
+        Err(e) => return error_fragment(&format!("internal: {}", e)),
+    };
+    if !pw_ok {
+        return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.bad_credentials"));
+    }
+    if user.status == 0 {
+        return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.account_disabled"));
+    }
+    if !user.is_admin {
+        // Only admins can use the dashboard. Non-admin users still get
+        // tokens via `/api/login` for the desktop client; they just don't
+        // see the management surface.
+        return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.admin_required"));
+    }
+    // Optional second leg: TOTP. If the user has a secret enrolled and the
+    // form didn't carry a code, return a fragment that asks for one.
+    let totp_secret = state
+        .db
+        .totp_get_secret(user.id)
+        .await
+        .ok()
+        .flatten();
+    if let Some(secret_b32) = totp_secret {
+        if form.tfa_code.is_empty() {
+            // Shape used by the JS in login.html to switch to the second
+            // leg: it watches for the special marker via HX-Trigger and
+            // reveals the #tfa-section.
+            let frag = format!(
+                r#"<span data-tfa-required="1" class="text-amber-300">{msg}</span>
+<script>
+  document.getElementById('tfa-section').classList.remove('hidden');
+  document.getElementById('tfaCode').focus();
+</script>"#,
+                msg = t(lang, "login.totp_required"),
+            );
+            // We don't need a session yet — caller will resubmit with the
+            // same username/password plus the code. (No nonce involved on
+            // the dashboard path: the password is already in scope, so
+            // tfa_check / tfa_code are folded into one form.)
+            let _ = secret_b32;
+            return Html(frag).into_response();
+        }
+        // Verify the supplied code.
+        let ok = match crate::api::auth::verify_totp(&secret_b32, &form.tfa_code) {
+            Ok(b) => b,
+            Err(_) => return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.internal_totp")),
+        };
+        if !ok {
+            return error_fragment(t(lang, "login.bad_totp"));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Mint + persist a token, set the cookie.
+    let token = mint_token();
+    let sha = sha256_token(&token);
+    if let Err(e) = state
+        .db
+        .token_insert(
+            user.id,
+            &sha,
+            "",
+            "",
+            r#"{"source":"admin-ui"}"#,
+            state.cfg.session_ttl_secs,
+        )
+        .await
+    {
+        return error_fragment(&format!("internal: {}", e));
+    }
+    let cookie = format!(
+        "{name}={token}; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age={ttl}",
+        name = SESSION_COOKIE,
+        token = token,
+        ttl = state.cfg.session_ttl_secs,
+    );
+    let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+    if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&cookie) {
+        headers.insert(SET_COOKIE, v);
+    }
+    // 200 with empty body; the form's hx-on::after-request redirects on
+    // success.
+    (StatusCode::OK, headers, "").into_response()
+}
+
+pub async fn logout(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+) -> Response {
+    // Best-effort: pull the token out of the cookie, drop the row.
+    if let Some(tok) = cookie_token(&headers) {
+        let sha = sha256_token(&tok);
+        let _ = state.db.token_delete(&sha).await;
+    }
+    let mut out = HeaderMap::new();
+    let clear = format!(
+        "{name}=; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=0",
+        name = SESSION_COOKIE
+    );
+    if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&clear) {
+        out.insert(SET_COOKIE, v);
+    }
+    (StatusCode::OK, out, "").into_response()
+}
+
+fn cookie_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+    let s = headers.get(COOKIE)?.to_str().ok()?;
+    for pair in s.split(';') {
+        if let Some((name, value)) = pair.trim().split_once('=') {
+            if name.trim() == SESSION_COOKIE {
+                let v = value.trim();
+                if !v.is_empty() {
+                    return Some(v.to_string());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn error_fragment(msg: &str) -> Response {
+    let html = format!("<span>{}</span>", html_escape(msg));
+    (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, Html(html)).into_response()
+}
+
+fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+//! `/admin/me` — small HTMX fragment used by the sidebar to show "signed in
+//! as <name>". Doubles as a cheap auth-check for the dashboard shell: if
+//! the cookie isn't valid, the AuthedUser extractor 401s and the page-level
+//! HTMX response handler bounces back to the login form.
+
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use axum::response::Html;
+
+pub async fn me(user: AuthedUser, lang: Lang) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    Ok(Html(format!(
+        "{label} <span class=\"text-slate-300\">{name}</span>",
+        label = t(lang, "nav.signed_in_as"),
+        name = html_escape(&user.name),
+    )))
+}
+
+fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+//! Admin dashboard router. Mounted at `/admin/*` by `api::router` when
+//! the operator hasn't disabled it via `--admin-ui-dir=` (empty).
+//!
+//! Static HTML/CSS lives in `admin_ui/` next to the source tree and is
+//! embedded into the binary at build time via `include_str!` — no separate
+//! deploy artifact, no ServeDir wildcard route conflicting with the
+//! literal /admin/login etc. The ASSETS table at the bottom is the
+//! authoritative list of files we ship.
+//!
+//! Layout served at runtime:
+//!   /admin/                  ← index.html (the SPA shell)
+//!   /admin/login.html        ← login form
+//!   /admin/login             POST handler (form-encoded, sets session cookie)
+//!   /admin/logout            POST handler (clears session cookie)
+//!   /admin/me                GET fragment (current user, sidebar widget)
+//!   /admin/pages/*           GET fragments (one per page)
+
+pub mod auth;
+pub mod i18n;
+pub mod me;
+pub mod oidc_login;
+pub mod pages;
+
+use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
+use axum::response::{Html, IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::routing::{get, post};
+use axum::Router;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{lang_from_headers, t, Lang};
+
+/// Files embedded into the binary. Paths are relative to this source file
+/// per `include_str!`. Adding a new HTML asset = one new entry here.
+const INDEX_HTML: &str = include_str!("../../../admin_ui/index.html");
+const LOGIN_HTML: &str = include_str!("../../../admin_ui/login.html");
+
+/// Third-party JS dependencies vendored under `admin_ui/assets/` so the
+/// dashboard doesn't fetch from cdn.tailwindcss.com / unpkg.com at runtime.
+/// See docs/CONFIGURATION.md "Web client" for the upgrade procedure.
+const TAILWIND_JS: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../admin_ui/assets/tailwindcss.js");
+const HTMX_JS: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../admin_ui/assets/htmx.min.js");
+
+pub fn build(state: Arc<crate::api::state::AppState>) -> Option<Router> {
+    if state.cfg.admin_ui_dir.is_empty() {
+        // Operator opted out by setting the flag to empty.
+        return None;
+    }
+    let r = Router::new()
+        // Static HTML pages — explicit routes per file, no wildcard.
+        .route("/admin", get(serve_index))
+        .route("/admin/", get(serve_index))
+        .route("/admin/index.html", get(serve_index))
+        .route("/admin/login.html", get(serve_login))
+        // Vendored third-party JS — versions pinned in source, so we can
+        // cache aggressively (immutable + 1-year max-age).
+        .route("/admin/assets/tailwindcss.js", get(serve_tailwind))
+        .route("/admin/assets/htmx.min.js", get(serve_htmx))
+        // Dynamic dashboard endpoints.
+        .route("/admin/login", post(auth::login))
+        .route("/admin/logout", post(auth::logout))
+        .route("/admin/me", get(me::me))
+        // OIDC entry points consumed by login.html (unauthenticated — they
+        // *initiate* a sign-in). The matching /oidc/callback is mounted by
+        // the public api router and finishes both desktop and admin flows.
+        .route("/admin/oidc/providers", get(oidc_login::list_providers))
+        .route("/admin/login/oidc/:provider", get(oidc_login::start_login))
+        // Page fragments — one per sidebar entry.
+        .route("/admin/pages/users", get(pages::users::index))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/table-fragment",
+            get(pages::users::table_fragment),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/columns",
+            post(pages::users::set_columns),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/page-size",
+            post(pages::users::set_page_size),
+        )
+        .route("/admin/pages/users/new", get(pages::users::new_form))
+        .route("/admin/pages/users/create", post(pages::users::create))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/update-info",
+            post(pages::users::update_info),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/password-reset",
+            post(pages::users::reset_password),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/toggle-admin",
+            post(pages::users::toggle_admin),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/toggle-status",
+            post(pages::users::toggle_status),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/totp-enroll",
+            post(pages::users::totp_enroll),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/users/:id/totp-unenroll",
+            post(pages::users::totp_unenroll),
+        )
+        .route("/admin/pages/users/:id/delete", post(pages::users::delete))
+        // Devices
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/list-fragment",
+            get(pages::devices::list_fragment),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/columns",
+            post(pages::devices::set_columns),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/page-size",
+            post(pages::devices::set_page_size),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/detail",
+            get(pages::devices::detail),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/disconnect",
+            post(pages::devices::force_disconnect),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/sysinfo-refresh",
+            post(pages::devices::force_sysinfo),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/delete",
+            post(pages::devices::delete),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/toggle-managed",
+            post(pages::devices::toggle_managed),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec",
+            get(pages::exec::index).post(pages::exec::dispatch),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec/:cmd_id/poll",
+            get(pages::exec::poll),
+        )
+        // Groups
+        .route("/admin/pages/groups/create", post(pages::groups::create))
+        .route("/admin/pages/groups/:id/delete", post(pages::groups::delete))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/groups/:id/members/add",
+            post(pages::groups::add_member),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/groups/:id/members/:user_id/remove",
+            post(pages::groups::remove_member),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/groups/:id/peers/add",
+            post(pages::groups::add_peer),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/groups/:id/peers/:peer_id/remove",
+            post(pages::groups::remove_peer),
+        )
+        // Strategies
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/create",
+            post(pages::strategies::create),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/:id/update",
+            post(pages::strategies::update),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/:id/delete",
+            post(pages::strategies::delete),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/:id/assignments/group",
+            post(pages::strategies::assign_group),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/:id/assignments/peer",
+            post(pages::strategies::assign_peer),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/strategies/:id/assignments/:assignment_id/delete",
+            post(pages::strategies::unassign),
+        )
+        .route("/admin/pages/deploy", get(pages::deploy::index))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/deploy/generate",
+            post(pages::deploy::generate),
+        )
+        // Web client (M6) — full-page SPA, NOT an HTMX fragment. Mounted
+        // outside /admin/pages/ because it's a standalone document the
+        // operator opens in a new tab from the Devices action menu.
+        .route(
+            "/admin/connect/:peer_id",
+            get(pages::connect::index),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/connect/assets/bundle.js",
+            get(pages::connect::bundle_js),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/connect/assets/bundle.css",
+            get(pages::connect::bundle_css),
+        )
+        .route("/admin/pages/devices", get(pages::devices::index))
+        .route("/admin/pages/groups", get(pages::groups::index))
+        .route("/admin/pages/strategies", get(pages::strategies::index))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books",
+            get(pages::address_books::index),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books/create",
+            post(pages::address_books::create),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books/:guid/delete",
+            post(pages::address_books::delete),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books/:guid/manage",
+            get(pages::address_books::manage),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books/:guid/shares/add",
+            post(pages::address_books::share_add),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/address-books/:guid/shares/:user_id/remove",
+            post(pages::address_books::share_remove),
+        )
+        // Self-service profile — cookie-only, no admin gate.
+        .route("/admin/pages/profile", get(pages::profile::index))
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/profile/update-info",
+            post(pages::profile::update_info),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/profile/change-password",
+            post(pages::profile::change_password),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/profile/totp/start",
+            post(pages::profile::totp_start),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/profile/totp/confirm",
+            post(pages::profile::totp_confirm),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/admin/pages/profile/totp/remove",
+            post(pages::profile::totp_remove),
+        )
+        .route("/admin/pages/audit", get(pages::audit::index));
+    hbb_common::log::info!(
+        "admin dashboard mounted at /admin (HTML embedded; --admin-ui-dir is informational)"
+    );
+    Some(r)
+}
+
+async fn serve_index(headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    let lang = lang_from_headers(&headers);
+    html_response_owned(render_index(lang))
+}
+
+async fn serve_login(headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    let lang = lang_from_headers(&headers);
+    html_response_owned(render_login(lang))
+}
+
+/// Apply i18n placeholders to the embedded `index.html` template.
+/// `APP_VERSION` is intentionally distinct from the `T_*` translation
+/// tokens — it's a server-side constant, not a localizable string.
+fn render_index(lang: Lang) -> String {
+    let body = INDEX_HTML
+        .replace("{{LANG_CODE}}", lang.code())
+        .replace("{{T_APP_TITLE}}", t(lang, "shell.app_title"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_USERS}}", t(lang, "nav.users"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_DEVICES}}", t(lang, "nav.devices"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_GROUPS}}", t(lang, "nav.groups"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_STRATEGIES}}", t(lang, "nav.strategies"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_AB}}", t(lang, "nav.address_books"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_AUDIT}}", t(lang, "nav.audit"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_DEPLOY}}", t(lang, "nav.deploy"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_PROFILE}}", t(lang, "nav.profile"))
+        .replace("{{T_NAV_SIGNOUT}}", t(lang, "nav.signout"))
+        .replace("{{T_LANGUAGE}}", t(lang, "common.language"))
+        .replace("{{T_LOADING}}", t(lang, "common.loading"))
+        .replace("{{APP_VERSION}}", crate::version::VERSION);
+    apply_lang_selected(body, lang)
+}
+
+/// Apply i18n placeholders to the embedded `login.html` template.
+fn render_login(lang: Lang) -> String {
+    let body = LOGIN_HTML
+        .replace("{{LANG_CODE}}", lang.code())
+        .replace("{{T_TITLE}}", t(lang, "login.title"))
+        .replace("{{T_SUBTITLE}}", t(lang, "login.subtitle"))
+        .replace("{{T_USERNAME}}", t(lang, "login.username"))
+        .replace("{{T_PASSWORD}}", t(lang, "login.password"))
+        .replace("{{T_TOTP_LABEL}}", t(lang, "login.totp_label"))
+        .replace("{{T_SIGNIN}}", t(lang, "login.signin"))
+        .replace("{{T_OR}}", t(lang, "login.or"))
+        .replace("{{T_LANGUAGE}}", t(lang, "common.language"))
+        .replace(
+            "{{T_SIGNIN_WITH_JSON}}",
+            &json_string(t(lang, "login.signin_with")),
+        )
+        .replace("{{APP_VERSION}}", crate::version::VERSION);
+    apply_lang_selected(body, lang)
+}
+
+/// Inject `selected` into the matching `<option>` for the active language and
+/// blank out the others. Both templates use the same `{{LANG_SEL_XX}}` markers.
+fn apply_lang_selected(body: String, lang: Lang) -> String {
+    let mut sel_en = "";
+    let mut sel_de = "";
+    let mut sel_fr = "";
+    let mut sel_ro = "";
+    let mut sel_es = "";
+    match lang {
+        Lang::En => sel_en = " selected",
+        Lang::De => sel_de = " selected",
+        Lang::Fr => sel_fr = " selected",
+        Lang::Ro => sel_ro = " selected",
+        Lang::Es => sel_es = " selected",
+    }
+    body.replace("{{LANG_SEL_EN}}", sel_en)
+        .replace("{{LANG_SEL_DE}}", sel_de)
+        .replace("{{LANG_SEL_FR}}", sel_fr)
+        .replace("{{LANG_SEL_RO}}", sel_ro)
+        .replace("{{LANG_SEL_ES}}", sel_es)
+}
+
+/// JSON-encode a string so it can be embedded inside a `<script>` block as a
+/// JS string literal. We only need to escape `"`, `\`, and the control chars
+/// that show up in our translations — none of them realistically contain
+/// newlines or `</script>`, but escape them defensively anyway.
+fn json_string(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len() + 2);
+    out.push('"');
+    for c in s.chars() {
+        match c {
+            '"' => out.push_str("\\\""),
+            '\\' => out.push_str("\\\\"),
+            '\n' => out.push_str("\\n"),
+            '\r' => out.push_str("\\r"),
+            '\t' => out.push_str("\\t"),
+            '<' => out.push_str("\\u003c"),
+            '>' => out.push_str("\\u003e"),
+            '&' => out.push_str("\\u0026"),
+            c if (c as u32) < 0x20 => {
+                use std::fmt::Write as _;
+                let _ = write!(out, "\\u{:04x}", c as u32);
+            }
+            c => out.push(c),
+        }
+    }
+    out.push('"');
+    out
+}
+
+fn html_response_owned(body: String) -> Response {
+    // Cache-Control: no-cache so the operator sees fresh HTML after a
+    // server upgrade without having to bump asset URLs.
+    let mut resp = Html(body).into_response();
+    resp.headers_mut().insert(
+        header::CACHE_CONTROL,
+        HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache"),
+    );
+    resp
+}
+
+async fn serve_tailwind() -> Response {
+    js_response(TAILWIND_JS)
+}
+
+async fn serve_htmx() -> Response {
+    js_response(HTMX_JS)
+}
+
+fn js_response(body: &'static [u8]) -> Response {
+    let mut resp = (StatusCode::OK, body).into_response();
+    let h = resp.headers_mut();
+    h.insert(
+        header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+        HeaderValue::from_static("application/javascript; charset=utf-8"),
+    );
+    // Vendored at a pinned version — safe to cache for a year. If we
+    // ever bump the version we should also bump the asset path so
+    // browsers don't keep stale copies; for now the path-pinned version
+    // is implicit in the binary build.
+    h.insert(
+        header::CACHE_CONTROL,
+        HeaderValue::from_static("public, max-age=31536000, immutable"),
+    );
+    resp
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+//! OIDC login entry points for the admin dashboard.
+//!
+//! Two unauthenticated GET endpoints used by `admin_ui/login.html`:
+//!
+//! - `GET /admin/oidc/providers` returns the enabled providers as JSON so
+//!   the login page can render a button per provider.
+//! - `GET /admin/login/oidc/:provider` creates an OIDC session marked as
+//!   admin-flow (via the sentinel below) and 302-redirects the browser to
+//!   the IdP authorization URL. After the IdP redirects to
+//!   `/oidc/callback`, the existing callback handler detects the sentinel
+//!   and finishes by setting `rd_admin_session` + redirecting to `/admin/`
+//!   (see api/oidc/callback.rs).
+//!
+//! We keep this module separate from the desktop-client OIDC flow so the
+//! "device polls /api/oidc/auth-query" semantics stay untouched.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::oidc::{discovery, random_token, require_provider, OIDC_SESSION_TTL_SECS};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::OidcSessionInsert;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path};
+use axum::response::Redirect;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Sentinel stuffed into `client_id_str` / `client_uuid` of an OidcSession
+/// so the callback can tell admin-UI flows apart from desktop-client flows.
+/// Real device UUIDs from the desktop client are hex-formatted GUIDs and
+/// won't collide.
+pub const ADMIN_SENTINEL: &str = "__admin_ui__";
+
+pub async fn list_providers(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+) -> Json<Value> {
+    let mut out: Vec<Value> = Vec::new();
+    if !state.cfg.public_base_url.is_empty() {
+        if let Ok(providers) = state.db.oidc_provider_list_enabled().await {
+            for p in providers {
+                out.push(json!({
+                    "name": p.name,
+                    "display_name": p.display_name.unwrap_or_else(|| p.name.clone()),
+                    "icon_url": p.icon_url,
+                }));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Json(json!(out))
+}
+
+pub async fn start_login(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Path(provider_name): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Redirect, ApiError> {
+    if state.cfg.public_base_url.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::Internal(
+            "OIDC requires --public-base-url to be set".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    let provider = require_provider(&state, &provider_name).await?;
+    let disc = discovery::discover(&provider.issuer_url)
+        .await
+        .map_err(ApiError::Internal)?;
+
+    let code = random_token();
+    let csrf_state = random_token();
+    let expires_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + OIDC_SESSION_TTL_SECS;
+    state
+        .db
+        .oidc_session_create(&OidcSessionInsert {
+            code: &code,
+            provider: &provider.name,
+            state: &csrf_state,
+            client_id_str: ADMIN_SENTINEL,
+            client_uuid: ADMIN_SENTINEL,
+            device_info_json: r#"{"source":"admin-ui"}"#,
+            expires_at,
+        })
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let url = format!(
+        "{auth}?response_type=code&client_id={cid}&redirect_uri={ru}&scope={scope}&state={st}",
+        auth = disc.authorization_endpoint,
+        cid = url_encode(&provider.client_id),
+        ru = url_encode(&provider.redirect_url),
+        scope = url_encode(&provider.scopes),
+        st = url_encode(&csrf_state),
+    );
+    Ok(Redirect::temporary(&url))
+}
+
+fn url_encode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for b in s.as_bytes() {
+        match b {
+            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
+                out.push(*b as char);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                use std::fmt::Write;
+                let _ = write!(out, "%{:02X}", b);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+//! Address books — list, create shared books, manage shares, delete.
+//! Personal books are owned by individual users and managed from the
+//! desktop client (the dashboard refuses to mutate them). Shared books
+//! are server-side artifacts: an admin creates one, then grants users
+//! `read` / `read+write` / `full` access; the desktop client picks them
+//! up via `/api/ab/shared/profiles` on the next AB sync (~30 s).
+
+use super::shared::{fmt_unix, html_escape, notice_html, require_admin};
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form, Path};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    Ok(Html(render_index(&state, lang, None).await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CreateForm {
+    pub name: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn create(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(f): Form<CreateForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let name = f.name.trim();
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_index(&state, lang, Some(("error", t(lang, "ab.name_required")))).await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    let res = state.db.ab_create_shared(admin.user_id, name).await;
+    let notice = match res {
+        Ok(_) => Some(("ok", tf1(lang, "ab.created", name))),
+        Err(e) => {
+            // The unique index trips when the same admin creates two books
+            // with the same name. Surface that cleanly instead of leaking
+            // the raw SQL error.
+            let msg = if e.to_string().to_lowercase().contains("unique") {
+                t(lang, "ab.exists").to_string()
+            } else {
+                tf1(lang, "ab.create_failed", &e.to_string())
+            };
+            Some(("error", msg))
+        }
+    };
+    let n = notice.as_ref().map(|(k, m)| (*k, m.as_str()));
+    Ok(Html(render_index(&state, lang, n).await?))
+}
+
+pub async fn delete(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let ok = state
+        .db
+        .ab_delete(&guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let notice = if ok {
+        ("ok", t(lang, "ab.deleted"))
+    } else {
+        ("error", t(lang, "ab.not_found"))
+    };
+    Ok(Html(render_index(&state, lang, Some(notice)).await?))
+}
+
+pub async fn manage(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    Ok(Html(render_manage(&state, lang, &guid, None).await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ShareForm {
+    pub user_id: i64,
+    pub rule: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn share_add(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(guid): Path<String>,
+    Form(f): Form<ShareForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    if !(1..=3).contains(&f.rule) {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_manage(&state, lang, &guid, Some(("error", t(lang, "ab.invalid_rule")))).await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .ab_share_set(&guid, f.user_id, f.rule)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_manage(&state, lang, &guid, Some(("ok", t(lang, "ab.share_saved")))).await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+pub async fn share_remove(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path((guid, user_id)): Path<(String, i64)>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let _ = state
+        .db
+        .ab_share_remove(&guid, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_manage(&state, lang, &guid, Some(("ok", t(lang, "ab.share_removed")))).await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+// ---------- rendering ----------
+
+async fn render_index(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let books = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_all_with_owner()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let notice_html = notice.map(|(k, m)| notice_html(k, m)).unwrap_or_default();
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div id="ab-region" class="space-y-6">
+  <header>
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{tagline}</p>
+  </header>
+
+  {notice_html}
+
+  <form
+    class="flex items-end gap-2 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-800 rounded-lg p-3"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/address-books/create"
+    hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML"
+  >
+    <div class="flex-1">
+      <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="ab-name">{new_shared}</label>
+      <input id="ab-name" name="name" type="text" required
+        placeholder="Engineering laptops"
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500" />
+    </div>
+    <button type="submit"
+      class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 text-white text-sm font-medium rounded px-4 py-2 transition">
+      {create}
+    </button>
+  </form>
+"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "ab.heading"),
+        tagline = t(lang, "ab.tagline"),
+        new_shared = t(lang, "ab.new_shared"),
+        create = t(lang, "common.create"),
+    );
+    if books.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="text-slate-500 text-sm">{}</p></div>"##,
+            t(lang, "ab.no_books"),
+        );
+        return Ok(s);
+    }
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900">
+  <table class="w-full text-sm">
+    <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950"><tr>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_owner}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_kind}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_name}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_peers}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_guid}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_created}</th>
+      <th class="text-right font-medium px-3 py-2 w-1">{c_actions}</th>
+    </tr></thead>
+    <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        c_owner = t(lang, "ab.col_owner"),
+        c_kind = t(lang, "ab.col_kind"),
+        c_name = t(lang, "ab.col_name"),
+        c_peers = t(lang, "ab.col_peers"),
+        c_guid = t(lang, "ab.col_guid"),
+        c_created = t(lang, "ab.col_created"),
+        c_actions = t(lang, "common.actions"),
+    );
+    for b in &books {
+        let kind_pill = match b.kind {
+            0 => format!(
+                r#"<span class="text-xs px-1.5 py-0.5 rounded bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 text-slate-300">{}</span>"#,
+                t(lang, "ab.kind_personal"),
+            ),
+            1 => format!(
+                r#"<span class="text-xs px-1.5 py-0.5 rounded bg-violet-900/40 border border-violet-700/50 text-violet-300">{}</span>"#,
+                t(lang, "ab.kind_shared"),
+            ),
+            _ => String::new(),
+        };
+        // Both kinds get a delete action. Shared books additionally get
+        // "Manage shares". Personal books carry an extra warning in the
+        // confirm because the owning user's desktop client may resync
+        // and recreate the book on next AB tick — deletion is "reset to
+        // empty", not "permanently revoked".
+        let actions = if b.kind == 1 {
+            format!(
+                r##"<details class="text-right relative">
+      <summary class="cursor-pointer list-none text-xs text-slate-400 hover:text-slate-200 select-none">···</summary>
+      <div class="absolute right-2 mt-1 z-10 w-48 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-700 rounded shadow-lg p-2 space-y-1 text-left">
+        <button class="w-full text-left px-2 py-1 text-xs hover:bg-slate-800 rounded"
+          hx-get="/admin/pages/address-books/{guid}/manage"
+          hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+          {manage}
+        </button>
+        <hr class="border-slate-700 my-1" />
+        <button class="w-full text-left px-2 py-1 text-xs text-rose-300 hover:bg-rose-900/40 rounded"
+          hx-post="/admin/pages/address-books/{guid}/delete"
+          hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML"
+          hx-confirm="{confirm}">
+          {delete}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </details>"##,
+                guid = html_escape(&b.guid),
+                manage = t(lang, "ab.manage_shares"),
+                confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "ab.confirm_delete_shared", &b.name)),
+                delete = t(lang, "ab.delete_book"),
+            )
+        } else {
+            format!(
+                r##"<details class="text-right relative">
+      <summary class="cursor-pointer list-none text-xs text-slate-400 hover:text-slate-200 select-none">···</summary>
+      <div class="absolute right-2 mt-1 z-10 w-56 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-700 rounded shadow-lg p-2 space-y-1 text-left">
+        <button class="w-full text-left px-2 py-1 text-xs text-rose-300 hover:bg-rose-900/40 rounded"
+          hx-post="/admin/pages/address-books/{guid}/delete"
+          hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML"
+          hx-confirm="{confirm}">
+          {delete}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </details>"##,
+                guid = html_escape(&b.guid),
+                confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "ab.confirm_delete_personal", &b.owner_username)),
+                delete = t(lang, "ab.delete_book"),
+            )
+        };
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<tr>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-200">{owner}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2">{kind}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-300">{name}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400">{count}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 font-mono text-xs text-slate-500">{guid}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{created}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2">{actions}</td>
+</tr>"##,
+            owner = html_escape(&b.owner_username),
+            kind = kind_pill,
+            name = html_escape(&b.name),
+            count = b.peer_count,
+            guid = html_escape(&b.guid),
+            created = html_escape(&fmt_unix(b.created_at)),
+            actions = actions,
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</tbody></table></div></div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
+
+async fn render_manage(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    guid: &str,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let owner_kind = state
+        .db
+        .ab_get_owner_kind(guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let Some((_owner_id, kind)) = owner_kind else {
+        return Ok(format!(
+            r##"<div id="ab-region">{notice}</div>"##,
+            notice = notice_html("error", t(lang, "ab.not_found")),
+        ));
+    };
+    if kind != 1 {
+        return Ok(format!(
+            r##"<div id="ab-region">{notice}</div>"##,
+            notice = notice_html("error", t(lang, "ab.personal_managed_at_client")),
+        ));
+    }
+    let shares = state
+        .db
+        .ab_list_shares(guid)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let (_total, users) = state
+        .db
+        .users_list_all(0, 1000)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let already_shared: std::collections::HashSet<i64> =
+        shares.iter().map(|s| s.user_id).collect();
+
+    let notice_html = notice.map(|(k, m)| notice_html(k, m)).unwrap_or_default();
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div id="ab-region" class="space-y-6">
+  <header class="flex items-center justify-between">
+    <div>
+      <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1 font-mono">{guid}</p>
+    </div>
+    <button
+      class="text-xs text-slate-300 hover:text-slate-100 px-2 py-1 rounded border border-slate-700 hover:border-slate-500"
+      hx-get="/admin/pages/address-books"
+      hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+      {back}
+    </button>
+  </header>
+
+  {notice_html}
+
+  <section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4 space-y-3">
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-200">{add_or_update}</h3>
+    <form
+      class="flex flex-wrap items-end gap-2"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/address-books/{guid}/shares/add"
+      hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML"
+    >
+      <div class="flex-1 min-w-[200px]">
+        <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="share-user">{user_label}</label>
+        <select id="share-user" name="user_id" required
+          class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500">"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "ab.manage_heading"),
+        back = t(lang, "ab.back"),
+        add_or_update = t(lang, "ab.add_or_update"),
+        user_label = t(lang, "ab.user_label"),
+        guid = html_escape(guid),
+        notice_html = notice_html,
+    );
+    if users.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r#"<option disabled>{}</option>"#,
+            t(lang, "ab.no_users"),
+        );
+    }
+    let already_text = t(lang, "ab.existing_will_update");
+    for u in &users {
+        let already = if already_shared.contains(&u.id) { already_text } else { "" };
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r#"<option value="{id}">{name}{already}</option>"#,
+            id = u.id,
+            name = html_escape(&u.username),
+            already = html_escape(already),
+        );
+    }
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"</select>
+      </div>
+      <div>
+        <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="share-rule">{rule}</label>
+        <select id="share-rule" name="rule"
+          class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500">
+          <option value="1">{r_read}</option>
+          <option value="2" selected>{r_rw}</option>
+          <option value="3">{r_full}</option>
+        </select>
+      </div>
+      <button type="submit"
+        class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 text-white text-sm font-medium rounded px-4 py-2 transition">
+        {save}
+      </button>
+    </form>
+  </section>
+
+  <section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900">
+    <header class="px-4 py-2 text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 border-b border-slate-800">
+      {current_shares}
+    </header>
+"##,
+        rule = t(lang, "ab.rule"),
+        r_read = t(lang, "ab.rule_read"),
+        r_rw = t(lang, "ab.rule_read_write"),
+        r_full = t(lang, "ab.rule_full"),
+        save = t(lang, "common.save"),
+        current_shares = tf1(lang, "ab.current_shares", &shares.len().to_string()),
+    );
+    if shares.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="px-4 py-3 text-slate-500 text-sm">{}</p></section></div>"##,
+            t(lang, "ab.no_shares"),
+        );
+        return Ok(s);
+    }
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<table class="w-full text-sm">
+      <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950"><tr>
+        <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{user_l}</th>
+        <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{rule_l}</th>
+        <th class="text-right font-medium px-3 py-2 w-1"></th>
+      </tr></thead>
+      <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        user_l = t(lang, "ab.user_label"),
+        rule_l = t(lang, "ab.rule"),
+    );
+    for sh in &shares {
+        let rule = match sh.rule {
+            1 => t(lang, "ab.rule_read"),
+            2 => t(lang, "ab.rule_read_write"),
+            3 => t(lang, "ab.rule_full"),
+            _ => "?",
+        };
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<tr>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-200">{user}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400">{rule}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-right">
+    <button class="text-xs text-rose-300 hover:text-rose-200 px-2 py-1 rounded hover:bg-rose-900/40"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/address-books/{guid}/shares/{uid}/remove"
+      hx-target="#ab-region" hx-swap="outerHTML"
+      hx-confirm="{confirm}">
+      {remove}
+    </button>
+  </td>
+</tr>"##,
+            user = html_escape(&sh.username),
+            rule = rule,
+            guid = html_escape(guid),
+            uid = sh.user_id,
+            confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "ab.confirm_remove", &sh.username)),
+            remove = t(lang, "common.remove"),
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</tbody></table></section></div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+//! Audit log browser — three tabs (conn / file / alarm), each capped at the
+//! latest 200 rows. M5c MVP. Pagination/filtering by date range can come in
+//! a follow-up if the operator outgrows this view.
+
+use super::shared::{fmt_unix, html_escape, require_admin};
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+const PAGE_SIZE: i64 = 200;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TabQuery {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub tab: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Query(q): Query<TabQuery>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let tab = q.tab.as_deref().unwrap_or("conn");
+    let body = match tab {
+        "file" => render_file(&state, lang).await?,
+        "alarm" => render_alarm(&state, lang).await?,
+        _ => render_conn(&state, lang).await?,
+    };
+    let pill = |id: &str, label: &str| {
+        let active = id == tab;
+        let cls = if active {
+            "bg-slate-800 text-sky-300 border-sky-800"
+        } else {
+            "bg-slate-900 text-slate-400 border-slate-800 hover:text-slate-200"
+        };
+        format!(
+            r##"<a href="#audit" hx-get="/admin/pages/audit?tab={id}" hx-target="#main" class="px-3 py-1 rounded border {cls}">{label}</a>"##,
+            id = id,
+            cls = cls,
+            label = label,
+        )
+    };
+    Ok(Html(format!(
+        r##"<div class="space-y-4">
+  <header class="flex items-center justify-between">
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500">{latest}</p>
+  </header>
+  <div class="flex gap-2 text-xs">{pill_conn}{pill_file}{pill_alarm}</div>
+  {body}
+</div>"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "audit.heading"),
+        latest = tf1(lang, "audit.latest", &PAGE_SIZE.to_string()),
+        pill_conn = pill("conn", t(lang, "audit.tab_conn")),
+        pill_file = pill("file", t(lang, "audit.tab_file")),
+        pill_alarm = pill("alarm", t(lang, "audit.tab_alarm")),
+        body = body,
+    )))
+}
+
+async fn render_conn(state: &Arc<AppState>, lang: Lang) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let rows = state
+        .db
+        .audit_conn_list(PAGE_SIZE)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if rows.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(empty_table(t(lang, "audit.no_conn")));
+    }
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 overflow-hidden">
+  <table class="w-full text-sm">
+    <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950"><tr>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_when}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_peer}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_conn}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_ip}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_action}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_note}</th>
+    </tr></thead>
+    <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        c_when = t(lang, "audit.col_when"),
+        c_peer = t(lang, "audit.col_peer"),
+        c_conn = t(lang, "audit.col_conn_session"),
+        c_ip = t(lang, "audit.col_ip"),
+        c_action = t(lang, "audit.col_action"),
+        c_note = t(lang, "audit.col_note"),
+    );
+    for r in &rows {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<tr>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{when}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 font-mono text-slate-200">{peer}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400">{conn} / {sess}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400 font-mono text-xs">{ip}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-300">{action}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400">{note}</td>
+</tr>"##,
+            when = html_escape(&fmt_unix(r.started_at)),
+            peer = html_escape(&r.peer_id),
+            conn = r.conn_id,
+            sess = r.session_id,
+            ip = html_escape(&r.ip),
+            action = html_escape(&r.action),
+            note = html_escape(&r.note)
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</tbody></table></div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
+
+async fn render_file(state: &Arc<AppState>, lang: Lang) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let rows = state
+        .db
+        .audit_file_list(PAGE_SIZE)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if rows.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(empty_table(t(lang, "audit.no_file")));
+    }
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 overflow-hidden">
+  <table class="w-full text-sm">
+    <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950"><tr>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_when}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_peer}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_dir}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_path}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_remote}</th>
+    </tr></thead>
+    <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        c_when = t(lang, "audit.col_when"),
+        c_peer = t(lang, "audit.col_peer"),
+        c_dir = t(lang, "audit.col_direction"),
+        c_path = t(lang, "audit.col_path"),
+        c_remote = t(lang, "audit.col_remote"),
+    );
+    for r in &rows {
+        let dir = match r.direction {
+            0 => t(lang, "audit.dir_to_remote"),
+            1 => t(lang, "audit.dir_from_remote"),
+            _ => "?",
+        };
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<tr>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{when}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 font-mono text-slate-200">{peer}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400">{dir}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-300 font-mono text-xs">{path}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400 font-mono text-xs">{remote}</td>
+</tr>"##,
+            when = html_escape(&fmt_unix(r.at)),
+            peer = html_escape(&r.peer_id),
+            dir = dir,
+            path = html_escape(&r.path),
+            remote = html_escape(&r.remote_peer)
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</tbody></table></div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
+
+async fn render_alarm(state: &Arc<AppState>, lang: Lang) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let rows = state
+        .db
+        .audit_alarm_list(PAGE_SIZE)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if rows.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(empty_table(t(lang, "audit.no_alarm")));
+    }
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 overflow-hidden">
+  <table class="w-full text-sm">
+    <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950"><tr>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_when}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_peer}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_type}</th>
+      <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_info}</th>
+    </tr></thead>
+    <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        c_when = t(lang, "audit.col_when"),
+        c_peer = t(lang, "audit.col_peer"),
+        c_type = t(lang, "audit.col_type"),
+        c_info = t(lang, "audit.col_info"),
+    );
+    for r in &rows {
+        let typ = match r.typ {
+            0 => "IpWhitelist",
+            1 => "ExceedThirtyAttempts",
+            2 => "SixAttemptsWithinOneMinute",
+            6 => "ExceedIPv6PrefixAttempts",
+            n => return Ok(format!("(unknown alarm type {})", n)),
+        };
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<tr>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{when}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 font-mono text-slate-200">{peer}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-amber-300">{typ}</td>
+  <td class="px-3 py-2 text-slate-400 font-mono text-xs break-all">{info}</td>
+</tr>"##,
+            when = html_escape(&fmt_unix(r.at)),
+            peer = html_escape(&r.peer_id),
+            typ = typ,
+            info = html_escape(&r.info_json)
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</tbody></table></div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
+
+fn empty_table(msg: &str) -> String {
+    format!(
+        r##"<div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-6 text-center text-sm text-slate-500">{}</div>"##,
+        html_escape(msg)
+    )
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+//! `/admin/connect/:peer_id` — serves the embedded web client SPA.
+//!
+//! Architecture: the SPA at web_client/src/main.ts opens WebSockets directly
+//! to the existing rendezvous (hbbs:21118) and relay (hbbr:21119) endpoints
+//! and speaks the same protocol the desktop client speaks. The role of this
+//! handler is to (a) gate access via the AuthedUser cookie middleware,
+//! (b) inject per-request config (rendezvous host, relay host, server pubkey,
+//! peer id, admin name) into the SPA, and (c) serve the bundled JS/CSS via
+//! `include_bytes!` so the binary is self-contained.
+//!
+//! Same `{{CUSTOM_CONFIG}}` template substitution pattern as deploy.rs.
+
+use super::shared::{html_escape, require_admin};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use axum::extract::Path;
+use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
+use axum::response::{Html, IntoResponse, Response};
+use serde_json::json;
+
+const CONNECT_HTML: &str = include_str!("../../../../admin_ui/connect.html");
+const BUNDLE_JS: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../../web_client/dist/bundle.js");
+const BUNDLE_CSS: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../../web_client/dist/bundle.css");
+
+/// `GET /admin/connect/:peer_id` — render the SPA shell with config injected.
+pub async fn index(
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(peer_id): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+
+    // Derive default rendezvous/relay hosts from the request Host header so
+    // operators don't need to configure separately for the common case where
+    // hbbs and hbbr live on the same machine the browser is currently talking
+    // to. Same approach as the deploy page.
+    let host = headers
+        .get(header::HOST)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .map(host_only)
+        .unwrap_or("")
+        .to_string();
+
+    let pubkey = read_pubkey();
+    let api_server = format!(
+        "{}://{}",
+        if is_https(&headers) { "https" } else { "http" },
+        headers
+            .get(header::HOST)
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("")
+    );
+
+    let cfg = json!({
+        "api_server":        api_server,
+        "rendezvous_server": host,
+        "relay_server":      host,
+        "key":               pubkey,
+        "peer_id":           peer_id,
+        "admin_name":        admin.name.clone(),
+    });
+
+    let cfg_str = cfg.to_string();
+    // The placeholder is inside <script id="custom-config" type="application/json">
+    // so the JSON content is parsed verbatim by JSON.parse — no further escaping
+    // beyond ensuring no literal "</script>" appears (which a JSON serializer
+    // never produces) and HTML-escaping any peer_id we substitute elsewhere.
+    let html = CONNECT_HTML.replace("{{CUSTOM_CONFIG}}", &cfg_str);
+
+    // Defensive: if a peer_id ever ends up reflected outside the JSON tag
+    // (the template doesn't currently do this, but future edits might),
+    // having html_escape called as part of the page-build flow is a habit
+    // worth preserving.
+    let _ = html_escape;
+
+    Ok(Html(html))
+}
+
+/// `GET /admin/connect/assets/bundle.js` — serve the SPA bundle.
+pub async fn bundle_js() -> Response {
+    asset_response(BUNDLE_JS, "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
+}
+
+/// `GET /admin/connect/assets/bundle.css` — serve the SPA stylesheet.
+pub async fn bundle_css() -> Response {
+    asset_response(BUNDLE_CSS, "text/css; charset=utf-8")
+}
+
+fn asset_response(body: &'static [u8], content_type: &'static str) -> Response {
+    let mut resp = (StatusCode::OK, body).into_response();
+    let headers = resp.headers_mut();
+    headers.insert(header::CONTENT_TYPE, HeaderValue::from_static(content_type));
+    // Bundles are content-addressed by SHA in name? Not yet — until we add
+    // hashed filenames, force fresh fetches so admin upgrades pick up new JS.
+    headers.insert(
+        header::CACHE_CONTROL,
+        HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache"),
+    );
+    resp
+}
+
+// ---------- helpers ----------
+
+/// Read the server's Ed25519 public key from `id_ed25519.pub` in CWD —
+/// same path `common::gen_sk` writes it to and what the deploy page reads.
+fn read_pubkey() -> String {
+    std::fs::read_to_string("id_ed25519.pub")
+        .ok()
+        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+/// Strip `:port` (and IPv6 brackets) from a Host-header value. Borrowed
+/// from the deploy page; kept inline here rather than promoting to shared
+/// to avoid a cross-module dep on a one-liner.
+fn host_only(s: &str) -> &str {
+    if let Some(rest) = s.strip_prefix('[') {
+        if let Some(end) = rest.find(']') {
+            return &rest[..end];
+        }
+    }
+    s.rsplit_once(':').map(|(h, _)| h).unwrap_or(s)
+}
+
+/// Heuristic: were we reached via HTTPS? The presence of any
+/// `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` from a reverse proxy is the standard signal.
+/// Falls back to false; the SPA only uses this to construct the displayed
+/// API URL, the actual WebSockets pick `ws://` vs `wss://` based on the
+/// page's own protocol.
+fn is_https(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool {
+    headers
+        .get("x-forwarded-proto")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .map(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("https"))
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+//! Deploy page — generates a `CustomServer` blob the Windows / macOS / Linux
+//! client accepts via `rustdesk --config <blob>`, plus the equivalent
+//! rename-the-installer filename. The blob format is documented at
+//! `<rustdesk>/src/custom_server.rs`: JSON → URL-safe-no-pad base64 →
+//! reverse-the-string. The client tries the unsigned JSON path before
+//! signature verification, so we don't need the Pro private key.
+
+use super::shared::{html_escape, require_admin};
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use axum::extract::Form;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::json;
+
+pub async fn index(
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let pubkey = read_pubkey();
+    // Best-effort prefill: the Host the admin's browser is currently
+    // talking to is almost always the same machine running hbbs, so it's
+    // the right default for the rendezvous-host field. Reverse proxies
+    // forward the original Host through unless explicitly stripped, so
+    // this works behind nginx/Caddy/Traefik too. Operator can edit if
+    // hbbr lives on a different host.
+    let host_default = headers
+        .get(axum::http::header::HOST)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .map(host_only)
+        .unwrap_or("")
+        .to_string();
+    let (api_default, relay_default) = if host_default.is_empty() {
+        (String::new(), String::new())
+    } else {
+        (format!("https://{}", host_default), host_default.clone())
+    };
+    Ok(Html(render_form(
+        lang,
+        &pubkey,
+        &host_default,
+        &api_default,
+        &relay_default,
+        "",
+        None,
+    )))
+}
+
+/// Strip an optional `:port` (and IPv6 brackets) from a Host-header value.
+/// "rustdesk.example.com:21114"  -> "rustdesk.example.com"
+/// "[::1]:21114"                 -> "::1"
+/// "10.196.83.110"               -> "10.196.83.110"
+fn host_only(s: &str) -> &str {
+    if let Some(rest) = s.strip_prefix('[') {
+        if let Some(end) = rest.find(']') {
+            return &rest[..end];
+        }
+    }
+    s.rsplit_once(':').map(|(h, _)| h).unwrap_or(s)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DeployForm {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub host: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub api: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub relay: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub key: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn generate(
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(f): Form<DeployForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    if f.host.trim().is_empty() {
+        return Ok(Html(render_form(
+            lang,
+            &f.key,
+            &f.host,
+            &f.api,
+            &f.relay,
+            "",
+            Some(("error", t(lang, "deploy.host_required"))),
+        )));
+    }
+    let blob = encode_blob(&f.host, &f.key, &f.api, &f.relay);
+    let result = render_result(lang, &f.host, &f.key, &f.api, &f.relay, &blob);
+    Ok(Html(render_form(
+        lang,
+        &f.key,
+        &f.host,
+        &f.api,
+        &f.relay,
+        &result,
+        None,
+    )))
+}
+
+// ---------- helpers ----------
+
+/// Best-effort read of the server's public key from `id_ed25519.pub` in CWD —
+/// the same path `common::gen_sk` writes it to. If the file is missing
+/// (operator passed `--key` explicitly, or the binary runs from a directory
+/// they can't read), the field is left blank for them to paste.
+fn read_pubkey() -> String {
+    std::fs::read_to_string("id_ed25519.pub")
+        .ok()
+        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+/// Encode a `CustomServer` payload the way the client's
+/// `get_custom_server_from_config_string` expects: JSON → URL-safe-no-pad
+/// base64 → reverse the resulting string. The client reverses it back, base64
+/// decodes, then JSON parses.
+fn encode_blob(host: &str, key: &str, api: &str, relay: &str) -> String {
+    let payload = json!({
+        "host":  host,
+        "key":   key,
+        "api":   api,
+        "relay": relay,
+    });
+    let b64 = base64::encode_config(payload.to_string().as_bytes(), base64::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD);
+    b64.chars().rev().collect()
+}
+
+fn render_form(
+    lang: Lang,
+    key: &str,
+    host: &str,
+    api: &str,
+    relay: &str,
+    result_html: &str,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+) -> String {
+    let notice_html = match notice {
+        Some((kind, msg)) => super::shared::notice_html(kind, msg),
+        None => String::new(),
+    };
+    format!(
+        r##"<div class="space-y-6">
+  <header>
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{intro}</p>
+  </header>
+
+  {notice_html}
+
+  <form
+    class="space-y-3 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-800 rounded-lg p-4"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/deploy/generate"
+    hx-target="#main"
+    hx-swap="innerHTML"
+  >
+    <div>
+      <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="host">{host_label}</label>
+      <input id="host" name="host" type="text" required value="{host}"
+        placeholder="rustdesk.example.com or 203.0.113.10"
+        oninput="
+          const h = this.value.trim();
+          const api = document.getElementById('api');
+          const relay = document.getElementById('relay');
+          if (api.dataset.derived !== '0') api.value = h ? 'https://' + h : '';
+          if (relay.dataset.derived !== '0') relay.value = h;
+          api.placeholder = h ? 'https://' + h : 'https://rustdesk.example.com';
+        "
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500" />
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{host_hint}</p>
+    </div>
+
+    <div>
+      <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="api">{api_label}</label>
+      <input id="api" name="api" type="text" value="{api}"
+        placeholder="https://rustdesk.example.com"
+        oninput="this.dataset.derived = '0';"
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500" />
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{api_hint}</p>
+    </div>
+
+    <div>
+      <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="relay">{relay_label}</label>
+      <input id="relay" name="relay" type="text" value="{relay}"
+        placeholder="rustdesk.example.com"
+        oninput="this.dataset.derived = '0';"
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-sm focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500" />
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{relay_hint}</p>
+    </div>
+
+    <div>
+      <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1" for="key">{key_label}</label>
+      <textarea id="key" name="key" rows="2"
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-3 py-2 text-xs font-mono focus:outline-none focus:border-sky-500">{key}</textarea>
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{key_hint}</p>
+    </div>
+
+    <button type="submit"
+      class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 text-white text-sm font-medium rounded px-4 py-2 transition">
+      {generate}
+    </button>
+  </form>
+
+  {result_html}
+</div>"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "deploy.heading"),
+        intro = t(lang, "deploy.intro"),
+        host_label = t(lang, "deploy.host_label"),
+        host_hint = t(lang, "deploy.host_hint"),
+        api_label = t(lang, "deploy.api_label"),
+        api_hint = t(lang, "deploy.api_hint"),
+        relay_label = t(lang, "deploy.relay_label"),
+        relay_hint = t(lang, "deploy.relay_hint"),
+        key_label = t(lang, "deploy.key_label"),
+        key_hint = t(lang, "deploy.key_hint"),
+        generate = t(lang, "deploy.generate"),
+        host = html_escape(host),
+        api = html_escape(api),
+        relay = html_escape(relay),
+        key = html_escape(key),
+        notice_html = notice_html,
+        result_html = result_html,
+    )
+}
+
+fn render_result(lang: Lang, host: &str, key: &str, api: &str, relay: &str, blob: &str) -> String {
+    // Build the rename-the-installer alternative. Windows filenames disallow
+    // `:` and `/`, which the API URL is full of (`http://host:21114`). The
+    // client falls back to `http://<host>:21114` when `api` is empty
+    // (rustdesk/src/common.rs:get_api_server_), so we can omit the API field
+    // from the filename whenever it matches that default. If the operator
+    // supplied a non-default API URL we still build a "renamed" string for
+    // reference but mark it as unusable on Windows and steer them to the
+    // --config path.
+    let default_api = format!("http://{}:21114", host);
+    let api_is_default = api.is_empty() || api == default_api;
+    let unsafe_chars = str_has_filename_unsafe_chars(api) && !api_is_default;
+
+    let mut renamed = format!("rustdesk-host={}", host);
+    if !key.is_empty() {
+        renamed.push_str(&format!(",key={}", key));
+    }
+    if !api_is_default && !unsafe_chars {
+        renamed.push_str(&format!(",api={}", api));
+    }
+    if !relay.is_empty() && !str_has_filename_unsafe_chars(relay) {
+        renamed.push_str(&format!(",relay={}", relay));
+    }
+    renamed.push_str(".exe");
+
+    let renamed_note = if unsafe_chars {
+        r##"<p class="text-xs text-rose-300 mt-1">⚠ Your API URL contains <code>:</code> or <code>/</code>, which Windows forbids in filenames. The renamed-installer approach cannot carry it — use approach A above instead.</p>"##.to_string()
+    } else if !api_is_default {
+        format!(
+            r##"<p class="text-xs text-amber-300 mt-1">⚠ Your API URL ({api_disp}) is not the default <code>http://&lt;host&gt;:21114</code>. The client will auto-derive the default from the rendezvous host on first launch, so this filename will deploy with the wrong API URL. Use approach A instead.</p>"##,
+            api_disp = html_escape(api)
+        )
+    } else if !api.is_empty() {
+        r##"<p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">API URL omitted from filename (Windows can't store <code>:</code> / <code>/</code>); the client auto-derives <code>http://&lt;host&gt;:21114</code> from the rendezvous host.</p>"##.to_string()
+    } else {
+        String::new()
+    };
+
+    let licensed = format!("rustdesk-licensed-{}", blob);
+    let cmd_win = format!(
+        r#""C:\Program Files\RustDesk\rustdesk.exe" --config {licensed}"#,
+        licensed = licensed
+    );
+    let cmd_unix = format!("rustdesk --config {}", licensed);
+    let cmd_hello = format!("hello-agent.exe --install --config {}", blob);
+
+    format!(
+        r##"<section class="space-y-4 bg-slate-900 border border-slate-800 rounded-lg p-4">
+  <header>
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-200">{artifact_heading}</h3>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{artifact_intro}</p>
+  </header>
+
+  <div>
+    <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1">{a_label}</label>
+    <pre class="text-xs bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 rounded p-2 overflow-x-auto select-all whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{cmd_win}</pre>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{a_hint}</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <div>
+    <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1">{b_label}</label>
+    <pre class="text-xs bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 rounded p-2 overflow-x-auto select-all whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{renamed}</pre>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{b_hint}</p>
+    {renamed_note}
+  </div>
+
+  <div>
+    <label class="block text-xs font-medium text-slate-400 mb-1">{c_label}</label>
+    <pre class="text-xs bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 rounded p-2 overflow-x-auto select-all whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{cmd_hello}</pre>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{c_hint}</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <details class="text-xs text-slate-400">
+    <summary class="cursor-pointer text-slate-300 select-none">{raw_blob}</summary>
+    <pre class="mt-2 bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 rounded p-2 overflow-x-auto select-all whitespace-pre-wrap break-all">{blob}</pre>
+  </details>
+</section>"##,
+        artifact_heading = t(lang, "deploy.artifact_heading"),
+        artifact_intro = t(lang, "deploy.artifact_intro"),
+        a_label = t(lang, "deploy.cmd_a_label"),
+        a_hint = tf1(lang, "deploy.cmd_a_hint", &html_escape(&cmd_unix)),
+        b_label = t(lang, "deploy.cmd_b_label"),
+        b_hint = t(lang, "deploy.cmd_b_hint"),
+        c_label = t(lang, "deploy.cmd_c_label"),
+        c_hint = t(lang, "deploy.cmd_c_hint"),
+        raw_blob = t(lang, "deploy.raw_blob"),
+        cmd_win = html_escape(&cmd_win),
+        cmd_hello = html_escape(&cmd_hello),
+        renamed = html_escape(&renamed),
+        renamed_note = renamed_note,
+        blob = html_escape(blob),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Rough check for characters Windows disallows in filenames. We don't try
+/// to be exhaustive (NUL, control chars etc. won't realistically appear in a
+/// hostname or URL), just the ones a typical URL/relay value will trip on.
+fn str_has_filename_unsafe_chars(s: &str) -> bool {
+    s.chars()
+        .any(|c| matches!(c, '/' | '\\' | ':' | '*' | '?' | '"' | '<' | '>' | '|'))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+//! Per-device PowerShell remote-exec page.
+//!
+//! Layout:
+//!   GET  /admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec                — full page
+//!   POST /admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec                — dispatch
+//!   GET  /admin/pages/devices/:peer_id/exec/:cmd_id/poll   — single-row fragment, auto-refreshes
+//!
+//! Gates:
+//!   - AuthedUser.is_admin
+//!   - peer.managed = 1   (no exec on legacy/unsigned peers)
+//!   - strategy.config_options."enable-remote-exec" = "Y"
+//!   - no other in-flight exec for this peer
+
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, tf2, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::strategy;
+use crate::database::ExecRow;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form, Path};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+const HISTORY_LIMIT: i64 = 20;
+const MAX_SCRIPT_BYTES: usize = 32 * 1024;
+/// Wall-clock cap, mirrored from heartbeat.rs::EXEC_MAX_SECS so the dispatch
+/// confirm dialog can surface the same number. Kept duplicated rather than
+/// shared as a pub const because the two values legitimately differ in
+/// future (per-strategy override is a likely next step).
+const UI_MAX_SECS: u64 = 300;
+const UI_MAX_BYTES: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DispatchForm {
+    pub script: String,
+}
+
+/// Main page (full content for `#main`). Renders the gate banner, the
+/// script form (only when allowed), and the recent-history table.
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(peer_id): Path<String>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    Ok(Html(render_page(&state, lang, &peer_id, None).await?))
+}
+
+/// Dispatch handler. Re-checks all gates server-side (the UI also gates
+/// the form, but the form is just HTML — never trust the client). On
+/// success: insert into exec_history with status='queued', return the
+/// page with a success notice; the next heartbeat will flip it to
+/// 'running' and the history row picks up auto-refresh.
+pub async fn dispatch(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(peer_id): Path<String>,
+    Form(form): Form<DispatchForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let script = form.script.trim_end_matches(['\r', '\n']).to_string();
+
+    // Validation runs BEFORE the gate checks so an empty script doesn't
+    // get a confusing "managed required" error. Order: shape → policy.
+    if script.trim().is_empty() {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_page(&state, lang, &peer_id, Some(("error", t(lang, "exec.error_empty").to_string()))).await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    if script.len() > MAX_SCRIPT_BYTES {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &peer_id,
+                Some((
+                    "error",
+                    tf2(
+                        lang,
+                        "exec.error_too_large",
+                        &script.len().to_string(),
+                        &MAX_SCRIPT_BYTES.to_string(),
+                    ),
+                )),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let gate = check_gate(&state, &peer_id).await?;
+    if !gate.allowed {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &peer_id,
+                Some(("error", gate_reason_message(lang, &gate))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    if gate.in_flight > 0 {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &peer_id,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "exec.error_in_flight").to_string())),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let cmd_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+    state
+        .db
+        .exec_create(&cmd_id, &peer_id, admin.user_id, &script)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    hbb_common::log::info!(
+        "admin {} queued exec cmd_id={} for peer {} ({} bytes)",
+        admin.name,
+        cmd_id,
+        peer_id,
+        script.len()
+    );
+
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_page(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            &peer_id,
+            Some(("ok", tf1(lang, "exec.queued", &cmd_id))),
+        )
+        .await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+/// Single-row poll fragment. Returned by an HTMX `hx-get` whose
+/// `hx-trigger` keeps firing until the row reaches a terminal state.
+pub async fn poll(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path((peer_id, cmd_id)): Path<(String, String)>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .exec_get_by_cmd_id(&cmd_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let row = match row {
+        Some(r) if r.peer_id == peer_id => r,
+        _ => {
+            return Ok(Html(format!(
+                r##"<tr><td colspan="5" class="px-3 py-2 text-rose-300 text-xs">{}</td></tr>"##,
+                t(lang, "exec.not_found"),
+            )));
+        }
+    };
+    Ok(Html(render_history_row(lang, &row)))
+}
+
+// ───────────────────────── helpers ─────────────────────────
+
+async fn check_gate(state: &Arc<AppState>, peer_id: &str) -> Result<GateCheck, ApiError> {
+    let auth = state
+        .db
+        .peer_get_auth(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let managed = matches!(auth, Some((_, true)));
+    let strategy_allows = strategy::allows_remote_exec(state, peer_id).await;
+    let in_flight = state
+        .db
+        .exec_in_flight_count(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(GateCheck {
+        allowed: managed && strategy_allows,
+        managed,
+        strategy_allows,
+        in_flight,
+    })
+}
+
+struct GateCheck {
+    allowed: bool,
+    managed: bool,
+    strategy_allows: bool,
+    in_flight: i64,
+}
+
+fn gate_reason_message(lang: Lang, g: &GateCheck) -> String {
+    if !g.managed {
+        return t(lang, "exec.reason_not_managed").to_string();
+    }
+    if !g.strategy_allows {
+        return t(lang, "exec.reason_strategy").to_string();
+    }
+    t(lang, "exec.reason_unknown").to_string()
+}
+
+async fn render_page(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    peer_id: &str,
+    notice: Option<(&'static str, String)>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let gate = check_gate(state, peer_id).await?;
+    let history = state
+        .db
+        .exec_list_for_peer(peer_id, HISTORY_LIMIT)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        &mut out,
+        r##"<div class="space-y-4">
+  <header class="flex items-center justify-between">
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading} <code class="font-mono text-sky-300">{id}</code></h2>
+    <button class="text-xs text-sky-300 hover:text-sky-200"
+      hx-get="/admin/pages/devices/list-fragment"
+      hx-target="#devices-region" hx-swap="innerHTML"
+      hx-push-url="#devices">{back}</button>
+  </header>"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "exec.heading"),
+        id = html_escape(peer_id),
+        back = t(lang, "devices.back"),
+    );
+
+    if let Some((kind, msg)) = notice {
+        let _ = write!(&mut out, "{}", notice_html(kind, &msg));
+    }
+
+    // Gate banner
+    let _ = write!(&mut out, "{}", render_gate_banner(lang, &gate));
+
+    // Script form — only rendered when gate is open
+    if gate.allowed {
+        let _ = write!(
+            &mut out,
+            r##"<form class="space-y-2" hx-post="/admin/pages/devices/{id}/exec"
+      hx-target="#devices-region" hx-swap="innerHTML"
+      hx-confirm="{confirm}">
+    <label class="block text-xs text-slate-400">{label}</label>
+    <textarea name="script" rows="8" required
+      class="w-full font-mono text-sm rounded border border-slate-700 bg-slate-950 text-slate-200 p-2"
+      placeholder="Get-Service hello-agent | Select-Object Status, Name"></textarea>
+    <div class="flex items-center justify-between">
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500">{caps}</p>
+      <button type="submit" class="rounded bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 text-sky-100 text-xs px-3 py-1.5">{run}</button>
+    </div>
+  </form>"##,
+            id = html_escape(peer_id),
+            label = t(lang, "exec.script_label"),
+            confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "exec.confirm_dispatch", peer_id)),
+            caps = html_escape(&tf2(
+                lang,
+                "exec.caps_note",
+                &UI_MAX_SECS.to_string(),
+                &(UI_MAX_BYTES / 1024 / 1024).to_string(),
+            )),
+            run = t(lang, "exec.run"),
+        );
+    }
+
+    // History table
+    let _ = write!(
+        &mut out,
+        r##"<section>
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-2">{hist}</h3>
+    <div class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900">
+      <table class="w-full text-sm">
+        <thead class="text-xs uppercase text-slate-500 bg-slate-950">
+          <tr>
+            <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_when}</th>
+            <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_who}</th>
+            <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_status}</th>
+            <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_script}</th>
+            <th class="text-left font-medium px-3 py-2">{c_output}</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody class="divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        hist = t(lang, "exec.history"),
+        c_when = t(lang, "exec.col_when"),
+        c_who = t(lang, "exec.col_who"),
+        c_status = t(lang, "exec.col_status"),
+        c_script = t(lang, "exec.col_script"),
+        c_output = t(lang, "exec.col_output"),
+    );
+    if history.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            &mut out,
+            r##"<tr><td colspan="5" class="px-3 py-3 text-center text-xs text-slate-500">{}</td></tr>"##,
+            t(lang, "exec.no_history"),
+        );
+    } else {
+        for row in &history {
+            out.push_str(&render_history_row(lang, row));
+        }
+    }
+    out.push_str(r##"      </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  </section>
+</div>"##);
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+fn render_gate_banner(lang: Lang, g: &GateCheck) -> String {
+    let (kind, msg) = if g.allowed {
+        ("ok", t(lang, "exec.gate_open").to_string())
+    } else if !g.managed {
+        ("error", t(lang, "exec.reason_not_managed").to_string())
+    } else if !g.strategy_allows {
+        ("error", t(lang, "exec.reason_strategy").to_string())
+    } else {
+        ("error", t(lang, "exec.reason_unknown").to_string())
+    };
+    notice_html(kind, &msg)
+}
+
+fn render_history_row(lang: Lang, r: &ExecRow) -> String {
+    // Auto-refresh while the row is non-terminal so the operator sees
+    // running → finished without manual reload. HTMX `hx-trigger` with
+    // `every 1s` fires until the SERVER emits a row missing the trigger
+    // (i.e. the row reached finished/timed_out/errored).
+    let row_id = format!("exec-row-{}", html_escape(&r.cmd_id));
+    let polling_attrs = if matches!(r.status.as_str(), "queued" | "running") {
+        format!(
+            r##"hx-get="/admin/pages/devices/{peer}/exec/{cmd}/poll" hx-trigger="load delay:1s" hx-target="this" hx-swap="outerHTML""##,
+            peer = html_escape(&r.peer_id),
+            cmd = html_escape(&r.cmd_id),
+        )
+    } else {
+        String::new()
+    };
+    let status_cell = render_status_badge(lang, r);
+    let when = fmt_unix(r.issued_at);
+    let script_preview = preview(&r.script, 80);
+    let output_block = render_output_block(lang, r);
+
+    format!(
+        r##"<tr id="{row_id}" {polling}>
+    <td class="px-3 py-2 text-xs text-slate-500 whitespace-nowrap">{when}</td>
+    <td class="px-3 py-2 text-xs text-slate-400">#{user}</td>
+    <td class="px-3 py-2 whitespace-nowrap">{status}</td>
+    <td class="px-3 py-2"><code class="font-mono text-xs text-slate-300">{script}</code></td>
+    <td class="px-3 py-2">{output}</td>
+  </tr>"##,
+        row_id = row_id,
+        polling = polling_attrs,
+        when = html_escape(&when),
+        user = r.issued_by_user_id,
+        status = status_cell,
+        script = html_escape(&script_preview),
+        output = output_block,
+    )
+}
+
+fn render_status_badge(lang: Lang, r: &ExecRow) -> String {
+    let (border, bg, text_color, label) = match r.status.as_str() {
+        "queued" => ("slate-700", "slate-800/40", "slate-300", t(lang, "exec.status_queued")),
+        "running" => ("amber-700/50", "amber-900/30", "amber-300", t(lang, "exec.status_running")),
+        "finished" => {
+            if r.exit_code == Some(0) {
+                ("emerald-700/50", "emerald-900/30", "emerald-300", t(lang, "exec.status_finished_ok"))
+            } else {
+                ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300", t(lang, "exec.status_finished_err"))
+            }
+        }
+        "timed_out" => ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300", t(lang, "exec.status_timed_out")),
+        _ => ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300", t(lang, "exec.status_errored")),
+    };
+    let exit_suffix = match (r.status.as_str(), r.exit_code) {
+        ("finished", Some(c)) => format!(" (exit {c})"),
+        _ => String::new(),
+    };
+    format!(
+        r##"<span class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 rounded border border-{b} bg-{bg} px-2 py-0.5 text-xs text-{t}">{label}{exit}</span>"##,
+        b = border,
+        bg = bg,
+        t = text_color,
+        label = html_escape(label),
+        exit = exit_suffix,
+    )
+}
+
+fn render_output_block(lang: Lang, r: &ExecRow) -> String {
+    if matches!(r.status.as_str(), "queued" | "running") {
+        return format!(
+            r##"<span class="text-xs text-slate-500">{}</span>"##,
+            t(lang, "exec.output_pending"),
+        );
+    }
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    if !r.stdout.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            &mut s,
+            r##"<details class="text-xs"><summary class="cursor-pointer text-slate-400 hover:text-slate-200">stdout ({n} bytes)</summary>
+<pre class="mt-1 max-h-80 overflow-auto rounded bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 p-2 font-mono text-slate-300 whitespace-pre-wrap">{out}</pre>
+</details>"##,
+            n = r.stdout.len(),
+            out = html_escape(&r.stdout),
+        );
+    }
+    if !r.stderr.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            &mut s,
+            r##"<details class="text-xs mt-1"><summary class="cursor-pointer text-rose-400 hover:text-rose-300">stderr ({n} bytes)</summary>
+<pre class="mt-1 max-h-80 overflow-auto rounded bg-slate-950 border border-slate-800 p-2 font-mono text-rose-300 whitespace-pre-wrap">{out}</pre>
+</details>"##,
+            n = r.stderr.len(),
+            out = html_escape(&r.stderr),
+        );
+    }
+    if r.truncated {
+        let _ = write!(
+            &mut s,
+            r##"<p class="text-xs text-amber-300 mt-1">{}</p>"##,
+            t(lang, "exec.output_truncated"),
+        );
+    }
+    if s.is_empty() {
+        s = format!(r##"<span class="text-xs text-slate-500">{}</span>"##, t(lang, "exec.output_empty"));
+    }
+    s
+}
+
+fn fmt_unix(ts: i64) -> String {
+    use chrono::TimeZone;
+    chrono::Utc
+        .timestamp_opt(ts, 0)
+        .single()
+        .map(|d| d.format("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S").to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "—".to_string())
+}
+
+fn preview(s: &str, max: usize) -> String {
+    let first_line = s.lines().next().unwrap_or("");
+    if first_line.len() <= max {
+        first_line.to_string()
+    } else {
+        format!("{}…", &first_line[..max])
+    }
+}
+
+fn notice_html(kind: &str, msg: &str) -> String {
+    let (border, bg, text) = match kind {
+        "ok" => ("emerald-700/50", "emerald-900/30", "emerald-300"),
+        _ => ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300"),
+    };
+    format!(
+        r##"<div class="rounded border border-{border} bg-{bg} p-3 text-sm text-{text}">{msg}</div>"##,
+        border = border,
+        bg = bg,
+        text = text,
+        msg = html_escape(msg),
+    )
+}
+
+fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+        .replace('"', "&quot;")
+}
+
+fn require_admin(u: &AuthedUser) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if u.is_admin {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(ApiError::Forbidden("admin required".into()))
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+//! Device-groups page — list, create, delete, add/remove member.
+//! Strategies and AB shares hang off device-group membership, so this is
+//! the canonical place to manage who can see whose devices.
+
+use super::shared::{html_escape, notice_html, require_admin};
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form, Path};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CreateForm {
+    pub name: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn create(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<CreateForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    if form.name.trim().is_empty() {
+        return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "groups.name_required")).await;
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_group_create(form.name.trim())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(&state, lang, "ok", &tf1(lang, "groups.created", &form.name)).await
+}
+
+pub async fn delete(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let ok = state
+        .db
+        .device_group_delete(id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        if ok { "ok" } else { "error" },
+        if ok { t(lang, "groups.deleted") } else { t(lang, "common.already_gone") },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct MemberForm {
+    pub user_id: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn add_member(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+    Form(form): Form<MemberForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_group_add_member(id, form.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+pub async fn remove_member(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path((id, user_id)): Path<(i64, i64)>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_group_remove_member(id, user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PeerForm {
+    pub peer_id: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn add_peer(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+    Form(form): Form<PeerForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let peer_id = form.peer_id.trim();
+    if peer_id.is_empty() {
+        return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "groups.peer_id_required")).await;
+    }
+    let exists = state
+        .db
+        .peer_exists(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if !exists {
+        return notice_then(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            "error",
+            &tf1(lang, "groups.no_device_yet", peer_id),
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_group_add_peer(id, peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+pub async fn remove_peer(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path((id, peer_id)): Path<(i64, String)>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_group_remove_peer(id, &peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+// ---------- rendering ----------
+
+/// Minimal percent-encoder for path segments. Peer IDs are usually digits,
+/// but the schema allows arbitrary text — encode anything outside the
+/// unreserved set so a literal `/` or `?` in a peer id can't break routing.
+fn url_encode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for b in s.as_bytes() {
+        match b {
+            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
+                out.push(*b as char);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                use std::fmt::Write;
+                let _ = write!(out, "%{:02X}", b);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+async fn notice_then(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    kind: &str,
+    msg: &str,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    let mut html = notice_html(kind, msg);
+    html.push_str(&render_full(state, lang).await?);
+    Ok(Html(html))
+}
+
+async fn render_full(state: &Arc<AppState>, lang: Lang) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let groups = state
+        .db
+        .device_groups_list_all()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let (_, all_users) = state
+        .db
+        .users_list_all(0, 1000)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div id="groups-region" class="space-y-6">
+  <header><h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2></header>
+  <section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-3">{create_heading}</h3>
+    <form class="flex gap-2 text-sm" hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/create" hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+      <input name="name" placeholder="{ph}" required class="flex-1 bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+      <button class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 font-medium text-white">{create}</button>
+    </form>
+  </section>
+"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "groups.heading"),
+        create_heading = t(lang, "groups.create_heading"),
+        ph = t(lang, "groups.group_name"),
+        create = t(lang, "common.create"),
+    );
+
+    if groups.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="text-slate-500 text-sm">{}</p>"##,
+            t(lang, "groups.no_groups"),
+        );
+    }
+    for g in &groups {
+        let members = state
+            .db
+            .device_group_members(g.id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+        let peer_members = state
+            .db
+            .device_group_peer_members(g.id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4 space-y-4">
+  <header class="flex items-center justify-between">
+    <h3 class="font-semibold">{name}</h3>
+    <button class="text-xs text-rose-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/{id}/delete"
+      hx-confirm="{confirm}"
+      hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{delete_group}</button>
+  </header>
+  <div>
+    <h4 class="text-xs font-semibold text-slate-400 uppercase tracking-wide mb-1">{users}</h4>
+    <ul class="text-sm divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+            id = g.id,
+            name = html_escape(&g.name),
+            confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "groups.confirm_delete", &g.name)),
+            delete_group = t(lang, "groups.delete_group"),
+            users = t(lang, "groups.users"),
+        );
+        if members.is_empty() {
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<li class="py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{}</li>"##,
+                t(lang, "groups.no_user_members"),
+            );
+        }
+        for u in &members {
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<li class="py-2 flex items-center justify-between">
+  <span class="text-slate-200">{username}</span>
+  <button class="text-xs text-slate-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/{gid}/members/{uid}/remove"
+    hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{remove}</button>
+</li>"##,
+                username = html_escape(&u.username),
+                gid = g.id,
+                uid = u.id,
+                remove = t(lang, "common.remove"),
+            );
+        }
+        s.push_str("</ul>");
+        // Add-member form: dropdown of users not currently in the group.
+        let in_group: std::collections::HashSet<i64> =
+            members.iter().map(|u| u.id).collect();
+        let candidates: Vec<_> =
+            all_users.iter().filter(|u| !in_group.contains(&u.id)).collect();
+        if !candidates.is_empty() {
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<form class="flex gap-2 text-sm pt-2 border-t border-slate-800"
+  hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/{id}/members/add"
+  hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+  <select name="user_id" class="flex-1 bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5">
+"##,
+                id = g.id
+            );
+            for u in &candidates {
+                let _ = write!(
+                    s,
+                    r##"<option value="{uid}">{username}</option>"##,
+                    uid = u.id,
+                    username = html_escape(&u.username)
+                );
+            }
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"</select>
+  <button class="bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-xs">{add_user}</button>
+</form>"##,
+                add_user = t(lang, "groups.add_user"),
+            );
+        }
+        s.push_str("</div>");
+
+        // ---- Devices section ----
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<div>
+    <h4 class="text-xs font-semibold text-slate-400 uppercase tracking-wide mb-1">{devices}</h4>
+    <ul class="text-sm divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+            devices = t(lang, "groups.devices_section"),
+        );
+        if peer_members.is_empty() {
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<li class="py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{}</li>"##,
+                t(lang, "groups.no_peer_members"),
+            );
+        }
+        for (peer_id, owner) in &peer_members {
+            let owner_label = if owner.is_empty() {
+                format!(
+                    r##"<span class="text-slate-500">{}</span>"##,
+                    t(lang, "groups.unowned"),
+                )
+            } else {
+                format!(
+                    r##"<span class="text-slate-500">{}</span>"##,
+                    html_escape(&tf1(lang, "groups.owner_label", owner)),
+                )
+            };
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<li class="py-2 flex items-center justify-between">
+  <span class="font-mono text-slate-200">{pid}</span>
+  <span class="text-xs flex items-center gap-3">
+    {owner_label}
+    <button class="text-slate-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/{gid}/peers/{pid_url}/remove"
+      hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{remove}</button>
+  </span>
+</li>"##,
+                pid = html_escape(peer_id),
+                pid_url = url_encode(peer_id),
+                gid = g.id,
+                owner_label = owner_label,
+                remove = t(lang, "common.remove"),
+            );
+        }
+        s.push_str("</ul>");
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<form class="flex gap-2 text-sm pt-2 border-t border-slate-800"
+  hx-post="/admin/pages/groups/{id}/peers/add"
+  hx-target="#groups-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+  <input name="peer_id" placeholder="{ph}" required
+    class="flex-1 bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 font-mono"/>
+  <button class="bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-xs">{add_device}</button>
+</form></div>"##,
+            id = g.id,
+            ph = t(lang, "groups.peer_id_placeholder"),
+            add_device = t(lang, "groups.add_device"),
+        );
+
+        s.push_str("</section>");
+    }
+    s.push_str("</div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+//! Per-page HTMX fragment handlers. Each page returns a chunk of HTML that
+//! the dashboard shell drops into `#main`. Filled in across M5b/M5c.
+
+pub mod address_books;
+pub mod audit;
+pub mod connect;
+pub mod deploy;
+pub mod devices;
+pub mod exec;
+pub mod groups;
+pub mod profile;
+pub mod shared;
+pub mod strategies;
+pub mod users;
+
+use axum::response::Html;
+
+/// Tiny placeholder fragment — replaced by the real page handlers in M5b.
+pub fn placeholder(title: &str) -> Html<String> {
+    Html(format!(
+        r##"<div class="space-y-2">
+  <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{title}</h2>
+  <p class="text-slate-400 text-sm">This page is part of M5b — the dashboard shell, login, and per-page navigation are wired in M5a; the actual table + form for <strong>{title}</strong> lands in the next slice.</p>
+</div>"##
+    ))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
+//! `/admin/pages/profile` — self-service profile page for the
+//! currently-signed-in user. Anyone with a valid dashboard cookie can
+//! reach this; no admin gate (the user-management page elsewhere is
+//! the admin-side equivalent for editing OTHER users).
+//!
+//! Flow for each section:
+//!   - Profile info  → POST update-info       (display_name, email)
+//!   - Password      → POST change-password   (current_pw, new_pw, confirm)
+//!   - TOTP enroll   → POST totp/start        (generate secret + QR)
+//!                  → POST totp/confirm       (verify 6-digit code)
+//!   - TOTP remove   → POST totp/remove       (current_pw)
+//!
+//! TOTP enrollment is two-step: a freshly-generated secret is shown to
+//! the user as a QR code AND echoed in a hidden form field. Until the
+//! user submits a valid 6-digit code derived from that secret, nothing
+//! is written to `user_totp_secrets`. This means a half-finished enroll
+//! (user closes the tab) leaves no garbage state.
+
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::users::{hash_password, verify_password};
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use totp_rs::Secret;
+
+// ---------- index ----------
+
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    Ok(Html(render_full_page(&state, lang, &user, None).await?))
+}
+
+// ---------- update profile info ----------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InfoForm {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub display_name: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub email: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn update_info(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<InfoForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    state
+        .db
+        .user_set_display_name(user.user_id, form.display_name.trim())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .raw_update_user_email(user.user_id, form.email.trim())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_full_page(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            &user,
+            Some(("ok", t(lang, "profile.profile_updated"))),
+        )
+        .await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+// ---------- change password ----------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PasswordForm {
+    pub current_password: String,
+    pub new_password: String,
+    pub confirm_password: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn change_password(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<PasswordForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_id(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
+    if row.is_oidc_linked() {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.password_oidc_change"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    if form.new_password.len() < 4 {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.password_min"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    if form.new_password != form.confirm_password {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.password_mismatch"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    let pw_ok = verify_password(row.password_hash.clone(), form.current_password)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    if !pw_ok {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.current_incorrect"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    let hash = hash_password(form.new_password)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .user_set_password(user.user_id, &hash)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_full_page(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            &user,
+            Some(("ok", t(lang, "profile.password_updated"))),
+        )
+        .await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+// ---------- TOTP: start ----------
+
+/// `POST /admin/pages/profile/totp/start` — generate a fresh secret
+/// and render the QR + confirm form. Nothing is written to the DB
+/// yet; the secret rides in a hidden form field until confirm.
+pub async fn totp_start(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    // Reject if the user already has TOTP — they should remove it first.
+    let already = state
+        .db
+        .user_has_totp(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    if already {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.tfa_already"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let raw = sodiumoxide::randombytes::randombytes(20);
+    let secret_b32 = Secret::Raw(raw).to_encoded().to_string();
+    let issuer = "RustDesk";
+    let label = format!("{}:{}", issuer, user.name);
+    let otpauth = format!(
+        "otpauth://totp/{label}?secret={secret}&issuer={issuer}&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30",
+        label = url_encode(&label),
+        secret = url_encode(&secret_b32),
+        issuer = url_encode(issuer),
+    );
+    let qr_svg = render_qr_svg(&otpauth);
+
+    Ok(Html(render_totp_enroll_panel(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        &user,
+        &secret_b32,
+        &qr_svg,
+        None,
+    )
+    .await?))
+}
+
+// ---------- TOTP: confirm ----------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TotpConfirmForm {
+    pub secret_b32: String,
+    pub code: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn totp_confirm(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<TotpConfirmForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    let code = form.code.trim();
+    let secret = form.secret_b32.trim();
+    if secret.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.tfa_missing_secret"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    let valid = crate::api::auth::verify_totp(secret, code).unwrap_or(false);
+    if !valid {
+        // Re-render the enroll panel with the same secret so the user
+        // can try again — losing the QR forces them to start over and
+        // re-scan, which is annoying when the only error was a typo'd
+        // code.
+        let issuer = "RustDesk";
+        let label = format!("{}:{}", issuer, user.name);
+        let otpauth = format!(
+            "otpauth://totp/{label}?secret={secret}&issuer={issuer}&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30",
+            label = url_encode(&label),
+            secret = url_encode(secret),
+            issuer = url_encode(issuer),
+        );
+        let qr_svg = render_qr_svg(&otpauth);
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_totp_enroll_panel(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                secret,
+                &qr_svg,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.tfa_bad_code"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .totp_enroll(user.user_id, secret)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_full_page(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            &user,
+            Some(("ok", t(lang, "profile.tfa_enrolled"))),
+        )
+        .await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+// ---------- TOTP: remove ----------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TotpRemoveForm {
+    pub current_password: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn totp_remove(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<TotpRemoveForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_id(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
+    let pw_ok = verify_password(row.password_hash.clone(), form.current_password)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    if !pw_ok {
+        return Ok(Html(
+            render_full_page(
+                &state,
+                lang,
+                &user,
+                Some(("error", t(lang, "profile.tfa_current_pw_incorrect"))),
+            )
+            .await?,
+        ));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .totp_unenroll(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Html(
+        render_full_page(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            &user,
+            Some(("ok", t(lang, "profile.tfa_removed"))),
+        )
+        .await?,
+    ))
+}
+
+// ---------- rendering ----------
+
+async fn render_full_page(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    user: &AuthedUser,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    render_full_page_with_totp_override(state, lang, user, notice, None).await
+}
+
+/// `totp_panel_override = Some(html)` swaps in a custom TOTP block —
+/// used during enrollment confirm so the QR code panel sits where the
+/// status badge would normally be, and the password / profile sections
+/// stay visible above it.
+async fn render_full_page_with_totp_override(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    user: &AuthedUser,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+    totp_panel_override: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_id(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
+    let has_totp = state
+        .db
+        .user_has_totp(user.user_id)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    let notice_block = notice
+        .map(|(k, m)| notice_html(k, m))
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+
+    // OIDC-linked accounts sign in via the IdP — local password and
+    // local TOTP both moot. Replace those sections with a short note.
+    let oidc_linked = row.is_oidc_linked();
+    let password_section = if oidc_linked {
+        format!(
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-2">{heading}</h3>
+  <p class="text-sm text-slate-400">
+    {msg}
+  </p>
+</section>"##,
+            heading = t(lang, "profile.password_oidc"),
+            msg = t(lang, "profile.password_oidc_msg"),
+        )
+    } else {
+        format!(
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-3">{heading}</h3>
+  <form
+    class="grid grid-cols-1 sm:grid-cols-3 gap-3 text-sm"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/profile/change-password"
+    hx-target="#main"
+    hx-swap="innerHTML"
+    hx-on::after-request="if (event.detail.successful) this.reset()"
+  >
+    <input name="current_password" type="password" required placeholder="{cur}" class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+    <input name="new_password" type="password" required minlength="4" placeholder="{new}" class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+    <input name="confirm_password" type="password" required minlength="4" placeholder="{conf}" class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+    <button type="submit" class="sm:col-span-3 justify-self-start bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-white text-sm">{btn}</button>
+  </form>
+</section>"##,
+            heading = t(lang, "profile.password_heading"),
+            cur = t(lang, "profile.current_password"),
+            new = t(lang, "profile.new_password"),
+            conf = t(lang, "profile.confirm_new"),
+            btn = t(lang, "profile.update_password"),
+        )
+    };
+
+    let totp_section = if let Some(panel) = totp_panel_override {
+        panel
+    } else if oidc_linked {
+        format!(
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-2">{heading}</h3>
+  <p class="text-sm text-slate-400">
+    {msg}
+  </p>
+</section>"##,
+            heading = t(lang, "profile.tfa"),
+            msg = t(lang, "profile.tfa_oidc_msg"),
+        )
+    } else if has_totp {
+        format!(
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-2">{heading}</h3>
+  <div class="flex items-center gap-3 mb-3">
+    <span class="inline-flex px-1.5 py-0.5 rounded bg-violet-900/50 border border-violet-700/50 text-violet-300 text-xs">{enrolled}</span>
+    <span class="text-xs text-slate-400">{tfa_msg}</span>
+  </div>
+  <form
+    class="flex gap-2 items-center text-sm"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/profile/totp/remove"
+    hx-target="#main"
+    hx-swap="innerHTML"
+    hx-confirm="{confirm}"
+  >
+    <input name="current_password" type="password" required placeholder="{cur}" class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 flex-1 max-w-xs"/>
+    <button class="bg-rose-700 hover:bg-rose-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-white text-xs">{btn}</button>
+  </form>
+</section>"##,
+            heading = t(lang, "profile.tfa"),
+            enrolled = t(lang, "users.totp_enrolled"),
+            tfa_msg = t(lang, "profile.tfa_enrolled_msg"),
+            confirm = t(lang, "profile.tfa_confirm_remove"),
+            cur = t(lang, "profile.current_password"),
+            btn = t(lang, "profile.tfa_disable"),
+        )
+    } else {
+        format!(
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-2">{heading}</h3>
+  <p class="text-sm text-slate-400 mb-3">
+    {intro}
+  </p>
+  <button
+    class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-white text-sm"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/profile/totp/start"
+    hx-target="#main"
+    hx-swap="innerHTML"
+  >{btn}</button>
+</section>"##,
+            heading = t(lang, "profile.tfa"),
+            intro = t(lang, "profile.tfa_intro"),
+            btn = t(lang, "profile.tfa_enroll"),
+        )
+    };
+
+    Ok(format!(
+        r##"<div class="space-y-6 max-w-3xl">
+  <header>
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-0.5">{signed_in_as} <span class="text-slate-300">{username}</span></p>
+  </header>
+  {notice}
+
+  <section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-3">{info_heading}</h3>
+    <form
+      class="grid grid-cols-1 sm:grid-cols-2 gap-3 text-sm"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/profile/update-info"
+      hx-target="#main"
+      hx-swap="innerHTML"
+    >
+      <label class="block">
+        <span class="text-xs text-slate-400">{display_name_l}</span>
+        <input name="display_name" value="{display_name}" class="mt-1 w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+      </label>
+      <label class="block">
+        <span class="text-xs text-slate-400">{email_l}</span>
+        <input name="email" type="email" value="{email}" class="mt-1 w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+      </label>
+      <button type="submit" class="sm:col-span-2 justify-self-start bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-white text-sm">{save}</button>
+    </form>
+  </section>
+
+  {password_section}
+
+  {totp_section}
+</div>"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "profile.heading"),
+        signed_in_as = t(lang, "profile.signed_in_as"),
+        info_heading = t(lang, "profile.info_heading"),
+        display_name_l = t(lang, "profile.display_name"),
+        email_l = t(lang, "profile.email"),
+        save = t(lang, "common.save"),
+        username = html_escape(&user.name),
+        display_name = html_escape(&row.display_name),
+        email = html_escape(&row.email),
+        notice = notice_block,
+        password_section = password_section,
+        totp_section = totp_section,
+    ))
+}
+
+async fn render_totp_enroll_panel(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    user: &AuthedUser,
+    secret_b32: &str,
+    qr_svg: &str,
+    notice: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let panel = format!(
+        r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-sky-700/60 bg-sky-900/20 p-4">
+  <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-sky-200 mb-2">{heading}</h3>
+  <p class="text-xs text-sky-200/80 mb-3">
+    {intro}
+  </p>
+  <div class="flex flex-col sm:flex-row gap-4 items-start">
+    <div class="bg-white p-2 rounded inline-block">{qr}</div>
+    <div class="flex-1 space-y-2 text-sm">
+      <div>
+        <span class="text-xs text-slate-400">{secret_label}</span>
+        <code class="block mt-1 break-all text-emerald-200 bg-slate-950 px-2 py-1.5 rounded text-xs">{secret}</code>
+      </div>
+      <form
+        class="flex gap-2 items-stretch"
+        hx-post="/admin/pages/profile/totp/confirm"
+        hx-target="#main"
+        hx-swap="innerHTML"
+      >
+        <input type="hidden" name="secret_b32" value="{secret}"/>
+        <input
+          name="code"
+          type="text"
+          inputmode="numeric"
+          pattern="[0-9]{{6}}"
+          required
+          maxlength="6"
+          autocomplete="one-time-code"
+          placeholder="123456"
+          class="bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 w-32 font-mono tracking-widest"
+        />
+        <button type="submit" class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-white text-sm">{confirm}</button>
+      </form>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "profile.tfa_confirm_heading"),
+        intro = t(lang, "profile.tfa_confirm_intro"),
+        secret_label = t(lang, "profile.tfa_secret_manual"),
+        confirm = t(lang, "common.confirm"),
+        qr = qr_svg,
+        secret = html_escape(secret_b32),
+    );
+    render_full_page_with_totp_override(state, lang, user, notice, Some(panel)).await
+}
+
+fn render_qr_svg(payload: &str) -> String {
+    // qrcode 0.14: build the QR, then render with the SVG renderer.
+    // .min_dimensions caps how big the SVG-pixel grid is; the actual
+    // CSS size is handled by inline width/height, but the underlying
+    // module size needs to be reasonable so it stays crisp on retina.
+    use qrcode::render::svg;
+    use qrcode::QrCode;
+    match QrCode::new(payload.as_bytes()) {
+        Ok(code) => code
+            .render::<svg::Color<'_>>()
+            .min_dimensions(180, 180)
+            .dark_color(svg::Color("#000"))
+            .light_color(svg::Color("#fff"))
+            .build(),
+        Err(_) => "<div class=\"text-rose-300 text-xs\">QR encode failed</div>".to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn notice_html(kind: &str, msg: &str) -> String {
+    let (border, bg, text) = match kind {
+        "ok" => ("emerald-700/50", "emerald-900/30", "emerald-300"),
+        _ => ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300"),
+    };
+    format!(
+        r##"<div class="rounded border border-{border} bg-{bg} p-3 mb-4 text-sm text-{text}">{msg}</div>"##,
+        border = border,
+        bg = bg,
+        text = text,
+        msg = html_escape(msg),
+    )
+}
+
+fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+        .replace('"', "&quot;")
+}
+
+fn url_encode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for b in s.as_bytes() {
+        match b {
+            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
+                out.push(*b as char);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                let _ = write!(out, "%{:02X}", b);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+//! Tiny rendering helpers shared by every admin page. Splitting these out
+//! keeps each page module under ~200 LOC.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+
+pub fn require_admin(u: &AuthedUser) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if u.is_admin {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(ApiError::Forbidden("admin required".into()))
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+        .replace('"', "&quot;")
+}
+
+pub fn notice_html(kind: &str, msg: &str) -> String {
+    let (border, bg, text) = match kind {
+        "ok" => ("emerald-700/50", "emerald-900/30", "emerald-300"),
+        _ => ("rose-700/50", "rose-900/30", "rose-300"),
+    };
+    format!(
+        r##"<div class="rounded border border-{border} bg-{bg} p-3 mb-4 text-sm text-{text}">{msg}</div>"##,
+        border = border,
+        bg = bg,
+        text = text,
+        msg = html_escape(msg),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Format a unix timestamp as a short ISO-ish string for table cells.
+pub fn fmt_unix(ts: i64) -> String {
+    if ts <= 0 {
+        return "—".into();
+    }
+    use chrono::{TimeZone, Utc};
+    Utc.timestamp_opt(ts, 0)
+        .single()
+        .map(|t| t.format("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%SZ").to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| ts.to_string())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+//! Strategies page — list / create / edit-config / delete, plus the
+//! assignment matrix that decides which clients receive each strategy.
+//! Assignments are scoped to device groups or individual peers; user-level
+//! assignments are still SQL-driven (rare in practice).
+
+use super::shared::{html_escape, notice_html, require_admin};
+use crate::api::admin::i18n::{t, tf1, tf2, Lang};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Form, Path};
+use axum::response::Html;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub async fn index(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    Ok(Html(render_full(&state, lang).await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CreateForm {
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub config_options_json: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn create(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Form(form): Form<CreateForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    if form.name.trim().is_empty() {
+        return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "groups.name_required")).await;
+    }
+    let cfg = if form.config_options_json.trim().is_empty() {
+        "{}".to_string()
+    } else {
+        // Validate it's a JSON object — empty object is fine, anything else
+        // gets rejected with a friendly message.
+        match serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&form.config_options_json) {
+            Ok(v) if v.is_object() => form.config_options_json.clone(),
+            Ok(_) => {
+                return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "strategies.json_obj_required")).await
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                return notice_then(
+                    &state,
+                    lang,
+                    "error",
+                    &tf1(lang, "strategies.invalid_json", &e.to_string()),
+                )
+                .await
+            }
+        }
+    };
+    state
+        .db
+        .strategy_create(form.name.trim(), &cfg, "{}")
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        "ok",
+        &tf1(lang, "strategies.created", &form.name),
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct UpdateForm {
+    pub config_options_json: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn update(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+    Form(form): Form<UpdateForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let cfg = match serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&form.config_options_json) {
+        Ok(v) if v.is_object() => form.config_options_json.clone(),
+        _ => {
+            return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "strategies.json_obj_required")).await
+        }
+    };
+    state
+        .db
+        .strategy_update_config(id, &cfg)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(&state, lang, "ok", t(lang, "strategies.updated")).await
+}
+
+pub async fn delete(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let ok = state
+        .db
+        .strategy_delete(id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        if ok { "ok" } else { "error" },
+        if ok { t(lang, "strategies.deleted") } else { t(lang, "common.already_gone") },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AssignGroupForm {
+    pub device_group_id: i64,
+}
+
+pub async fn assign_group(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+    Form(form): Form<AssignGroupForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .strategy_assign_group(id, form.device_group_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(&state, lang, "ok", t(lang, "strategies.group_assigned")).await
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AssignPeerForm {
+    pub peer_id: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn assign_peer(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path(id): Path<i64>,
+    Form(form): Form<AssignPeerForm>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let peer_id = form.peer_id.trim();
+    if peer_id.is_empty() {
+        return notice_then(&state, lang, "error", t(lang, "groups.peer_id_required")).await;
+    }
+    let exists = state
+        .db
+        .peer_exists(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if !exists {
+        return notice_then(
+            &state,
+            lang,
+            "error",
+            &tf1(lang, "groups.no_device_yet", peer_id),
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .strategy_assign_peer_replace(id, peer_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        "ok",
+        &tf1(lang, "strategies.peer_assigned", peer_id),
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+pub async fn unassign(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    admin: AuthedUser,
+    lang: Lang,
+    Path((id, assignment_id)): Path<(i64, i64)>,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    require_admin(&admin)?;
+    let ok = state
+        .db
+        .strategy_assignment_delete(id, assignment_id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    notice_then(
+        &state,
+        lang,
+        if ok { "ok" } else { "error" },
+        if ok { t(lang, "strategies.unassigned") } else { t(lang, "common.already_gone") },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+// ---------- rendering ----------
+
+async fn notice_then(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    lang: Lang,
+    kind: &str,
+    msg: &str,
+) -> Result<Html<String>, ApiError> {
+    let mut html = notice_html(kind, msg);
+    html.push_str(&render_full(state, lang).await?);
+    Ok(Html(html))
+}
+
+async fn render_full(state: &Arc<AppState>, lang: Lang) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let strategies = state
+        .db
+        .strategies_list_all()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let all_groups = state
+        .db
+        .device_groups_list_all()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let mut s = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div id="strategies-region" class="space-y-6">
+  <header>
+    <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold">{heading}</h2>
+    <p class="text-xs text-slate-500 mt-1">{tagline}</p>
+  </header>
+  <section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4">
+    <h3 class="text-sm font-semibold text-slate-300 mb-3">{create_heading}</h3>
+    <form class="space-y-2 text-sm" hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/create" hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+      <input name="name" placeholder="{ph}" required class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5"/>
+      <textarea name="config_options_json" rows="3" placeholder='{{"enable-udp": "N", "whitelist": ""}}'
+        class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 font-mono text-xs"></textarea>
+      <button class="bg-sky-600 hover:bg-sky-500 rounded px-3 py-1.5 font-medium text-white">{create}</button>
+    </form>
+  </section>
+"##,
+        heading = t(lang, "strategies.heading"),
+        tagline = t(lang, "strategies.tagline"),
+        create_heading = t(lang, "strategies.create_heading"),
+        ph = t(lang, "strategies.name_unique"),
+        create = t(lang, "common.create"),
+    );
+    if strategies.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="text-slate-500 text-sm">{}</p>"##,
+            t(lang, "strategies.no_strategies"),
+        );
+    }
+    for str_ in &strategies {
+        let assignments = state
+            .db
+            .strategy_assignments_for(str_.id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<section class="rounded-md border border-slate-800 bg-slate-900 p-4 space-y-3">
+  <header class="flex items-center justify-between">
+    <div>
+      <h3 class="font-semibold">{name}</h3>
+      <p class="text-xs text-slate-500">{meta}</p>
+    </div>
+    <button class="text-xs text-rose-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+      hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{id}/delete"
+      hx-confirm="{confirm}"
+      hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{delete}</button>
+  </header>
+  <form class="space-y-2 text-sm"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{id}/update"
+    hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+    <label class="block text-xs text-slate-400">{cfg_label}</label>
+    <textarea name="config_options_json" rows="4"
+      class="w-full bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 font-mono text-xs">{cfg}</textarea>
+    <button class="bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-xs">{save}</button>
+  </form>"##,
+            id = str_.id,
+            name = html_escape(&str_.name),
+            meta = tf2(lang, "strategies.id_modified", &str_.id.to_string(), &str_.modified_at.to_string()),
+            cfg = html_escape(&str_.config_options_json),
+            confirm = html_escape(&tf1(lang, "strategies.confirm_delete", &str_.name)),
+            delete = t(lang, "common.delete"),
+            cfg_label = t(lang, "strategies.config_label"),
+            save = t(lang, "common.save"),
+        );
+
+        // ---- Assignments section ----
+        render_assignments(&mut s, lang, str_.id, &assignments, &all_groups);
+
+        s.push_str("</section>");
+    }
+    s.push_str("</div>");
+    Ok(s)
+}
+
+fn render_assignments(
+    s: &mut String,
+    lang: Lang,
+    strategy_id: i64,
+    assignments: &[crate::database::StrategyAssignmentRow],
+    all_groups: &[crate::database::DeviceGroupRow],
+) {
+    let group_assigned: std::collections::HashSet<i64> = assignments
+        .iter()
+        .filter_map(|a| a.device_group_id)
+        .collect();
+    let group_rows: Vec<&crate::database::StrategyAssignmentRow> = assignments
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|a| a.device_group_id.is_some())
+        .collect();
+    let peer_rows: Vec<&crate::database::StrategyAssignmentRow> = assignments
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|a| a.peer_id.is_some())
+        .collect();
+
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div class="pt-3 border-t border-slate-800 space-y-3">
+  <h4 class="text-xs font-semibold text-slate-400 uppercase tracking-wide">{filter_heading}</h4>
+  <p class="text-[11px] text-slate-500">{filter_hint}</p>"##,
+        filter_heading = t(lang, "strategies.filter_heading"),
+        filter_hint = t(lang, "strategies.filter_hint"),
+    );
+
+    // ---- Device groups ----
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div>
+    <div class="text-[11px] font-semibold text-slate-400 mb-1">{groups_label}</div>
+    <ul class="text-sm divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        groups_label = t(lang, "strategies.groups_label"),
+    );
+    if group_rows.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<li class="py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{}</li>"##,
+            t(lang, "strategies.no_group_assignments"),
+        );
+    }
+    for a in &group_rows {
+        let name = a
+            .device_group_name
+            .as_deref()
+            .unwrap_or("(deleted group)");
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<li class="py-2 flex items-center justify-between">
+  <span class="text-slate-200">{name}</span>
+  <button class="text-xs text-slate-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{sid}/assignments/{aid}/delete"
+    hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{remove}</button>
+</li>"##,
+            name = html_escape(name),
+            sid = strategy_id,
+            aid = a.id,
+            remove = t(lang, "common.remove"),
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</ul>");
+    let candidates: Vec<&crate::database::DeviceGroupRow> = all_groups
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|g| !group_assigned.contains(&g.id))
+        .collect();
+    if !candidates.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<form class="flex gap-2 text-sm pt-2"
+  hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{sid}/assignments/group"
+  hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+  <select name="device_group_id" class="flex-1 bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5">
+"##,
+            sid = strategy_id,
+        );
+        for g in &candidates {
+            let _ = write!(
+                s,
+                r##"<option value="{gid}">{name}</option>"##,
+                gid = g.id,
+                name = html_escape(&g.name),
+            );
+        }
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"</select>
+  <button class="bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-xs">{assign}</button>
+</form>"##,
+            assign = t(lang, "strategies.assign_group"),
+        );
+    } else if !all_groups.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="text-[11px] text-slate-500 pt-1">{}</p>"##,
+            t(lang, "strategies.all_groups_assigned"),
+        );
+    } else {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<p class="text-[11px] text-slate-500 pt-1">{}</p>"##,
+            t(lang, "strategies.no_groups_exist"),
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</div>");
+
+    // ---- Peers ----
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<div>
+    <div class="text-[11px] font-semibold text-slate-400 mb-1">{peers_label}</div>
+    <ul class="text-sm divide-y divide-slate-800">"##,
+        peers_label = t(lang, "strategies.peers_label"),
+    );
+    if peer_rows.is_empty() {
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<li class="py-2 text-slate-500 text-xs">{}</li>"##,
+            t(lang, "strategies.no_peer_assignments"),
+        );
+    }
+    for a in &peer_rows {
+        let pid = a.peer_id.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
+        let _ = write!(
+            s,
+            r##"<li class="py-2 flex items-center justify-between">
+  <span class="font-mono text-slate-200">{pid}</span>
+  <button class="text-xs text-slate-400 hover:text-rose-300"
+    hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{sid}/assignments/{aid}/delete"
+    hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">{remove}</button>
+</li>"##,
+            pid = html_escape(pid),
+            sid = strategy_id,
+            aid = a.id,
+            remove = t(lang, "common.remove"),
+        );
+    }
+    s.push_str("</ul>");
+    let _ = write!(
+        s,
+        r##"<form class="flex gap-2 text-sm pt-2"
+  hx-post="/admin/pages/strategies/{sid}/assignments/peer"
+  hx-target="#strategies-region" hx-swap="outerHTML">
+  <input name="peer_id" placeholder="{ph}" required
+    class="flex-1 bg-slate-800 border border-slate-700 rounded px-2 py-1.5 font-mono"/>
+  <button class="bg-sky-700 hover:bg-sky-600 rounded px-3 py-1.5 text-xs">{assign}</button>
+</form>"##,
+        sid = strategy_id,
+        ph = t(lang, "groups.peer_id_placeholder"),
+        assign = t(lang, "strategies.assign_peer"),
+    );
+    s.push_str("</div></div>");
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+//! `POST /api/agent/exec-result` — agent posts back the result of a
+//! PowerShell command queued via the heartbeat reply.
+//!
+//! Auth: same per-peer signed-API gate as the other agent endpoints
+//! ([`crate::api::device_auth`]). Because remote exec is only ever
+//! dispatched against `peer.managed = 1` peers, *this* endpoint
+//! additionally refuses unsigned posts even when the peer happens to be
+//! `managed=0` — there's no legacy compatibility story for exec, so we
+//! fail closed.
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ExecResultBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub uuid: String,
+    pub cmd_id: String,
+    pub exit_code: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub stdout: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub stderr: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub timed_out: bool,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub truncated: bool,
+}
+
+pub async fn exec_result(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let outcome =
+        device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/agent/exec-result", &headers, &body).await?;
+    let payload: ExecResultBody = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+    if payload.id.is_empty() || payload.uuid.is_empty() || payload.cmd_id.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "id, uuid, and cmd_id required".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Bind identity to body. Unsigned posts are flat-out rejected here
+    // even when the peer is currently managed=0 — exec is a signed-only
+    // feature, no legacy path.
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if payload.id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized),
+    };
+
+    let updated = state
+        .db
+        .exec_finish(
+            &payload.cmd_id,
+            &id,
+            payload.exit_code,
+            &payload.stdout,
+            &payload.stderr,
+            payload.timed_out,
+            payload.truncated,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if !updated {
+        // Either the cmd_id doesn't exist, belongs to another peer, or
+        // is already in a terminal state. The agent doesn't need to
+        // distinguish — log on our side and return OK so it doesn't
+        // retry forever.
+        hbb_common::log::warn!(
+            "exec-result: no-op update for cmd_id={} peer={} (already finalized or wrong peer)",
+            payload.cmd_id,
+            id
+        );
+    }
+    Ok("OK".to_string())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+//! `POST /api/audit/alarm` — security alarm (IP whitelist hit, brute-force
+//! thresholds). Wire shape from CONSOLE_API.md §7.3:
+//! `{ id, uuid, typ: int, info: stringified-JSON }`.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AlarmAuditBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub typ: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub info: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn alarm(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(body): Json<AlarmAuditBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    if body.id.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id required".into()));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .audit_alarm_insert(&body.id, body.typ, &body.info)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+//! `POST /api/audit/conn` — fire-and-forget connection log entry. The client
+//! ([src/server/connection.rs:1248-1279](file:///Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/server/connection.rs#L1248))
+//! emits this on every accepted session, no Authorization header. We answer
+//! with `{"guid":"..."}` so the client can pass that guid back later in
+//! `PUT /api/audit` (CONSOLE_API.md §7.1).
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ConnAuditBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub conn_id: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub session_id: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub ip: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub action: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn conn(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(body): Json<ConnAuditBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if body.id.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id required".into()));
+    }
+    let action = if body.action.is_empty() {
+        "new"
+    } else {
+        body.action.as_str()
+    };
+    let guid = state
+        .db
+        .audit_conn_insert(&body.id, body.conn_id, body.session_id, &body.ip, action)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "guid": guid })))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+//! `POST /api/audit/file` — file transfer log entry (CONSOLE_API.md §7.2).
+//! `info` arrives as a stringified JSON object; we store it verbatim.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct FileAuditBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub peer_id: String,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "type")]
+    pub direction: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub path: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub is_file: bool,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub info: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn file(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(body): Json<FileAuditBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    if body.id.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id required".into()));
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .audit_file_insert(
+            &body.id,
+            &body.peer_id,
+            body.direction,
+            &body.path,
+            body.is_file,
+            &body.info,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+pub mod alarm;
+pub mod conn;
+pub mod file;
+pub mod note;
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+//! `PUT /api/audit` — operator end-of-session note. Sent from the Flutter
+//! `_showConnEndAuditDialogCloseCanceled` flow at
+//! [flutter/lib/common/widgets/dialog.dart:1656](file:///Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/flutter/lib/common/widgets/dialog.dart#L1656).
+//! Bearer-authenticated.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct NoteBody {
+    pub guid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub note: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn note(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    _user: AuthedUser,
+    Json(body): Json<NoteBody>,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    if body.guid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("guid required".into()));
+    }
+    let updated = state
+        .db
+        .audit_conn_update_note(&body.guid, &body.note)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if !updated {
+        return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
+    }
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+use crate::api::email;
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::{sha256_token, AuthedUser};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::users::{verify_password, UserPayload};
+use crate::database::UserRow;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use totp_rs::{Algorithm, Secret, TOTP};
+
+const EMAIL_CODE_TTL_SECS: i64 = 600;
+
+/// `LoginRequest` mirrors the Flutter client at
+/// flutter/lib/common/hbbs/hbbs.dart:133. M1 only consults `username`,
+/// `password`, and `type`; the other fields are tolerated for forward-compat.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct LoginRequest {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "type")]
+    pub kind: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "deviceInfo")]
+    pub device_info: Option<Value>,
+    // Tolerated, ignored in M1:
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub auto_login: Option<bool>,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "verificationCode")]
+    pub verification_code: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "tfaCode")]
+    pub tfa_code: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub secret: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct IdUuidBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn login_options_head() -> StatusCode {
+    StatusCode::OK
+}
+
+pub async fn login_options(Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>) -> Json<Vec<String>> {
+    // Static base set from config (account / email_code), plus a dynamic
+    // `oidc/<name>` entry per enabled provider in the DB. Recomputed per
+    // request so adding a provider via SQL takes effect without a restart.
+    let mut out = state.cfg.login_options.clone();
+    if !state.cfg.public_base_url.is_empty() {
+        if let Ok(providers) = state.db.oidc_provider_list_enabled().await {
+            for p in providers {
+                out.push(format!("oidc/{}", p.name));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Json(out)
+}
+
+const TFA_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECS: i64 = 300;
+
+pub async fn login(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(req): Json<LoginRequest>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    // The desktop client reuses the email-code dialog for the TOTP second
+    // leg: it POSTs `type: "email_code"` with `tfaCode` set (and the email
+    // `verificationCode` field also set, but we ignore that when tfaCode is
+    // present). Detect that shape up-front and route to the TOTP verifier;
+    // otherwise dispatch on the declared `type`.
+    let has_tfa = req.tfa_code.as_deref().is_some_and(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        && req.secret.as_deref().is_some_and(|s| !s.is_empty());
+    if has_tfa {
+        return login_tfa_code(state, req).await;
+    }
+    let kind = req.kind.as_deref().unwrap_or("account");
+    match kind {
+        "account" | "" => login_account(state, req).await,
+        "tfa_code" => login_tfa_code(state, req).await,
+        "email_code" => login_email_code(state, req).await,
+        other => Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "unsupported login type: {}",
+            other
+        ))),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Two-leg passwordless login by email. Leg 1 (no `verificationCode`) mints a
+/// fresh 6-digit code and emails it to the user (or logs to stdout when SMTP
+/// is unconfigured). Leg 2 (with `verificationCode`) verifies the code,
+/// consumes it, and issues an access token.
+async fn login_email_code(
+    state: Arc<AppState>,
+    req: LoginRequest,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    // The Flutter client passes the email/username in the `username` field;
+    // accept it either as a literal email or as a username we can map to one.
+    let identifier = req
+        .username
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("username (email) required".into()))?;
+    let user = resolve_user_by_identifier(&state, identifier).await?;
+    let email = if !user.email.is_empty() {
+        user.email.clone()
+    } else if user.username.contains('@') {
+        // Operator bootstraps users with email-as-username — accept that.
+        user.username.clone()
+    } else {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "user has no email address on file".into(),
+        ));
+    };
+
+    if let Some(code) = req
+        .verification_code
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+    {
+        // Leg 2: verify.
+        let supplied_hash = sodiumoxide::crypto::hash::sha256::hash(code.as_bytes())
+            .as_ref()
+            .to_vec();
+        let ok = state
+            .db
+            .email_code_verify(&email, &supplied_hash)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+        if !ok {
+            return Err(ApiError::BadCredentials);
+        }
+        if user.status == 0 {
+            return Err(ApiError::AccountDisabled);
+        }
+        if user.status == -1 {
+            return Err(ApiError::Unverified);
+        }
+        return issue_session(&state, &req, &user).await;
+    }
+
+    // Leg 1: mint + send a fresh code.
+    let (code, code_hash) = email::mint_code();
+    state
+        .db
+        .email_code_create(&email, &code_hash, EMAIL_CODE_TTL_SECS)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if let Err(e) = email::send_login_code(state.cfg.email.as_ref(), &email, &code).await {
+        return Err(ApiError::Internal(e));
+    }
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "type": "email_check" })))
+}
+
+async fn resolve_user_by_identifier(
+    state: &AppState,
+    identifier: &str,
+) -> Result<UserRow, ApiError> {
+    if identifier.contains('@') {
+        if let Some(u) = state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_email(identifier)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        {
+            return Ok(u);
+        }
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_username(identifier)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::BadCredentials)
+}
+
+async fn login_account(
+    state: Arc<AppState>,
+    req: LoginRequest,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    let username = req
+        .username
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("username required".into()))?;
+    let password = req
+        .password
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("password required".into()))?;
+
+    let user = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_username(username)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::BadCredentials)?;
+
+    let ok = verify_password(user.password_hash.clone(), password.to_string()).await?;
+    if !ok {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadCredentials);
+    }
+    if user.status == 0 {
+        return Err(ApiError::AccountDisabled);
+    }
+    if user.status == -1 {
+        return Err(ApiError::Unverified);
+    }
+
+    // 2FA gate: if the user has TOTP enrolled, mint a short-lived nonce and
+    // tell the client we want the TOTP code in a follow-up POST. The client
+    // echoes the nonce back as `secret`.
+    //
+    // Wire shape matches the Flutter client's expectations
+    // (flutter/lib/common/widgets/login.dart:485): the outer `type` is the
+    // generic `email_check` envelope (the dialog the client opens for any
+    // second-leg challenge), and `tfa_type` distinguishes TOTP (`tfa_check`)
+    // from email (`email_check`). Returning `type:"tfa_check"` directly
+    // would miss the switch's only branch and surface as the unhelpful
+    // "bad response from server" toast.
+    if state.db.totp_get_secret(user.id).await?.is_some() {
+        let nonce = state
+            .db
+            .tfa_challenge_create(user.id, TFA_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECS)
+            .await?;
+        return Ok(Json(json!({
+            "type":     "email_check",
+            "tfa_type": "tfa_check",
+            "secret":   nonce,
+        })));
+    }
+
+    issue_session(&state, &req, &user).await
+}
+
+async fn login_tfa_code(
+    state: Arc<AppState>,
+    req: LoginRequest,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    let nonce = req
+        .secret
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("secret required".into()))?;
+    let code = req
+        .tfa_code
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("tfaCode required".into()))?;
+
+    let user_id = state
+        .db
+        .tfa_challenge_lookup(nonce)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid or expired challenge".into()))?;
+    let secret_b32 = state
+        .db
+        .totp_get_secret(user_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("TOTP not enrolled".into()))?;
+
+    if !verify_totp(&secret_b32, code)? {
+        // Leave the challenge row alive — operators may want short retries.
+        return Err(ApiError::BadCredentials);
+    }
+    state.db.tfa_challenge_consume(nonce).await?;
+
+    let user = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_id(user_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
+    issue_session(&state, &req, &user).await
+}
+
+/// Build and persist a fresh access token, claim the calling device, and
+/// return the standard logged-in response shape. Shared by the password,
+/// post-TOTP, post-email-code, and (later) post-OIDC paths.
+async fn issue_session(
+    state: &AppState,
+    req: &LoginRequest,
+    user: &UserRow,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    let token = mint_token();
+    let sha = sha256_token(&token);
+    let device_info_json = req
+        .device_info
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|v| v.to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    state
+        .db
+        .token_insert(
+            user.id,
+            &sha,
+            req.id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+            req.uuid.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+            &device_info_json,
+            state.cfg.session_ttl_secs,
+        )
+        .await?;
+    // Bind the calling device to this user so /api/peers shows it correctly.
+    state
+        .db
+        .device_claim(
+            user.id,
+            req.id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+            req.uuid.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "access_token": token,
+        "type":         "access_token",
+        "user":         UserPayload::from(user),
+    })))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_totp(secret_b32: &str, code: &str) -> Result<bool, ApiError> {
+    let secret = Secret::Encoded(secret_b32.to_string())
+        .to_bytes()
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("bad TOTP secret: {:?}", e)))?;
+    let totp = TOTP::new(Algorithm::SHA1, 6, 1, 30, secret)
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("TOTP init: {}", e)))?;
+    totp.check_current(code)
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("TOTP check: {}", e)))
+}
+
+pub async fn current_user(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    // Body is required by the client but its content is purely advisory.
+    Json(_body): Json<IdUuidBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<UserPayload>, ApiError> {
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .user_find_by_id(user.user_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
+    Ok(Json(UserPayload::from(&row)))
+}
+
+pub async fn logout(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
+    Json(_body): Json<IdUuidBody>,
+) -> StatusCode {
+    // Best-effort: parse the bearer ourselves so a missing/invalid token still
+    // returns 200 (matches the client's fire-and-forget logout flow).
+    if let Some(auth) = headers.get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION) {
+        if let Ok(s) = auth.to_str() {
+            if let Some(tok) = s.strip_prefix("Bearer ").map(str::trim) {
+                if !tok.is_empty() {
+                    let sha = sha256_token(tok);
+                    let _ = state.db.token_delete(&sha).await;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    StatusCode::OK
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn mint_token() -> String {
+    let bytes = sodiumoxide::randombytes::randombytes(32);
+    base64::encode_config(bytes, base64::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+//! Ed25519-signature gate for the agent-facing HTTP API
+//! (`/api/heartbeat`, `/api/sysinfo`).
+//!
+//! Trust root: the device's Ed25519 public key is already written into
+//! `peer.pk` during the rendezvous `RegisterPk` handshake (TCP/protobuf,
+//! port 21116). That handshake proves possession of the matching private key
+//! to the rendezvous server — so any later HTTP request signed by the same
+//! key is provably from the same device.
+//!
+//! Cutover: per-peer. `peer.managed = 0` (default) keeps stock-client
+//! behaviour — no signature required. `managed = 1` requires a valid sig on
+//! every request. The flag flips from 0→1 on the first valid signature we
+//! observe (TOFU) or via the admin endpoint. It never flips back from a
+//! request — only an admin can downgrade.
+//!
+//! Wire format (both headers required on signed requests):
+//!   X-RD-Device-Id: <id>
+//!   X-RD-Signature: v1.<unix_ts>.<base64(ed25519_sig)>
+//! where the signed message is:
+//!   "rd-api-v1\n" || METHOD || "\n" || PATH || "\n" || TS || "\n" || sha256(body)
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use lazy_static::lazy_static;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+const SIG_VERSION: &str = "v1";
+const HEADER_ID: &str = "x-rd-device-id";
+const HEADER_SIG: &str = "x-rd-signature";
+const SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECS: i64 = 300;
+const REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS: i64 = 600;
+const REPLAY_CACHE_MAX: usize = 16_384;
+
+/// Outcome of running the gate. The handler uses this to decide which `id`
+/// to trust as the device identity:
+///   - `Verified` → caller is cryptographically that device.
+///   - `LegacyUnsigned` → managed=0 peer that sent no sig headers; the
+///     handler may proceed but the body `id` is trusted only weakly
+///     (same risk as today). The handler still calls `get_peer` to confirm
+///     the id is known.
+pub enum AuthOutcome {
+    Verified { id: String },
+    LegacyUnsigned,
+}
+
+lazy_static! {
+    /// Replay cache. Key: "<id>|<ts>|<sig_first32>". Value: expiry unix ts.
+    /// Small enough that the sweep-on-insert cost is negligible.
+    static ref REPLAY: Mutex<HashMap<String, i64>> = Mutex::new(HashMap::new());
+}
+
+pub async fn verify(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    method: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    body: &[u8],
+) -> Result<AuthOutcome, ApiError> {
+    let sig_hdr = headers.get(HEADER_SIG).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+    let id_hdr = headers.get(HEADER_ID).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+
+    // No signature headers at all → legacy path. Even then we still need to
+    // check that the peer (if it claims an id in the body) isn't marked
+    // `managed=1`. The handler doesn't know the body id yet, so we defer
+    // the managed-check to a second call (`enforce_managed_for_id`) after
+    // the handler has parsed the body. Returning LegacyUnsigned here just
+    // means "no sig present, you must call enforce_managed_for_id next".
+    let (sig_hdr, id_hdr) = match (sig_hdr, id_hdr) {
+        (Some(s), Some(i)) if !s.is_empty() && !i.is_empty() => (s, i),
+        (None, None) => return Ok(AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned),
+        // Partial headers: someone tried to sign but messed up the request.
+        // Don't fall through to legacy — treat as an outright failure so we
+        // don't silently downgrade a misconfigured agent.
+        _ => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {}: partial headers (id={:?}, sig_present={})",
+                path,
+                id_hdr,
+                sig_hdr.map(|s| !s.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false),
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Parse "v1.<ts>.<b64>".
+    let mut parts = sig_hdr.splitn(3, '.');
+    let ver = parts.next().unwrap_or("");
+    let ts_s = parts.next().unwrap_or("");
+    let sig_b64 = parts.next().unwrap_or("");
+    if ver != SIG_VERSION || ts_s.is_empty() || sig_b64.is_empty() {
+        hbb_common::log::warn!(
+            "signed API {} from {}: malformed signature header (ver={:?})",
+            path, id_hdr, ver,
+        );
+        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+    }
+    let ts: i64 = match ts_s.parse() {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(_) => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {} from {}: bad timestamp {:?}",
+                path, id_hdr, ts_s,
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+    };
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+    if (now - ts).abs() > SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECS {
+        hbb_common::log::warn!(
+            "signed API {} from {}: clock skew {}s exceeds {}s tolerance",
+            path, id_hdr, (now - ts).abs(), SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECS,
+        );
+        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+    }
+    let sig_bytes = match base64::decode(sig_b64) {
+        Ok(b) => b,
+        Err(e) => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {} from {}: base64 decode failed: {}",
+                path, id_hdr, e,
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Replay check before the expensive crypto. The (id, ts, sig-prefix)
+    // tuple is unique per request from a non-broken agent.
+    let replay_key = {
+        let prefix: String = sig_b64.chars().take(32).collect();
+        format!("{}|{}|{}", id_hdr, ts, prefix)
+    };
+    {
+        let mut cache = REPLAY.lock().unwrap();
+        cache.retain(|_, exp| *exp > now);
+        if cache.contains_key(&replay_key) {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {} from {}: replay rejected",
+                path, id_hdr,
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+        if cache.len() < REPLAY_CACHE_MAX {
+            cache.insert(replay_key, now + REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS);
+        }
+        // If the cache is full we accept (no DoS via cache exhaustion). The
+        // 5-min skew window already bounds replay risk.
+    }
+
+    // Look up the peer's pk and managed flag in one query.
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .peer_get_auth(id_hdr)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let (pk_bytes, managed) = match row {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => {
+            // Early-boot race: the agent generates its keypair and starts
+            // signing API requests before its `--server` child has done
+            // the rendezvous RegisterPk handshake that creates the peer
+            // row. Returning Unauthorized here would leave brand-new
+            // agents stuck — the retry loop is designed around the
+            // ID_NOT_FOUND response from the handler, not a hard auth
+            // failure. Fall through to legacy so the handler can answer
+            // ID_NOT_FOUND; the next retry after RegisterPk completes
+            // will validate normally and TOFU-promote.
+            hbb_common::log::debug!(
+                "signed API request for unregistered peer {} — pre-rendezvous race, \
+                 deferring to legacy path",
+                id_hdr,
+            );
+            return Ok(AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned);
+        }
+    };
+    if pk_bytes.is_empty() {
+        // Peer row exists (rendezvous touched it) but no PK yet — same
+        // race as above, mid-handshake. Defer to legacy; the handler's
+        // `enforce_managed_for_id` still protects this peer if it was
+        // somehow flagged managed=1 with no pk.
+        hbb_common::log::debug!(
+            "signed API request for peer {} with empty pk — deferring to legacy path",
+            id_hdr,
+        );
+        return Ok(AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned);
+    }
+
+    // Build the canonical signed message:
+    //   "rd-api-v1\n" || METHOD || "\n" || PATH || "\n" || TS || "\n" || sha256(body)
+    let body_sha = sodiumoxide::crypto::hash::sha256::hash(body);
+    let mut msg = Vec::with_capacity(64 + method.len() + path.len());
+    msg.extend_from_slice(b"rd-api-v1\n");
+    msg.extend_from_slice(method.as_bytes());
+    msg.push(b'\n');
+    msg.extend_from_slice(path.as_bytes());
+    msg.push(b'\n');
+    msg.extend_from_slice(ts_s.as_bytes());
+    msg.push(b'\n');
+    msg.extend_from_slice(body_sha.as_ref());
+
+    let pk = match sodiumoxide::crypto::sign::PublicKey::from_slice(&pk_bytes) {
+        Some(p) => p,
+        None => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {} from {}: stored pk ({}B) is not a valid Ed25519 public key",
+                path, id_hdr, pk_bytes.len(),
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+    };
+    let sig = match sodiumoxide::crypto::sign::Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes) {
+        Ok(s) => s,
+        Err(_) => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "signed API {} from {}: signature length {} is not the Ed25519 size",
+                path, id_hdr, sig_bytes.len(),
+            );
+            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+        }
+    };
+    if !sodiumoxide::crypto::sign::verify_detached(&sig, &msg, &pk) {
+        // The agent's keypair doesn't match the pk stored in `peer`.
+        // Usually this means a config was wiped/regenerated on the agent
+        // side without the server's row being cleared — the next
+        // successful RegisterPk handshake will fix it.
+        hbb_common::log::warn!(
+            "signed API {} from {}: signature does NOT verify against stored pk \
+             (agent's keypair differs from the one rendezvous registered) \
+             — managed={}",
+            path, id_hdr, managed,
+        );
+        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+    }
+
+    // TOFU promote: first valid sig flips managed=0 → 1. After this, the
+    // same device can no longer fall back to the legacy unsigned path.
+    if !managed {
+        if let Err(e) = state.db.peer_set_managed(id_hdr, true).await {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!("peer_set_managed({}) failed: {}", id_hdr, e);
+            // Don't fail the request — the sig was valid, the promote is
+            // best-effort. Next request will retry the promote.
+        } else {
+            hbb_common::log::info!("peer {} TOFU-promoted to managed=1", id_hdr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(AuthOutcome::Verified {
+        id: id_hdr.to_string(),
+    })
+}
+
+/// Called by handlers AFTER they've parsed the body and extracted the
+/// device id. Only meaningful when `verify` returned `LegacyUnsigned`.
+/// Enforces: if the peer is currently managed=1, an unsigned request for
+/// that id must be rejected.
+pub async fn enforce_managed_for_id(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    id: &str,
+) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if id.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .peer_get_auth(id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    match row {
+        Some((_, true)) => {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "rejecting unsigned API request for managed peer {}",
+                id,
+            );
+            Err(ApiError::Unauthorized)
+        }
+        _ => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+//! `POST /api/devices/cli` — used by `rustdesk --assign --token <T> ...`
+//! to enroll a freshly installed device into a tenant slot.
+//!
+//! Per CONSOLE_API.md §11: bearer-authenticated; the response body is plain
+//! text (empty = success, non-empty = informational message). The client
+//! prints "Done!" when the body is empty.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::AbPeerInsert;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::header;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AssignBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub user_name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub strategy_name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub address_book_name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub address_book_tag: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub address_book_alias: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub address_book_password: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub address_book_note: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub device_group_name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub note: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub device_username: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub device_name: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn assign(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    caller: AuthedUser,
+    Json(body): Json<AssignBody>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, ApiError> {
+    if body.id.is_empty() || body.uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid required".into()));
+    }
+    let mut warnings: Vec<String> = vec![];
+
+    // Resolve owner. If --user_name was supplied, that's the owner; otherwise
+    // the caller becomes the owner (matches `rustdesk --assign` flows where
+    // the operator's account is the destination).
+    let owner = if let Some(name) = body.user_name.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        if !caller.is_admin {
+            return Err(ApiError::Forbidden(
+                "admin required to assign to another user".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+        match state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_username(name)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        {
+            Some(u) => u,
+            None => {
+                return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+                    "no such user: {}",
+                    name
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_id(caller.user_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?
+    };
+
+    // Bind the device to the owner (mirrors what /api/login's device_claim
+    // does, but here it's an admin operation rather than user-initiated).
+    state.db.device_claim(owner.id, &body.id, &body.uuid).await;
+
+    // Address-book entry. We always target the *owner's* personal AB.
+    if let Some(ab_name) = body.address_book_name.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        let _ = ab_name; // M2's get_or_create_personal ignores the name; OSS has one personal AB per user.
+        let ab_guid = state
+            .db
+            .ab_get_or_create_personal(owner.id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+        let tags: Option<Vec<String>> = body
+            .address_book_tag
+            .as_deref()
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+            .map(|t| t.split(',').map(|s| s.trim().to_string()).collect());
+        if let Err(e) = state
+            .db
+            .ab_peer_insert(
+                &ab_guid,
+                AbPeerInsert {
+                    id: &body.id,
+                    alias: body.address_book_alias.as_deref(),
+                    note: body.address_book_note.as_deref(),
+                    password: body.address_book_password.as_deref(),
+                    hash: None,
+                    username: body.device_username.as_deref(),
+                    hostname: body.device_name.as_deref(),
+                    platform: None,
+                },
+                tags.as_deref(),
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            // Likely a UNIQUE conflict if the peer is already in the AB;
+            // surface as a warning rather than failing the whole call.
+            warnings.push(format!("address-book entry not added: {}", e));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Strategy assignment by name. We attach to the device directly (peer-scoped),
+    // which is the most-specific tier in our resolver.
+    if let Some(name) = body.strategy_name.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        match resolve_strategy_id(&state, name).await? {
+            Some(strategy_id) => {
+                if let Err(e) = state
+                    .db
+                    .strategy_assign_peer(strategy_id, &body.id)
+                    .await
+                {
+                    warnings.push(format!("strategy assignment failed: {}", e));
+                }
+            }
+            None => {
+                warnings.push(format!("strategy {:?} does not exist", name));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Device-group membership: ensure the group exists, ensure the owner is a
+    // member. We treat the group name as the natural key per the M2 schema.
+    if let Some(group_name) = body.device_group_name.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        if let Err(e) = state
+            .db
+            .device_group_ensure_member(group_name, owner.id)
+            .await
+        {
+            warnings.push(format!("device-group assignment failed: {}", e));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Fields we accept but don't currently persist as discrete columns. These
+    // travel with the next sysinfo upload anyway (note, device_username,
+    // device_name end up in `device_sysinfo.payload` JSON).
+    if body.note.as_deref().map(|s| !s.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false) {
+        warnings.push(
+            "--note is currently surfaced via sysinfo only, not persisted as a discrete field"
+                .into(),
+        );
+    }
+
+    let body_text = if warnings.is_empty() {
+        String::new()
+    } else {
+        warnings.join("\n")
+    };
+    Ok((
+        [(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "text/plain; charset=utf-8")],
+        body_text,
+    ))
+}
+
+async fn resolve_strategy_id(
+    state: &AppState,
+    name: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<i64>, ApiError> {
+    state
+        .db
+        .strategy_find_by_name(name)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Wrap the `Value` JSON the request _could_ have under `Json<Value>` if a
+/// future variation needs it. Currently unused; kept for symmetry with other
+/// modules that work with raw JSON in/out.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+fn ignore_value(_v: Value) {}
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+//! SMTP transport for email-code login. Two modes:
+//!
+//! - **Production:** `--smtp-host` (and friends) configured → real SMTP via
+//!   `lettre` with optional STARTTLS + auth.
+//! - **Dev:** `--smtp-host` empty → the code is logged to stdout instead.
+//!   This makes the round-trip testable without standing up a mail server.
+
+use crate::api::state::EmailConfig;
+use hbb_common::log;
+use lettre::message::header::ContentType;
+use lettre::transport::smtp::authentication::Credentials;
+use lettre::transport::smtp::AsyncSmtpTransport;
+use lettre::{AsyncTransport, Message, Tokio1Executor};
+
+pub async fn send_login_code(
+    cfg: Option<&EmailConfig>,
+    to: &str,
+    code: &str,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if to.is_empty() {
+        return Err("recipient address is empty".into());
+    }
+    let Some(cfg) = cfg else {
+        // Dev mode: surface the code so the operator can complete the flow.
+        log::info!("[email-code] login code for <{}>: {}", to, code);
+        return Ok(());
+    };
+    let body = format!(
+        "Your login code is: {}\n\nIt expires in 10 minutes.\nIf you didn't request this, ignore this email.\n",
+        code
+    );
+    let message = Message::builder()
+        .from(
+            cfg.from
+                .parse()
+                .map_err(|e| format!("invalid From address {:?}: {}", cfg.from, e))?,
+        )
+        .to(to.parse().map_err(|e| format!("invalid To address {:?}: {}", to, e))?)
+        .subject("Your RustDesk login code")
+        .header(ContentType::TEXT_PLAIN)
+        .body(body)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("compose: {}", e))?;
+
+    let mut builder = if cfg.starttls {
+        AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::starttls_relay(&cfg.host)
+            .map_err(|e| format!("STARTTLS init for {}: {}", cfg.host, e))?
+    } else {
+        AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::builder_dangerous(&cfg.host)
+    }
+    .port(cfg.port);
+    if let (Some(user), Some(pass)) = (cfg.username.as_deref(), cfg.password.as_deref()) {
+        builder = builder.credentials(Credentials::new(user.to_string(), pass.to_string()));
+    }
+    let transport = builder.build();
+    transport
+        .send(message)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("smtp send to {}: {}", cfg.host, e))?;
+    log::info!("[email-code] code mailed to <{}>", to);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Generate a 6-digit numeric code with cryptographic entropy. Returns the
+/// code as a string and its sha256 for storage.
+pub fn mint_code() -> (String, Vec<u8>) {
+    // Sample 4 random bytes, fold into 0..1_000_000, format as 6-digit
+    // zero-padded decimal. 24 bits of entropy is plenty for a 10-minute
+    // 5-attempt-limit code.
+    let bytes = sodiumoxide::randombytes::randombytes(4);
+    let mut n: u32 = 0;
+    for b in &bytes {
+        n = (n << 8) | (*b as u32);
+    }
+    let n = n % 1_000_000;
+    let code = format!("{:06}", n);
+    let hash = sodiumoxide::crypto::hash::sha256::hash(code.as_bytes())
+        .as_ref()
+        .to_vec();
+    (code, hash)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::Json;
+use serde_json::json;
+
+/// Single error type for the management API. Always serializes to
+/// `{"error":"..."}` per the protocol spec; the HTTP status is chosen so the
+/// client behaves correctly:
+///
+/// - 401 Unauthorized clears the local access_token (intentional fallback in
+///   the Flutter client — see CONSOLE_API.md §3.6).
+/// - 200 OK + JSON `error` for business failures (bad creds, validation).
+///   Most non-auth handlers should return BadRequest or Conflict instead so
+///   the operator can distinguish them in logs.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum ApiError {
+    Unauthorized,
+    BadCredentials,
+    AccountDisabled,
+    Unverified,
+    Forbidden(String),
+    NotFound,
+    BadRequest(String),
+    Internal(String),
+}
+
+impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
+    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        let (status, msg) = match self {
+            ApiError::Unauthorized => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized".to_string()),
+            ApiError::BadCredentials => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "bad credentials".to_string()),
+            ApiError::AccountDisabled => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "account disabled".to_string()),
+            ApiError::Unverified => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "unverified".to_string()),
+            // Returning HTTP 200 + {"error": ...} for share-rule rejections.
+            // Flutter's _jsonDecodeActionResp at ab_model.dart:2002 surfaces
+            // the JSON `error` field as a toast and stays signed-in; using
+            // 403 here would trigger the global 401/403 logout path and yank
+            // the user's session.
+            ApiError::Forbidden(m) => (StatusCode::OK, m),
+            ApiError::NotFound => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found".to_string()),
+            ApiError::BadRequest(m) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, m),
+            ApiError::Internal(m) => {
+                hbb_common::log::error!("api internal error: {}", m);
+                (StatusCode::OK, "internal error".to_string())
+            }
+        };
+        (status, Json(json!({ "error": msg }))).into_response()
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<hbb_common::anyhow::Error> for ApiError {
+    fn from(e: hbb_common::anyhow::Error) -> Self {
+        ApiError::Internal(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+//! `GET /api/device-group/accessible` — paginated list of device groups the
+//! caller is a member of (admin sees all). The Flutter client at
+//! flutter/lib/models/group_model.dart:103 silently tolerates errors here, so
+//! we keep the behavior tight: empty list when no groups exist, never panic.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::pagination::{Page, PageQuery};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Serialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct DeviceGroupOut {
+    pub name: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn accessible(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Query(q): Query<PageQuery>,
+) -> Result<Json<Page<DeviceGroupOut>>, ApiError> {
+    let (total, rows) = state
+        .db
+        .groups_list_for_user(user.user_id, user.is_admin, q.offset(), q.limit())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Json(Page {
+        total,
+        data: rows
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|g| DeviceGroupOut { name: g.name })
+            .collect(),
+    }))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+//! `POST /api/heartbeat` — the agent management loop. The client sends every
+//! ~15 s (3 s when active connections exist). The reply may carry, in any
+//! combination:
+//!   - `sysinfo: true` — force the client to re-upload sysinfo immediately,
+//!   - `disconnect: [conn_id, ...]` — tell the client to drop those sessions,
+//!   - `modified_at` + `strategy` — push a config-options merge,
+//!   - `exec: [{cmd_id, script, max_secs, max_bytes}, ...]` — PowerShell
+//!     commands queued from the admin UI. The agent runs each and POSTs
+//!     results to `/api/agent/exec-result`. See docs/AGENT-API-AUTH.md.
+//!
+//! Auth: signed agents (peer.managed=1) must carry `X-RD-Device-Id` +
+//! `X-RD-Signature` headers — see `device_auth::verify`. Stock clients
+//! (peer.managed=0) keep posting unsigned bodies; the first valid sig we
+//! see flips the peer to managed=1 (TOFU).
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::strategy;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct HeartbeatBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub ver: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub conns: Option<Vec<i64>>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub modified_at: i64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct HeartbeatResp {
+    /// Present-and-truthy → client re-uploads sysinfo immediately.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub sysinfo: Option<bool>,
+    /// Conn IDs the client should drop. Always present (possibly empty).
+    pub disconnect: Vec<i64>,
+    /// Strategy version. Echoed back by the client; when it changes, the
+    /// client re-merges `strategy.config_options` into local config.
+    pub modified_at: i64,
+    pub strategy: Value,
+    /// PowerShell commands queued for this peer. Omitted from the JSON
+    /// reply when empty so vanilla rustdesk clients (which don't parse
+    /// this field) see a payload that's byte-for-byte identical to what
+    /// they received before this feature shipped.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub exec: Vec<ExecRequest>,
+}
+
+/// What the agent receives per queued PowerShell command. Caps live on the
+/// server so the operator can tune fleet-wide without redeploying agents.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct ExecRequest {
+    pub cmd_id: String,
+    pub script: String,
+    pub max_secs: u64,
+    pub max_bytes: u64,
+}
+
+/// Wall-clock ceiling on a single PowerShell exec. Server-side cap; the
+/// agent kills the process when the deadline elapses and reports
+/// `timed_out=true` to `/api/agent/exec-result`.
+const EXEC_MAX_SECS: u64 = 300;
+/// Combined stdout+stderr byte ceiling. Past this the agent stops
+/// appending and sets `truncated=true`. 1 MiB matches the cap surfaced
+/// in the admin UI confirm dialog.
+const EXEC_MAX_BYTES: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
+
+pub async fn heartbeat(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    raw: Bytes,
+) -> Result<Json<HeartbeatResp>, ApiError> {
+    let outcome = device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/heartbeat", &headers, &raw).await?;
+    let body: HeartbeatBody = serde_json::from_slice(&raw)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+    if body.id.is_empty() || body.uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid required".into()));
+    }
+    match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if body.id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, &body.id).await?;
+        }
+    }
+    let conns_json = serde_json::to_string(&body.conns.unwrap_or_default())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "[]".into());
+
+    let needs_sysinfo = state
+        .db
+        .sysinfo_heartbeat(
+            &body.id,
+            &body.uuid,
+            body.ver,
+            &conns_json,
+            &state.cfg.sysinfo_ver,
+        )
+        .await?;
+
+    // One-shot operator commands queued for this peer (force-disconnect,
+    // force-sysinfo). Read-and-delete in one transaction.
+    let mut disconnect: Vec<i64> = vec![];
+    let mut force_sysinfo = needs_sysinfo;
+    for cmd in state
+        .db
+        .heartbeat_pop_commands(&body.id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+    {
+        match cmd.kind.as_str() {
+            "disconnect" => {
+                if let Some(payload) = cmd.payload {
+                    if let Ok(arr) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<i64>>(&payload) {
+                        disconnect.extend(arr);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            "sysinfo" => force_sysinfo = true,
+            other => hbb_common::log::warn!("unknown heartbeat_command kind {:?}", other),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Strategy resolution (peer > device-group > user, highest priority wins).
+    let (modified_at, strategy) = strategy::resolve_for(&state, &body.id).await;
+
+    // Pop any queued PowerShell exec commands for this peer and flip them
+    // to 'running' in one transaction. The handler doesn't re-check the
+    // strategy gate here — that was done at dispatch time. By the time a
+    // row reaches 'queued' status, the operator has already passed all
+    // checks; if the strategy changed since dispatch, the rows in flight
+    // still ride out their lifecycle (an admin can flip the per-row state
+    // via the dashboard if they need to abort, but that's a separate UI
+    // surface — see future work in AGENT-API-AUTH.md).
+    let exec = state
+        .db
+        .exec_pop_queued_for_peer(&body.id)
+        .await
+        .map(|rows| {
+            rows.into_iter()
+                .map(|r| ExecRequest {
+                    cmd_id: r.cmd_id,
+                    script: r.script,
+                    max_secs: EXEC_MAX_SECS,
+                    max_bytes: EXEC_MAX_BYTES,
+                })
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!("exec_pop_queued_for_peer({}) failed: {}", body.id, e);
+            Vec::new()
+        });
+
+    Ok(Json(HeartbeatResp {
+        sysinfo: if force_sysinfo { Some(true) } else { None },
+        disconnect,
+        modified_at,
+        strategy,
+        exec,
+    }))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+//! TCP-over-rendezvous HTTP fallback. The client wraps any `/api/*` request
+//! in an `HttpProxyRequest` protobuf and ships it over the rendezvous TCP
+//! connection (already encrypted via secure_tcp) when
+//! `OPTION_USE_RAW_TCP_FOR_API=Y`. We dispatch the wrapped request through
+//! the **same** axum `Router` the HTTPS listener uses, so every existing
+//! handler — auth, AB, audit, OIDC, … — is reachable through this path
+//! with zero per-route plumbing.
+
+use axum::body::Body;
+use axum::Router;
+use hbb_common::log;
+use hbb_common::rendezvous_proto::{HeaderEntry, HttpProxyRequest, HttpProxyResponse};
+use http::header::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue};
+use http::{Method, Request};
+use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
+use std::convert::TryFrom;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+/// Shared router. Populated by [`api::serve`] before the HTTPS listener
+/// starts, so that the rendezvous TCP path can reach the same handlers.
+/// `Mutex` because `Router` isn't `Sync` even though it is `Send + Clone`;
+/// we never hold the lock across an await — we clone out, drop the guard,
+/// and call `oneshot` on the clone.
+static ROUTER: Lazy<Mutex<Option<Router>>> = Lazy::new(|| Mutex::new(None));
+
+pub fn install_router(r: Router) {
+    *ROUTER.lock().unwrap() = Some(r);
+}
+
+pub async fn dispatch(req: HttpProxyRequest) -> HttpProxyResponse {
+    let router = match ROUTER.lock().unwrap().as_ref() {
+        Some(r) => r.clone(),
+        None => return error_response(503, "router not initialized"),
+    };
+
+    let http_req = match build_request(&req) {
+        Ok(r) => r,
+        Err(msg) => return error_response(400, &msg),
+    };
+
+    let response = match router.oneshot(http_req).await {
+        Ok(r) => r,
+        Err(e) => {
+            log::warn!("http_proxy: router error: {}", e);
+            return error_response(500, &format!("router: {}", e));
+        }
+    };
+
+    let status = response.status().as_u16() as i32;
+    let headers = serialize_headers(response.headers());
+    let body = match collect_body(response.into_body()).await {
+        Ok(b) => b,
+        Err(msg) => return error_response(500, &msg),
+    };
+
+    HttpProxyResponse {
+        status,
+        headers,
+        body: body.into(),
+        error: String::new(),
+        ..Default::default()
+    }
+}
+
+fn build_request(req: &HttpProxyRequest) -> Result<Request<Body>, String> {
+    let method = if req.method.is_empty() {
+        Method::GET
+    } else {
+        Method::try_from(req.method.as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|e| format!("invalid method {:?}: {}", req.method, e))?
+    };
+    let uri = if req.path.is_empty() {
+        "/".to_string()
+    } else if req.path.starts_with('/') {
+        req.path.clone()
+    } else {
+        format!("/{}", req.path)
+    };
+    let body_bytes: Vec<u8> = req.body.to_vec();
+    let mut builder = Request::builder().method(method).uri(uri);
+    let headers_map = builder
+        .headers_mut()
+        .ok_or_else(|| "request builder produced no headers map".to_string())?;
+    let mut saw_content_type = false;
+    for h in &req.headers {
+        if h.name.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let lower = h.name.to_ascii_lowercase();
+        // Drop hop-by-hop / framing headers we'll set ourselves to match
+        // the actual body length axum sees.
+        if matches!(
+            lower.as_str(),
+            "host" | "content-length" | "connection" | "transfer-encoding"
+        ) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if lower == "content-type" {
+            saw_content_type = true;
+        }
+        let name = HeaderName::try_from(h.name.as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|e| format!("bad header name {:?}: {}", h.name, e))?;
+        let value = HeaderValue::try_from(h.value.as_bytes())
+            .map_err(|e| format!("bad header value for {:?}: {}", h.name, e))?;
+        headers_map.append(name, value);
+    }
+    // Default to JSON if the client forgot — every /api/* handler expects
+    // JSON unless the route reads `body` as raw bytes (only /api/record),
+    // which doesn't care about content-type.
+    if !saw_content_type {
+        headers_map.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+            HeaderValue::from_static("application/json"),
+        );
+    }
+    builder
+        .body(Body::from(body_bytes))
+        .map_err(|e| format!("build request: {}", e))
+}
+
+fn serialize_headers(map: &HeaderMap) -> Vec<HeaderEntry> {
+    map.iter()
+        .map(|(k, v)| HeaderEntry {
+            name: k.as_str().to_string(),
+            value: v.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Collect any `http_body::Body` whose chunks are buffer-like into a `Vec<u8>`.
+/// Works against both the request `Body` we build and axum's
+/// `UnsyncBoxBody<Bytes, axum::Error>` response body.
+async fn collect_body<B>(mut body: B) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String>
+where
+    B: http_body::Body + Unpin,
+    B::Data: hbb_common::bytes::Buf,
+    B::Error: std::fmt::Display,
+{
+    use hbb_common::bytes::Buf;
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    while let Some(chunk) = body.data().await {
+        let mut chunk = chunk.map_err(|e| format!("body read: {}", e))?;
+        while chunk.has_remaining() {
+            let s = chunk.chunk();
+            buf.extend_from_slice(s);
+            let n = s.len();
+            chunk.advance(n);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(buf)
+}
+
+fn error_response(status: i32, msg: &str) -> HttpProxyResponse {
+    HttpProxyResponse {
+        status,
+        body: msg.as_bytes().to_vec().into(),
+        error: msg.to_string(),
+        ..Default::default()
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+//! `POST /api/agent/login-event` — agent-side reporting of user logon /
+//! logoff events observed on the controlled machine. Surfaces a per-device
+//! login history on the admin Devices detail page.
+//!
+//! Auth: same per-peer signed-API gate as `/api/sysinfo` /
+//! `/api/heartbeat` / `/api/unattended-password` — see
+//! [`crate::api::device_auth`]. Stock RustDesk doesn't post here at all,
+//! so in practice every caller is a managed agent; we still keep the
+//! `LegacyUnsigned → enforce_managed_for_id` path for symmetry with the
+//! other agent endpoints.
+//!
+//! Body shape (events batched so an agent that was offline can catch up
+//! on reconnect):
+//!
+//! ```json
+//! {
+//!   "id":   "<peer id>",
+//!   "uuid": "<peer uuid>",
+//!   "events": [
+//!     {
+//!       "at":           1717920000,
+//!       "kind":         "logon",       // or "logoff"
+//!       "username":     "alice",
+//!       "domain":       "CORP",
+//!       "session_id":   2,
+//!       "session_kind": "rdp"          // or "console"
+//!     }
+//!   ]
+//! }
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Response: `"OK"` on success, `"ID_NOT_FOUND"` for an unregistered peer
+//! (same shape as `/api/unattended-password` so the agent can use a single
+//! retry helper for both).
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct LoginEventIn {
+    pub at: i64,
+    pub kind: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub username: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub domain: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub session_id: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub session_kind: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct LoginEventBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub uuid: String,
+    pub events: Vec<LoginEventIn>,
+}
+
+/// Cap per-request to bound DB cost from a misbehaving / catching-up agent.
+const MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST: usize = 256;
+
+pub async fn login_event(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let outcome =
+        device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/agent/login-event", &headers, &body).await?;
+
+    let payload: LoginEventBody = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+
+    if payload.id.is_empty() || payload.uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid are required".into()));
+    }
+    if payload.events.is_empty() {
+        return Ok("OK".to_string());
+    }
+    if payload.events.len() > MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "too many events in one POST (max {MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST})"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    // Bind the trusted identity to the body. Same rule as the other agent
+    // endpoints: signed → header id must equal body id; unsigned → peer
+    // must not be `managed=1`.
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if payload.id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, &payload.id).await?;
+            payload.id.clone()
+        }
+    };
+
+    let peer = state
+        .db
+        .get_peer(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if peer.is_none() {
+        // Same shape as /api/unattended-password — agent treats this as
+        // "retry later, rendezvous hasn't registered me yet".
+        return Ok("ID_NOT_FOUND".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let mut accepted = 0usize;
+    for ev in &payload.events {
+        let kind = ev.kind.trim();
+        if kind != "logon" && kind != "logoff" {
+            // Unknown kinds are ignored rather than 400ing the whole batch;
+            // a future agent build that adds e.g. "lock" should be able to
+            // post a mixed batch against an older server without losing
+            // the known-kind rows.
+            continue;
+        }
+        if let Err(e) = state
+            .db
+            .login_event_insert(
+                &id,
+                &payload.uuid,
+                ev.at,
+                kind,
+                ev.username.trim(),
+                ev.domain.trim(),
+                ev.session_id,
+                ev.session_kind.trim(),
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            // Don't fail the whole batch on a single insert error — the
+            // agent's retry loop will resend the events that didn't land,
+            // and we'd rather record what we can than reject everything.
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "login_event_insert for peer {} failed: {}",
+                id,
+                e
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        accepted += 1;
+    }
+
+    hbb_common::log::debug!(
+        "login-event: peer={} accepted={}/{}",
+        id,
+        accepted,
+        payload.events.len()
+    );
+    Ok("OK".to_string())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+//! `POST /api/agent/metrics` — continuous performance time-series the
+//! agent samples at ~1/min. The admin Devices detail page renders this
+//! as a CPU / memory sparkline plus a "current snapshot" card.
+//!
+//! Auth: same per-peer signed-API gate as the other agent endpoints —
+//! see [`crate::api::device_auth`]. Body shape (batched so an agent
+//! that's catching up after a transport outage can land everything in
+//! one POST):
+//!
+//! ```json
+//! {
+//!   "id":   "<peer id>",
+//!   "uuid": "<peer uuid>",
+//!   "samples": [
+//!     {
+//!       "at":           1717920000,
+//!       "cpu_pct":      42.5,
+//!       "mem_used_mb":  7820,
+//!       "mem_total_mb": 16384,
+//!       "proc_count":   341,
+//!       "uptime_secs":  173000,
+//!       "top_cpu_name": "chrome.exe",
+//!       "top_cpu_pct":  18.3,
+//!       "top_mem_name": "chrome.exe",
+//!       "top_mem_mb":   1240
+//!     }
+//!   ]
+//! }
+//! ```
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::MetricsSampleRow;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct MetricsSampleIn {
+    pub at: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub cpu_pct: f64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub mem_used_mb: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub mem_total_mb: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub proc_count: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uptime_secs: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub top_cpu_name: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub top_cpu_pct: f64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub top_mem_name: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub top_mem_mb: i64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct MetricsBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub uuid: String,
+    pub samples: Vec<MetricsSampleIn>,
+}
+
+/// Cap per request. At 60s sampling cadence + the agent's 30-minute
+/// retry-and-drain budget, even a long outage should fit well under this.
+const MAX_SAMPLES_PER_POST: usize = 512;
+
+/// Defensive bound on string fields the agent puts in `top_*_name` — a
+/// runaway process name doesn't get to balloon the DB row.
+const MAX_PROC_NAME_LEN: usize = 128;
+
+pub async fn metrics(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let outcome =
+        device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/agent/metrics", &headers, &body).await?;
+
+    let payload: MetricsBody = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+
+    if payload.id.is_empty() || payload.uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid are required".into()));
+    }
+    if payload.samples.is_empty() {
+        return Ok("OK".to_string());
+    }
+    if payload.samples.len() > MAX_SAMPLES_PER_POST {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "too many samples in one POST (max {MAX_SAMPLES_PER_POST})"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if payload.id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, &payload.id).await?;
+            payload.id.clone()
+        }
+    };
+
+    let peer = state
+        .db
+        .get_peer(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if peer.is_none() {
+        return Ok("ID_NOT_FOUND".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let mut accepted = 0usize;
+    for s in &payload.samples {
+        // Sanity-clamp the floats and string lengths. The agent should
+        // produce well-formed values, but the public-API shape means
+        // garbage-in shouldn't propagate to garbage-on-screen.
+        let cpu_pct = clamp_pct(s.cpu_pct);
+        let top_cpu_pct = clamp_pct(s.top_cpu_pct);
+        let row = MetricsSampleRow {
+            at: s.at,
+            cpu_pct,
+            mem_used_mb: s.mem_used_mb.max(0),
+            mem_total_mb: s.mem_total_mb.max(0),
+            proc_count: s.proc_count.max(0),
+            uptime_secs: s.uptime_secs.max(0),
+            top_cpu_name: truncate(&s.top_cpu_name, MAX_PROC_NAME_LEN),
+            top_cpu_pct,
+            top_mem_name: truncate(&s.top_mem_name, MAX_PROC_NAME_LEN),
+            top_mem_mb: s.top_mem_mb.max(0),
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = state
+            .db
+            .metrics_sample_insert(&id, &payload.uuid, &row)
+            .await
+        {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "metrics_sample_insert for peer {} failed: {}",
+                id,
+                e
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        accepted += 1;
+    }
+
+    hbb_common::log::debug!(
+        "metrics: peer={} accepted={}/{}",
+        id,
+        accepted,
+        payload.samples.len()
+    );
+    Ok("OK".to_string())
+}
+
+fn clamp_pct(v: f64) -> f64 {
+    if v.is_nan() {
+        0.0
+    } else {
+        v.clamp(0.0, 100.0)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Char-aware truncate (so we don't slice mid-multibyte). The cap is
+/// generous so process names that include arguments or Unicode survive.
+fn truncate(s: &str, max_chars: usize) -> String {
+    if s.chars().count() <= max_chars {
+        s.to_string()
+    } else {
+        s.chars().take(max_chars).collect()
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use axum::extract::{FromRequest, RequestParts};
+use axum::http::header;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Cookie name used by the admin dashboard. Browser-set, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict.
+pub const SESSION_COOKIE: &str = "rd_admin_session";
+
+pub struct AuthedUser {
+    pub user_id: i64,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub is_admin: bool,
+}
+
+pub fn sha256_token(token: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    sodiumoxide::crypto::hash::sha256::hash(token.as_bytes())
+        .as_ref()
+        .to_vec()
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl<B: Send> FromRequest<B> for AuthedUser {
+    type Rejection = ApiError;
+
+    async fn from_request(req: &mut RequestParts<B>) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        let state: axum::extract::Extension<Arc<AppState>> =
+            axum::extract::Extension::from_request(req)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal("missing state".into()))?;
+        let token = extract_token(req).ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
+        let sha = sha256_token(&token);
+
+        let (user_id, _exp) = state
+            .db
+            .token_lookup(&sha)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
+
+        // Slide the expiry forward on every authenticated request.
+        if let Err(e) = state.db.token_touch(&sha, state.cfg.session_ttl_secs).await {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!("token_touch failed: {}", e);
+        }
+
+        let user = state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_id(user_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            user_id: user.id,
+            name: user.username,
+            is_admin: user.is_admin,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Extract a token from either the `Authorization: Bearer …` header (preferred,
+/// for the desktop client and curl) or the `rd_admin_session` cookie (for the
+/// browser-driven admin dashboard). Returns `None` if neither is present.
+fn extract_token<B>(req: &RequestParts<B>) -> Option<String> {
+    // Bearer header wins so a curl smoke test always behaves predictably,
+    // even when run from the same browser session.
+    if let Some(auth) = req.headers().get(header::AUTHORIZATION) {
+        if let Ok(s) = auth.to_str() {
+            if let Some(tok) = s.strip_prefix("Bearer ").map(str::trim) {
+                if !tok.is_empty() {
+                    return Some(tok.to_string());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // Cookie header is a single line: `name=value; name2=value2; …`. Walk
+    // the comma-or-semicolon-separated pairs without pulling in a cookie crate.
+    if let Some(cookie_hdr) = req.headers().get(header::COOKIE) {
+        if let Ok(s) = cookie_hdr.to_str() {
+            for pair in s.split(';') {
+                let pair = pair.trim();
+                if let Some((name, value)) = pair.split_once('=') {
+                    if name.trim() == SESSION_COOKIE {
+                        let v = value.trim();
+                        if !v.is_empty() {
+                            return Some(v.to_string());
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+//! HTTP management API mounted in-process alongside hbbs's rendezvous
+//! listeners. The router is wired in via `src/rendezvous_server.rs`'s outer
+//! `tokio::select!`. M1 covers auth + heartbeat + sysinfo; later milestones
+//! add address book, audit, OIDC, etc.
+
+pub mod ab;
+pub mod admin;
+pub mod agent_exec;
+pub mod audit;
+pub mod auth;
+pub mod device_auth;
+pub mod devices_cli;
+pub mod email;
+pub mod error;
+pub mod groups;
+pub mod heartbeat;
+pub mod http_proxy;
+pub mod login_event;
+pub mod metrics;
+pub mod perf_events;
+pub mod middleware;
+pub mod oidc;
+pub mod pagination;
+pub mod peers;
+pub mod plugin_sign;
+pub mod record;
+pub mod state;
+pub mod strategy;
+pub mod sysinfo;
+pub mod twofa;
+pub mod unattended;
+pub mod users;
+
+pub use state::AppState;
+
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::routing::{delete, get, post, put};
+use axum::Router;
+use hbb_common::{log, ResultType};
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub fn router(state: Arc<AppState>) -> Router {
+    let app = Router::new()
+        // M1: auth + heartbeat + sysinfo
+        .route(
+            "/api/login-options",
+            get(auth::login_options).head(auth::login_options_head),
+        )
+        .route("/api/login", post(auth::login))
+        .route("/api/currentUser", post(auth::current_user))
+        .route("/api/logout", post(auth::logout))
+        .route("/api/heartbeat", post(heartbeat::heartbeat))
+        .route("/api/sysinfo_ver", post(sysinfo::sysinfo_ver))
+        .route("/api/sysinfo", post(sysinfo::sysinfo))
+        .route("/api/agent/exec-result", post(agent_exec::exec_result))
+        .route("/api/agent/login-event", post(login_event::login_event))
+        .route("/api/agent/metrics", post(metrics::metrics))
+        .route("/api/agent/perf-events", post(perf_events::perf_events))
+        .route(
+            "/api/unattended-password",
+            post(unattended::unattended_password),
+        )
+        // M2: address book — modern (shared + personal)
+        .route("/api/ab/settings", post(ab::settings::settings))
+        .route("/api/ab/personal", post(ab::profiles::personal))
+        .route(
+            "/api/ab/shared/profiles",
+            post(ab::profiles::shared_profiles),
+        )
+        .route("/api/ab/peers", post(ab::peers::list))
+        .route("/api/ab/tags/:guid", post(ab::tags::list))
+        .route("/api/ab/peer/add/:guid", post(ab::peers::add))
+        .route("/api/ab/peer/update/:guid", put(ab::peers::update))
+        .route("/api/ab/peer/:guid", delete(ab::peers::delete))
+        .route("/api/ab/tag/add/:guid", post(ab::tags::add))
+        .route("/api/ab/tag/rename/:guid", put(ab::tags::rename))
+        .route("/api/ab/tag/update/:guid", put(ab::tags::update))
+        .route("/api/ab/tag/:guid", delete(ab::tags::delete))
+        // M2: address book — legacy single-blob fallback
+        .route(
+            "/api/ab",
+            get(ab::legacy::get).post(ab::legacy::put),
+        )
+        // M2: group / users / peers panel
+        .route(
+            "/api/device-group/accessible",
+            get(groups::accessible),
+        )
+        .route("/api/users", get(users::list))
+        .route("/api/peers", get(peers::list))
+        .route("/api/peers/:id/managed", put(peers::set_managed))
+        // M3: audit
+        .route("/api/audit/conn", post(audit::conn::conn))
+        .route("/api/audit/file", post(audit::file::file))
+        .route("/api/audit/alarm", post(audit::alarm::alarm))
+        .route("/api/audit", put(audit::note::note))
+        // M3: session recording upload
+        .route("/api/record", post(record::record))
+        // M4: TOTP enrollment (admin-only)
+        .route("/api/2fa/enroll", post(twofa::enroll))
+        .route("/api/2fa/unenroll", post(twofa::unenroll))
+        // M4: rustdesk --assign target
+        .route("/api/devices/cli", post(devices_cli::assign))
+        // M4: plugin signing (no auth — protocol-level)
+        .route("/lic/web/api/plugin-sign", post(plugin_sign::plugin_sign))
+        // M4: OIDC device-flow login
+        .route("/api/oidc/auth", post(oidc::auth::auth))
+        .route("/api/oidc/auth-query", get(oidc::poll::auth_query))
+        .route("/oidc/callback", get(oidc::callback::callback));
+    // M5: admin dashboard (HTMX + embedded HTML). Merged BEFORE the
+    // Extension layer so the merged router carries the shared state.
+    let app = match admin::build(state.clone()) {
+        Some(admin_router) => app.merge(admin_router),
+        None => app,
+    };
+    app.layer(Extension(state))
+}
+
+pub async fn serve(addr: SocketAddr, state: Arc<AppState>) -> ResultType<()> {
+    log::info!("HTTP API listening on {}", addr);
+    let app = router(state);
+    // Share the same router with the rendezvous-TCP HttpProxyRequest path so
+    // both transports route through the exact same handlers.
+    http_proxy::install_router(app.clone());
+    axum::Server::bind(&addr)
+        .serve(app.into_make_service())
+        .await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+//! `POST /api/oidc/auth` — start the device-flow login.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::oidc::{discovery, random_token, require_provider, OIDC_SESSION_TTL_SECS};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::OidcSessionInsert;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthBody {
+    /// Provider short-name from `oidc_providers.name`. The Flutter client
+    /// sends this from the `op` field of the OIDC dialog.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub op: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+    #[serde(default, rename = "deviceInfo")]
+    pub device_info: Option<Value>,
+}
+
+pub async fn auth(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(body): Json<AuthBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if state.cfg.public_base_url.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::Internal(
+            "OIDC requires --public-base-url to be set".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    if body.op.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("op (provider name) required".into()));
+    }
+    let provider = require_provider(&state, &body.op).await?;
+    let disc = discovery::discover(&provider.issuer_url)
+        .await
+        .map_err(ApiError::Internal)?;
+
+    let code = random_token();
+    let csrf_state = random_token();
+    let device_info_json = body
+        .device_info
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|v| v.to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "{}".to_string());
+
+    let expires_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + OIDC_SESSION_TTL_SECS;
+    state
+        .db
+        .oidc_session_create(&OidcSessionInsert {
+            code: &code,
+            provider: &provider.name,
+            state: &csrf_state,
+            client_id_str: &body.id,
+            client_uuid: &body.uuid,
+            device_info_json: &device_info_json,
+            expires_at,
+        })
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    // Build the IdP authorization URL.
+    let url = format!(
+        "{auth}?response_type=code&client_id={cid}&redirect_uri={ru}&scope={scope}&state={state}",
+        auth = disc.authorization_endpoint,
+        cid = url_encode(&provider.client_id),
+        ru = url_encode(&provider.redirect_url),
+        scope = url_encode(&provider.scopes),
+        state = url_encode(&csrf_state),
+    );
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "code": code,
+        "url":  url,
+    })))
+}
+
+/// Inline percent-encoder for the auth URL query string. See
+/// `api::twofa::url_encode` for the same routine.
+fn url_encode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for b in s.as_bytes() {
+        match b {
+            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
+                out.push(*b as char);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                use std::fmt::Write;
+                let _ = write!(out, "%{:02X}", b);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+//! `GET /oidc/callback?code=&state=` — browser-facing redirect target.
+//!
+//! After the user signs in at the IdP, the IdP redirects their browser
+//! here. We exchange the IdP code for tokens, fetch userinfo, find/create
+//! a local user, mint our access token, and mark the session `success`.
+//! The browser sees a small "you can close this window" page; the desktop
+//! client picks up the token via `/api/oidc/auth-query`.
+
+use crate::api::admin::oidc_login::ADMIN_SENTINEL;
+use crate::api::auth::mint_token;
+use crate::api::middleware::{sha256_token, SESSION_COOKIE};
+use crate::api::oidc::{discovery, require_provider};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::http::header::{LOCATION, SET_COOKIE};
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
+use axum::response::{Html, IntoResponse, Response};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CallbackQuery {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub code: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub state: String,
+    /// Some IdPs forward an error here on failed auth (e.g. user clicked
+    /// "deny"). We surface it as the session error and as a friendly page.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub error: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub error_description: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn callback(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Query(q): Query<CallbackQuery>,
+) -> Response {
+    match handle(state.clone(), q).await {
+        Ok(ok) if ok.is_admin_flow => {
+            if !ok.user_is_admin {
+                return Html(html_page(
+                    "Sign-in failed",
+                    "This account does not have admin access. Ask an existing admin to grant it on the Users page, then try again.",
+                ))
+                .into_response();
+            }
+            // Set the dashboard session cookie and redirect to /admin/.
+            // Same cookie shape /admin/login uses on success.
+            let cookie = format!(
+                "{name}={token}; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age={ttl}",
+                name = SESSION_COOKIE,
+                token = ok.token,
+                ttl = state.cfg.session_ttl_secs,
+            );
+            let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&cookie) {
+                headers.insert(SET_COOKIE, v);
+            }
+            headers.insert(LOCATION, HeaderValue::from_static("/admin/"));
+            (StatusCode::SEE_OTHER, headers).into_response()
+        }
+        Ok(_) => Html(html_page(
+            "Sign-in complete",
+            "You can close this window and return to RustDesk.",
+        ))
+        .into_response(),
+        Err(msg) => Html(html_page("Sign-in failed", &html_escape(&msg))).into_response(),
+    }
+}
+
+struct HandleOk {
+    /// Bearer token freshly minted for the local user. For the admin flow
+    /// we set it as `rd_admin_session`; for the desktop flow it's already
+    /// stashed on the OidcSession row for `/api/oidc/auth-query` polling.
+    token: String,
+    user_is_admin: bool,
+    is_admin_flow: bool,
+}
+
+async fn handle(state: Arc<AppState>, q: CallbackQuery) -> Result<HandleOk, String> {
+    if q.state.is_empty() {
+        return Err("missing state parameter".into());
+    }
+    let session = state
+        .db
+        .oidc_session_get_by_state(&q.state)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+        .ok_or_else(|| "unknown or expired oidc session (state)".to_string())?;
+
+    if let Some(err) = q.error.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        let detail = q
+            .error_description
+            .as_deref()
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+            .unwrap_or(err);
+        let _ = state
+            .db
+            .oidc_session_fail(&session.code, &format!("idp: {}", detail))
+            .await;
+        return Err(format!("identity provider returned an error: {}", detail));
+    }
+    if q.code.is_empty() {
+        return Err("missing authorization code".into());
+    }
+
+    let provider = require_provider(&state, &session.provider)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("{:?}", e))?;
+    let disc = discovery::discover(&provider.issuer_url).await?;
+
+    // Token exchange.
+    let token_body = match discovery::http_post_form(
+        &disc.token_endpoint,
+        &[
+            ("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
+            ("code", &q.code),
+            ("redirect_uri", &provider.redirect_url),
+            ("client_id", &provider.client_id),
+            ("client_secret", &provider.client_secret),
+        ],
+    )
+    .await
+    {
+        Ok(b) => b,
+        Err(e) => {
+            let _ = state
+                .db
+                .oidc_session_fail(&session.code, &format!("token exchange: {}", e))
+                .await;
+            return Err(e);
+        }
+    };
+    let token_resp: Value =
+        serde_json::from_str(&token_body).map_err(|e| format!("parse token resp: {}", e))?;
+    let access_token = token_resp
+        .get("access_token")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| "token response missing access_token".to_string())?;
+
+    // Fetch userinfo. We trust the userinfo endpoint as the authority on
+    // the user's identity (sub + optional email + name).
+    let userinfo_url = disc
+        .userinfo_endpoint
+        .as_deref()
+        .ok_or_else(|| "provider has no userinfo_endpoint".to_string())?;
+    let userinfo_body = discovery::http_get_with_bearer(userinfo_url, access_token).await?;
+    let userinfo: Value = serde_json::from_str(&userinfo_body)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("parse userinfo: {}", e))?;
+    let sub = userinfo
+        .get("sub")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| "userinfo missing sub".to_string())?;
+    let email = userinfo.get("email").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
+    let display_name = userinfo
+        .get("name")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .or_else(|| userinfo.get("preferred_username").and_then(|v| v.as_str()));
+
+    // Optional role-based admin sync. When the provider is configured with
+    // `admin_role`, we look up the userinfo claim at `roles_claim` (default
+    // "roles") and set is_admin accordingly. Two shapes are supported:
+    //   - object: presence of the role name as a key
+    //     (Zitadel default: `"urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles":
+    //       {"admin": {"<orgid>": "<orgname>"}}`)
+    //   - array of strings: presence of the role name as an element
+    //     (e.g. a custom claim mapping `"roles": ["admin", "user"]`)
+    let desired_admin = provider.admin_role.as_deref().map(|role| {
+        let claim_name = provider.roles_claim.as_deref().unwrap_or("roles");
+        eval_admin_role(&userinfo, claim_name, role)
+    });
+
+    let user = state
+        .db
+        .user_upsert_oidc(sub, email, display_name, desired_admin)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    if user.status == 0 {
+        return Err("user is disabled".into());
+    }
+
+    // Mint our own access token, store hashed, mark session complete.
+    let token = mint_token();
+    let sha = sha256_token(&token);
+    let is_admin_flow = session.client_uuid == ADMIN_SENTINEL;
+    // For admin-UI OIDC the "device id/uuid" fields carry the sentinel —
+    // don't pollute the tokens.peer_* columns with it.
+    let (token_peer_id, token_peer_uuid): (&str, &str) = if is_admin_flow {
+        ("", "")
+    } else {
+        (
+            session.client_id_str.as_str(),
+            session.client_uuid.as_str(),
+        )
+    };
+    state
+        .db
+        .token_insert(
+            user.id,
+            &sha,
+            token_peer_id,
+            token_peer_uuid,
+            &session.device_info_json,
+            state.cfg.session_ttl_secs,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    // Best-effort device claim — same path as `/api/login`. Skipped for
+    // admin-UI flow because the "device" is the operator's browser, not a
+    // real RustDesk peer; calling device_claim with the sentinel would
+    // insert a phantom row in device_sysinfo.
+    if !is_admin_flow {
+        state
+            .db
+            .device_claim(user.id, &session.client_id_str, &session.client_uuid)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    state
+        .db
+        .oidc_session_complete(&session.code, &token, user.id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    Ok(HandleOk {
+        token,
+        user_is_admin: user.is_admin,
+        is_admin_flow,
+    })
+}
+
+fn html_page(title: &str, body: &str) -> String {
+    format!(
+        r#"<!doctype html>
+<html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>{title}</title>
+<style>
+body {{ font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, sans-serif;
+  display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center;
+  justify-content: center; height: 100vh; margin: 0;
+  background: #0e0f12; color: #e6e6e6; }}
+.card {{ background: #1c1e22; padding: 48px 56px;
+  border-radius: 12px; box-shadow: 0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.3); max-width: 480px; }}
+h1 {{ margin: 0 0 16px; font-size: 22px; }}
+p  {{ margin: 0; line-height: 1.5; color: #b8b8b8; }}
+</style>
+</head><body><div class="card">
+<h1>{title}</h1>
+<p>{body}</p>
+</div></body></html>"#,
+        title = title,
+        body = body
+    )
+}
+
+fn html_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('&', "&amp;")
+        .replace('<', "&lt;")
+        .replace('>', "&gt;")
+}
+
+/// Returns true iff the userinfo's `claim_name` field carries `role` —
+/// either as an object key (Zitadel) or as an element of a string array
+/// (generic). Anything else (missing claim, wrong type, role not present)
+/// is treated as "not admin" so a misconfigured claim demotes rather than
+/// silently grants.
+fn eval_admin_role(userinfo: &Value, claim_name: &str, role: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some(node) = userinfo.get(claim_name) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if let Some(obj) = node.as_object() {
+        return obj.contains_key(role);
+    }
+    if let Some(arr) = node.as_array() {
+        return arr
+            .iter()
+            .any(|v| v.as_str().map(|s| s == role).unwrap_or(false));
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_role_zitadel_object_shape() {
+        let u = json!({
+            "sub": "1",
+            "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles": {
+                "admin": {"123": "myorg"},
+                "user":  {"123": "myorg"},
+            },
+        });
+        assert!(eval_admin_role(&u, "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles", "admin"));
+        assert!(!eval_admin_role(&u, "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles", "owner"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_role_generic_array_shape() {
+        let u = json!({"sub": "1", "roles": ["admin", "user"]});
+        assert!(eval_admin_role(&u, "roles", "admin"));
+        assert!(!eval_admin_role(&u, "roles", "owner"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_role_missing_claim_is_not_admin() {
+        let u = json!({"sub": "1"});
+        assert!(!eval_admin_role(&u, "roles", "admin"));
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+//! `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration` discovery + in-memory cache.
+//!
+//! Most OIDC providers serve a JSON document at this URL describing the
+//! authorization, token, and userinfo endpoints. Doing discovery once per
+//! provider and caching the result keeps the per-login overhead to two
+//! HTTP calls (token exchange + userinfo).
+
+use hbb_common::log;
+use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+pub struct OidcDiscovery {
+    pub authorization_endpoint: String,
+    pub token_endpoint: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub userinfo_endpoint: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub issuer: Option<String>,
+}
+
+static CACHE: Lazy<Mutex<HashMap<String, OidcDiscovery>>> =
+    Lazy::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
+
+/// Fetch (or return cached) discovery document for `issuer_url`. Strips a
+/// trailing `/` so the cache key is stable across operator typos.
+pub async fn discover(issuer_url: &str) -> Result<OidcDiscovery, String> {
+    let issuer = issuer_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
+    if let Some(d) = CACHE.lock().unwrap().get(&issuer).cloned() {
+        return Ok(d);
+    }
+    let url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", issuer);
+    log::info!("oidc: discovering {}", url);
+    let body = http_get(&url).await?;
+    let parsed: OidcDiscovery = serde_json::from_str(&body)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("discovery parse {}: {}", url, e))?;
+    CACHE.lock().unwrap().insert(issuer, parsed.clone());
+    Ok(parsed)
+}
+
+/// Blocking HTTP GET wrapped in `spawn_blocking`. We use the existing
+/// `reqwest::blocking::Client` rather than adding an async client, because
+/// (a) discovery happens at most once per provider and (b) the rustdesk
+/// reqwest fork is configured for blocking-only use throughout the server.
+pub async fn http_get(url: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let url = url.to_owned();
+    hbb_common::tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+            .build()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http client build: {}", e))?;
+        let resp = client
+            .get(&url)
+            .send()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http get {}: {}", url, e))?;
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().map_err(|e| format!("read body: {}", e))?;
+        if !status.is_success() {
+            return Err(format!("http {} -> {}: {}", url, status, body));
+        }
+        Ok(body)
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| format!("spawn_blocking: {}", e))?
+}
+
+pub async fn http_post_form(
+    url: &str,
+    form: &[(&str, &str)],
+) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let url = url.to_owned();
+    let owned: Vec<(String, String)> = form
+        .iter()
+        .map(|(k, v)| (k.to_string(), v.to_string()))
+        .collect();
+    hbb_common::tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+            .build()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http client build: {}", e))?;
+        let pairs: Vec<(&str, &str)> = owned
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(k, v)| (k.as_str(), v.as_str()))
+            .collect();
+        let resp = client
+            .post(&url)
+            .form(&pairs)
+            .send()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http post {}: {}", url, e))?;
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().map_err(|e| format!("read body: {}", e))?;
+        if !status.is_success() {
+            return Err(format!("http {} -> {}: {}", url, status, body));
+        }
+        Ok(body)
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| format!("spawn_blocking: {}", e))?
+}
+
+pub async fn http_get_with_bearer(
+    url: &str,
+    bearer: &str,
+) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let url = url.to_owned();
+    let bearer = bearer.to_owned();
+    hbb_common::tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+            .build()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http client build: {}", e))?;
+        let resp = client
+            .get(&url)
+            .header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", bearer))
+            .send()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("http get {}: {}", url, e))?;
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().map_err(|e| format!("read body: {}", e))?;
+        if !status.is_success() {
+            return Err(format!("http {} -> {}: {}", url, status, body));
+        }
+        Ok(body)
+    })
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| format!("spawn_blocking: {}", e))?
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+//! OIDC device-flow login.
+//!
+//! Wire flow (matching CONSOLE_API.md §3.5):
+//!
+//! 1. `POST /api/oidc/auth { op: <provider>, id, uuid, deviceInfo }` →
+//!    `{ code: <opaque-poll-handle>, url: <browser auth URL> }`. The client
+//!    opens `url` in the user's browser.
+//! 2. The IdP redirects the browser back to our `/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...`.
+//!    That handler exchanges the IdP code for a token, fetches userinfo,
+//!    upserts a local user, mints our own access token, and marks the
+//!    session `success`.
+//! 3. The client polls `GET /api/oidc/auth-query?code=&id=&uuid=` until it
+//!    sees a wrapped `AuthBody` envelope.
+//!
+//! Auth on the IdP side is handled by the provider's standard OAuth2
+//! authorization-code flow. We keep the hbbs side minimal: discovery via
+//! `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`, no JWT verification (we
+//! trust the userinfo endpoint, authenticated via the access token).
+
+pub mod auth;
+pub mod callback;
+pub mod discovery;
+pub mod poll;
+pub mod providers;
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::OidcProviderRow;
+
+pub(crate) const OIDC_SESSION_TTL_SECS: i64 = 600; // 10 minutes — the user has to sign in fast
+
+/// Convenience: resolve a provider name to its row, or an ApiError if it
+/// doesn't exist or is disabled.
+pub(crate) async fn require_provider(
+    state: &AppState,
+    name: &str,
+) -> Result<OidcProviderRow, ApiError> {
+    state
+        .db
+        .oidc_provider_get(name)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest(format!("unknown OIDC provider: {}", name)))
+}
+
+/// 24 random bytes, base64url-encoded → ~32 characters. Used for both the
+/// poll-handle (`code`) and the CSRF state.
+pub(crate) fn random_token() -> String {
+    base64::encode_config(
+        sodiumoxide::randombytes::randombytes(24),
+        base64::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD,
+    )
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+//! `GET /api/oidc/auth-query?code=&id=&uuid=` — desktop-client poll loop.
+//!
+//! Wire shape: return the inner payload as the HTTP body directly. Do NOT
+//! wrap in another `{ "body": ... }` envelope — the desktop client's
+//! transport (`http_request_sync` in src/common.rs) already wraps every
+//! response in `{ status_code, headers, body }` and feeds the inner `body`
+//! string to `HbbHttpResponse::parse`. An extra envelope makes the parser
+//! see `{"body": "..."}`, fail to deserialize as `AuthBody`, and silently
+//! retry until the 180 s client timeout. Spent half a day on this — keep
+//! the bare shape.
+//!
+//! Inner payloads:
+//!   - while pending: `{"error":"No authed oidc is found"}` — client keeps polling.
+//!   - on success:   `{access_token, type:"access_token", user}` — client stops.
+//!   - on error:     `{"error":"<message>"}` — client surfaces and stops polling.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::api::users::UserPayload;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PollQuery {
+    pub code: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub uuid: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn auth_query(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Query(q): Query<PollQuery>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+    let session = state
+        .db
+        .oidc_session_get_by_code(&q.code)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::BadRequest("unknown oidc session".into()))?;
+    hbb_common::log::info!(
+        "oidc poll: code={} status={} user_id={:?} elapsed_to_expiry={}",
+        q.code,
+        session.status,
+        session.user_id,
+        session.expires_at - now,
+    );
+    if session.expires_at <= now && session.status == "pending" {
+        // The client treats this as an ordinary "still pending" tick and
+        // gives up on its own timeout (180 s).
+        return Ok(Json(json!({"error": "No authed oidc is found"})));
+    }
+    match session.status.as_str() {
+        "pending" => Ok(Json(json!({"error": "No authed oidc is found"}))),
+        "error" => {
+            let msg = session
+                .error
+                .clone()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| "OIDC sign-in failed".to_string());
+            Ok(Json(json!({ "error": msg })))
+        }
+        "success" => {
+            let access_token = session
+                .access_token
+                .clone()
+                .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::Internal("success session missing token".into()))?;
+            let user_id = session
+                .user_id
+                .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::Internal("success session missing user_id".into()))?;
+            let user = state
+                .db
+                .user_find_by_id(user_id)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+                .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::Internal("user vanished mid-flow".into()))?;
+            Ok(Json(json!({
+                "access_token": access_token,
+                "type": "access_token",
+                "user": UserPayload::from(&user),
+            })))
+        }
+        other => Err(ApiError::Internal(format!(
+            "unknown oidc status {:?}",
+            other
+        ))),
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+//! Operator-supplied provider config. Reads a TOML file shaped like:
+//!
+//! ```toml
+//! [[providers]]
+//! name           = "google"
+//! display_name   = "Google"
+//! issuer_url     = "https://accounts.google.com"
+//! client_id      = "<google client id>"
+//! client_secret  = "<google client secret>"
+//! scopes         = "openid email profile"
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Each entry is upserted into the `oidc_providers` table at startup.
+//! `redirect_url` is computed from `--public-base-url` + `/oidc/callback`.
+//!
+//! TOML parsing uses the existing `rust-ini` crate? — no, we'd need a TOML
+//! parser. We already have `toml` transitively via several deps; pull it in
+//! directly for clarity.
+
+use crate::database::{Database, OidcProviderRow};
+use hbb_common::log;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+struct ProvidersFile {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    providers: Vec<ProviderEntry>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+struct ProviderEntry {
+    name: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    display_name: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    icon_url: Option<String>,
+    issuer_url: String,
+    client_id: String,
+    client_secret: String,
+    #[serde(default = "default_scopes")]
+    scopes: String,
+    /// Optional override; defaults to `<public-base-url>/oidc/callback`.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    redirect_url: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    enabled: bool,
+    /// Role-based admin sync. Set both to drive `is_admin` from the IdP:
+    ///   admin_role  = "admin"
+    ///   roles_claim = "urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles"   # Zitadel
+    /// Or for a generic IdP that emits `roles: ["admin","user"]`:
+    ///   admin_role  = "admin"
+    ///   # roles_claim defaults to "roles"
+    #[serde(default)]
+    admin_role: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    roles_claim: Option<String>,
+}
+
+fn default_scopes() -> String {
+    "openid email profile".to_string()
+}
+fn default_true() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+
+pub async fn load_from_file(
+    db: &Database,
+    path: &Path,
+    public_base_url: &str,
+) -> Result<usize, String> {
+    let bytes = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {}", path.display(), e))?;
+    let parsed: ProvidersFile =
+        toml::from_str(&bytes).map_err(|e| format!("parse {}: {}", path.display(), e))?;
+    let mut count = 0;
+    for p in parsed.providers {
+        let redirect_url = p
+            .redirect_url
+            .clone()
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                let base = public_base_url.trim_end_matches('/');
+                format!("{}/oidc/callback", base)
+            });
+        let row = OidcProviderRow {
+            name: p.name.clone(),
+            display_name: p.display_name,
+            icon_url: p.icon_url,
+            issuer_url: p.issuer_url,
+            client_id: p.client_id,
+            client_secret: p.client_secret,
+            scopes: p.scopes,
+            redirect_url,
+            enabled: p.enabled,
+            admin_role: p.admin_role.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()),
+            roles_claim: p.roles_claim.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()),
+        };
+        db.oidc_provider_upsert(&row)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| format!("upsert {}: {}", p.name, e))?;
+        count += 1;
+        log::info!("oidc: provider {:?} configured", p.name);
+    }
+    Ok(count)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// Query-string pagination for list endpoints. The Flutter client at
+/// flutter/lib/models/ab_model.dart and group_model.dart sends
+/// `?current=1&pageSize=100` against every paginated list. Field names are
+/// spelled explicitly here — `serde(rename_all = "camelCase")` would also
+/// rename `current`, which we don't want.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PageQuery {
+    #[serde(default = "default_current")]
+    pub current: i64,
+    #[serde(default = "default_page_size", rename = "pageSize")]
+    pub page_size: i64,
+}
+
+fn default_current() -> i64 {
+    1
+}
+fn default_page_size() -> i64 {
+    100
+}
+
+impl PageQuery {
+    pub fn offset(&self) -> i64 {
+        let cur = self.current.max(1);
+        (cur - 1) * self.limit()
+    }
+    pub fn limit(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.page_size.clamp(1, 1000)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Standard envelope: `{ total, data }`.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct Page<T: Serialize> {
+    pub total: i64,
+    pub data: Vec<T>,
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+//! `GET /api/peers` — paginated peer list for the Group tab in the desktop
+//! client. Flutter decoder at flutter/lib/common/hbbs/hbbs.dart:77 expects
+//! `{ id, user, user_name, device_group_name, note, status, info: {...} }`
+//! per row.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::pagination::{Page, PageQuery};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query};
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct PeerOut {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub user: String,
+    pub user_name: String,
+    pub device_group_name: String,
+    pub note: String,
+    pub status: i64,
+    pub info: Value,
+}
+
+pub async fn list(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Query(q): Query<PageQuery>,
+) -> Result<Json<Page<PeerOut>>, ApiError> {
+    let (total, rows) = state
+        .db
+        .peers_list_accessible(user.user_id, user.is_admin, q.offset(), q.limit())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    let data: Vec<PeerOut> = rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| {
+            // Trim the full sysinfo blob to what the client actually reads.
+            let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(&r.sysinfo_payload).unwrap_or(Value::Null);
+            let pick = |k: &str| -> String {
+                parsed
+                    .get(k)
+                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                    .unwrap_or_default()
+                    .to_string()
+            };
+            let info = json!({
+                "username":    pick("username"),
+                "device_name": pick("hostname"),
+                "os":          pick("os"),
+            });
+            PeerOut {
+                id: r.id,
+                user: r.owner_username,
+                user_name: r.owner_display_name,
+                device_group_name: r.device_group_name,
+                note: r.note,
+                status: r.status,
+                info,
+            }
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok(Json(Page { total, data }))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SetManagedBody {
+    pub managed: bool,
+}
+
+/// `PUT /api/peers/:id/managed` — admin-only toggle for the signed-API gate.
+/// Setting `managed=true` is also done TOFU-style by the sig-verify helper
+/// on the first valid signature, so this endpoint is mainly useful for:
+///   - Pre-enrolling a peer before its agent boots.
+///   - Downgrading a peer back to the unsigned path after a managed agent
+///     is uninstalled or replaced with stock RustDesk.
+pub async fn set_managed(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Path(id): Path<String>,
+    Json(body): Json<SetManagedBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if !user.is_admin {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("admin only".into()));
+    }
+    // Confirm the peer exists before flipping, so an admin typo doesn't
+    // silently create a row-not-found situation.
+    let row = state
+        .db
+        .peer_get_auth(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if row.is_none() {
+        return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .peer_set_managed(&id, body.managed)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    hbb_common::log::info!(
+        "admin {} set peer {} managed={}",
+        user.name,
+        id,
+        body.managed
+    );
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true, "managed": body.managed })))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+//! `POST /api/agent/perf-events` — performance-related Windows event log
+//! entries the agent surfaced from `Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-
+//! Performance/Operational`, `Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-
+//! Detector/Operational`, and a few hand-picked IDs from `System`
+//! (unexpected reboots, BSODs, dirty shutdowns). The admin UI shows
+//! the recent ones in the device's Performance section.
+//!
+//! Auth: same per-peer signed-API gate as the other agent endpoints.
+//! Server-side dedup is via the UNIQUE (peer_id, provider, record_id)
+//! index — the agent persists a per-channel cursor to disk, but a
+//! restart that loses the cursor can safely re-emit overlapping ranges.
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::PerfEventRow;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PerfEventIn {
+    pub at: i64,
+    pub provider: String,
+    pub event_id: i64,
+    #[serde(default = "default_level")]
+    pub level: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub record_id: i64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub summary: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub detail_json: String,
+}
+
+fn default_level() -> i64 {
+    4 // WEL "Information"
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PerfEventsBody {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub uuid: String,
+    pub events: Vec<PerfEventIn>,
+}
+
+const MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST: usize = 128;
+const MAX_PROVIDER_LEN: usize = 64;
+const MAX_SUMMARY_LEN: usize = 512;
+const MAX_DETAIL_LEN: usize = 8 * 1024;
+
+pub async fn perf_events(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let outcome =
+        device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/agent/perf-events", &headers, &body).await?;
+
+    let payload: PerfEventsBody = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+
+    if payload.id.is_empty() || payload.uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid are required".into()));
+    }
+    if payload.events.is_empty() {
+        return Ok("OK".to_string());
+    }
+    if payload.events.len() > MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+            "too many events in one POST (max {MAX_EVENTS_PER_POST})"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if payload.id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, &payload.id).await?;
+            payload.id.clone()
+        }
+    };
+
+    let peer = state
+        .db
+        .get_peer(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if peer.is_none() {
+        return Ok("ID_NOT_FOUND".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let mut accepted = 0usize;
+    for e in &payload.events {
+        let provider = e.provider.trim();
+        if provider.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let row = PerfEventRow {
+            at: e.at,
+            provider: truncate(provider, MAX_PROVIDER_LEN),
+            event_id: e.event_id,
+            level: e.level,
+            record_id: e.record_id,
+            summary: truncate(&e.summary, MAX_SUMMARY_LEN),
+            detail_json: truncate(&e.detail_json, MAX_DETAIL_LEN),
+            received_at: 0, // server fills via DEFAULT on INSERT
+        };
+        if let Err(err) = state.db.perf_event_insert(&id, &payload.uuid, &row).await {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!(
+                "perf_event_insert for peer {} failed: {}",
+                id,
+                err
+            );
+            continue;
+        }
+        accepted += 1;
+    }
+
+    hbb_common::log::debug!(
+        "perf-events: peer={} accepted={}/{}",
+        id,
+        accepted,
+        payload.events.len()
+    );
+    Ok("OK".to_string())
+}
+
+fn truncate(s: &str, max_chars: usize) -> String {
+    if s.chars().count() <= max_chars {
+        s.to_string()
+    } else {
+        s.chars().take(max_chars).collect()
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+//! `POST /lic/web/api/plugin-sign` — signs a plugin's status/heartbeat
+//! payload with the server's Ed25519 secret. The client (plugin runtime,
+//! src/plugin/callback_msg.rs:282-296) sends:
+//!
+//!   `{ "plugin_id": "...", "version": "...", "msg": [u8, u8, ...] }`
+//!
+//! and expects:
+//!
+//!   `{ "signed_msg": [u8, u8, ...] }`
+//!
+//! No Authorization header — the client opens this without a token. Auth
+//! is implicit via the licence-key shared secret on the rest of the
+//! deployment; we just sign whatever is asked. (Pro can additionally
+//! validate the plugin against an allowlist; OSS just signs.)
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sodiumoxide::crypto::sign;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PluginSignReq {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub plugin_id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub version: String,
+    pub msg: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct PluginSignResp {
+    pub signed_msg: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// The signing key is the same Ed25519 secret hbbs already uses for
+/// rendezvous KeyExchange (`id_ed25519`). We pull it from the shared
+/// `RendezvousServer.inner.sk` via the AppState — but `AppState` doesn't
+/// hold it today, so this handler reads it directly from a process-wide
+/// `OnceCell` populated at startup. (See `set_signing_key` below.)
+pub async fn plugin_sign(
+    Json(req): Json<PluginSignReq>,
+) -> Result<Json<PluginSignResp>, ApiError> {
+    let sk = SIGNING_KEY
+        .get()
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::Internal("plugin signing not configured".into()))?;
+    let signed = sign::sign(&req.msg, sk);
+    Ok(Json(PluginSignResp { signed_msg: signed }))
+}
+
+use once_cell::sync::OnceCell;
+
+static SIGNING_KEY: OnceCell<Arc<sign::SecretKey>> = OnceCell::new();
+
+/// Called once from `RendezvousServer::start` after the keypair is loaded.
+/// A no-op if already set; the server will only ever have one Ed25519 key.
+pub fn set_signing_key(sk: sign::SecretKey) {
+    let _ = SIGNING_KEY.set(Arc::new(sk));
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+//! `POST /api/record?type={new|part|tail|remove}&file=&offset=&length=`
+//!
+//! No Authorization header — clients fire-and-forget. The wire flow is
+//! defined in CONSOLE_API.md §8 and src/hbbs_http/record_upload.rs in the
+//! client. We dispatch on `?type=` into the storage state machine.
+
+pub mod storage;
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct RecordQuery {
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub file: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub offset: Option<u64>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub length: Option<usize>,
+}
+
+pub async fn record(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Query(q): Query<RecordQuery>,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    match q.kind.as_str() {
+        "new" => storage::handle_new(&state, &q.file, "").await?,
+        "part" => {
+            let offset = q.offset.unwrap_or(0);
+            let length = q.length.unwrap_or(body.len());
+            storage::handle_part(&state, &q.file, offset, length, &body).await?;
+        }
+        "tail" => {
+            let offset = q.offset.unwrap_or(0);
+            let length = q.length.unwrap_or(body.len());
+            storage::handle_tail(&state, &q.file, offset, length, &body).await?;
+        }
+        "remove" => storage::handle_remove(&state, &q.file).await?,
+        other => {
+            return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(format!(
+                "unknown record type {:?}",
+                other
+            )));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+//! On-disk file IO for `/api/record`. The wire flow lives in
+//! [src/hbbs_http/record_upload.rs](file:///Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/record_upload.rs)
+//! on the client side: the controller emits `?type=new` once, then a series
+//! of `?type=part&offset=N&length=L` chunks, and finally a `?type=tail`
+//! header rewrite at offset 0. We mirror that as a tiny state machine.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
+use tokio::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use tokio::io::{AsyncSeekExt, AsyncWriteExt, SeekFrom};
+
+const TAIL_MAX: usize = 1024;
+
+/// Reject any filename that contains a path separator or `..` component.
+/// The client only ever sends a basename per
+/// `record_upload.rs:118-122`, so anything else is suspicious.
+pub fn sanitized_path(root: &Path, file: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, ApiError> {
+    if file.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("file required".into()));
+    }
+    let p = Path::new(file);
+    let mut comps = p.components();
+    let only = comps.next();
+    let extra = comps.next();
+    match (only, extra) {
+        (Some(Component::Normal(name)), None) if !name.is_empty() => Ok(root.join(name)),
+        _ => Err(ApiError::BadRequest("invalid file name".into())),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn handle_new(
+    state: &AppState,
+    file: &str,
+    peer_id: &str,
+) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    let path = sanitized_path(&state.cfg.recording_dir, file)?;
+    if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(dir)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("mkdir {}: {}", dir.display(), e)))?;
+    }
+    // Truncate (or create) the file.
+    OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create(true)
+        .truncate(true)
+        .open(&path)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("create {}: {}", path.display(), e)))?;
+    state
+        .db
+        .recording_new(peer_id, file)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn handle_part(
+    state: &AppState,
+    file: &str,
+    offset: u64,
+    length: usize,
+    body: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if body.len() != length {
+        hbb_common::log::warn!(
+            "record part length mismatch: declared={} actual={}",
+            length,
+            body.len()
+        );
+    }
+    let path = sanitized_path(&state.cfg.recording_dir, file)?;
+    let max = state.cfg.recording_max_size_bytes;
+    if max > 0 && offset.saturating_add(body.len() as u64) > max {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("recording size cap exceeded".into()));
+    }
+    let mut f: File = OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create(true)
+        .open(&path)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("open {}: {}", path.display(), e)))?;
+    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(offset))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("seek: {}", e)))?;
+    f.write_all(body)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("write: {}", e)))?;
+    f.flush().await.ok();
+    let new_size = offset + body.len() as u64;
+    state
+        .db
+        .recording_set_state(file, "recording", Some(new_size as i64), false)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn handle_tail(
+    state: &AppState,
+    file: &str,
+    offset: u64,
+    length: usize,
+    body: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if offset != 0 {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("tail must be at offset 0".into()));
+    }
+    if length > TAIL_MAX || body.len() > TAIL_MAX {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("tail exceeds 1024 bytes".into()));
+    }
+    let path = sanitized_path(&state.cfg.recording_dir, file)?;
+    let mut f = OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .open(&path)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("open {}: {}", path.display(), e)))?;
+    f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("seek: {}", e)))?;
+    f.write_all(body)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(format!("write tail: {}", e)))?;
+    f.flush().await.ok();
+    state
+        .db
+        .recording_set_state(file, "finished", None, true)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn handle_remove(state: &AppState, file: &str) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    let path = sanitized_path(&state.cfg.recording_dir, file)?;
+    if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::remove_file(&path).await {
+        if e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound {
+            hbb_common::log::warn!("remove {}: {}", path.display(), e);
+        }
+    }
+    state
+        .db
+        .recording_delete(file)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+use crate::common::{get_arg, get_arg_or};
+use crate::database::Database;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ApiConfig {
+    pub login_options: Vec<String>,
+    pub sysinfo_ver: String,
+    pub session_ttl_secs: i64,
+    /// When true, `/api/ab/personal` returns 404, forcing the client into the
+    /// legacy single-blob AB path (`GET/POST /api/ab`). The default is the
+    /// modern shared-AB path.
+    pub ab_legacy_mode: bool,
+    /// Surfaced verbatim via `/api/ab/settings.max_peer_one_ab`.
+    pub ab_max_peers_per_book: i64,
+    /// On-disk root for `/api/record` uploads. Created on first use; one
+    /// subdirectory per peer-id under here.
+    pub recording_dir: PathBuf,
+    /// 0 means unlimited.
+    pub recording_max_size_bytes: u64,
+    /// 0 means no retention sweep.
+    pub audit_retention_days: i64,
+    /// SMTP transport for email-code login. `None` = dev mode: codes are
+    /// logged to stdout instead of mailed.
+    pub email: Option<EmailConfig>,
+    /// Externally reachable base URL of this server, e.g. for the OIDC
+    /// redirect_uri. Empty disables OIDC.
+    pub public_base_url: String,
+    /// On-disk root for the admin dashboard's static files. Empty disables
+    /// the dashboard entirely.
+    pub admin_ui_dir: String,
+}
+
+/// SMTP wiring for email-code login.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct EmailConfig {
+    pub host: String,
+    pub port: u16,
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+    pub from: String,
+    pub starttls: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct AppState {
+    pub db: Database,
+    pub cfg: ApiConfig,
+}
+
+impl AppState {
+    pub fn new(db: Database) -> Arc<Self> {
+        let ab_legacy_mode = matches!(
+            get_arg_or("ab-legacy-mode", "off".to_string())
+                .to_ascii_lowercase()
+                .as_str(),
+            "on" | "y" | "yes" | "true" | "1"
+        );
+        let ab_max_peers_per_book: i64 = get_arg_or("ab-max-peers-per-book", "100".to_string())
+            .parse()
+            .unwrap_or(100);
+        let recording_dir =
+            PathBuf::from(get_arg_or("recording-dir", "./recordings".to_string()));
+        let recording_max_size_bytes: u64 = get_arg_or("recording-max-size-mb", "0".to_string())
+            .parse::<u64>()
+            .unwrap_or(0)
+            .saturating_mul(1024 * 1024);
+        let audit_retention_days: i64 = get_arg_or("audit-retention-days", "0".to_string())
+            .parse()
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+        let email = build_email_config();
+        let public_base_url = get_arg("public-base-url");
+        let admin_ui_dir = get_arg_or("admin-ui-dir", "./admin_ui".to_string());
+        // login_options advertises every login method this server accepts.
+        // The Flutter client uses this to render the matching button on the
+        // sign-in dialog. `email_code` and `oidc/<name>` are opt-in so a
+        // deployment without SMTP / OIDC doesn't dangle a broken button.
+        let mut login_options = vec!["account".to_string()];
+        if email.is_some() || std::env::var("ALLOW_DEV_EMAIL_CODE").is_ok() {
+            login_options.push("email_code".to_string());
+        }
+        // OIDC providers are mounted dynamically — actual provider names are
+        // appended later by the oidc::providers loader once the DB rows exist.
+        Arc::new(Self {
+            db,
+            cfg: ApiConfig {
+                login_options,
+                sysinfo_ver: "m1-1".to_string(),
+                session_ttl_secs: 30 * 86400,
+                ab_legacy_mode,
+                ab_max_peers_per_book,
+                recording_dir,
+                recording_max_size_bytes,
+                audit_retention_days,
+                email,
+                public_base_url,
+                admin_ui_dir,
+            },
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+fn build_email_config() -> Option<EmailConfig> {
+    let host = get_arg("smtp-host");
+    if host.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let port: u16 = get_arg_or("smtp-port", "587".to_string())
+        .parse()
+        .unwrap_or(587);
+    let username = {
+        let u = get_arg("smtp-user");
+        if u.is_empty() { None } else { Some(u) }
+    };
+    let password = {
+        let p = get_arg("smtp-pass");
+        if p.is_empty() { None } else { Some(p) }
+    };
+    let from = {
+        let f = get_arg("smtp-from");
+        if f.is_empty() {
+            format!("noreply@{}", host)
+        } else {
+            f
+        }
+    };
+    let starttls = matches!(
+        get_arg_or("smtp-tls", "on".to_string()).to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
+        "on" | "y" | "yes" | "true" | "1"
+    );
+    Some(EmailConfig {
+        host,
+        port,
+        username,
+        password,
+        from,
+        starttls,
+    })
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+//! Strategy resolver for the heartbeat path. The actual SQL lives in
+//! `Database::strategy_resolve_for` — this module exists to give the
+//! heartbeat handler a stable import surface and to centralize how a
+//! resolved strategy is converted into the wire-shape JSON the client
+//! expects (`strategy.config_options` + `strategy.extra` per
+//! CONSOLE_API.md §6.1).
+
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::ResolvedStrategy;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+
+/// Resolve and serialize a strategy for `peer_id`. Returns
+/// `(modified_at, strategy_value)` where `strategy_value` is the JSON object
+/// the heartbeat reply embeds under `strategy`. When no strategy applies, we
+/// return an empty `{config_options: {}, extra: {}}` and `modified_at = 0`.
+pub async fn resolve_for(state: &AppState, peer_id: &str) -> (i64, Value) {
+    let resolved = state
+        .db
+        .strategy_resolve_for(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    serialize(&resolved)
+}
+
+fn serialize(r: &ResolvedStrategy) -> (i64, Value) {
+    let cfg: Value = serde_json::from_str(&r.config_options_json).unwrap_or_else(|_| json!({}));
+    let extra: Value = serde_json::from_str(&r.extra_json).unwrap_or_else(|_| json!({}));
+    (
+        r.modified_at,
+        json!({
+            "config_options": cfg,
+            "extra": extra,
+        }),
+    )
+}
+
+/// `true` iff the resolved strategy for `peer_id` carries
+/// `config_options."enable-remote-exec" = "Y"`. Default is `false` (no
+/// strategy assigned, or strategy didn't set the key) — exec is opt-in
+/// per the design in docs/AGENT-API-AUTH.md.
+pub async fn allows_remote_exec(state: &AppState, peer_id: &str) -> bool {
+    let resolved = state
+        .db
+        .strategy_resolve_for(peer_id)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let cfg: Value = serde_json::from_str(&resolved.config_options_json)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| json!({}));
+    cfg.get("enable-remote-exec")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .map(|s| s.eq_ignore_ascii_case("Y"))
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Plain-text version string that the client compares against its cached
+/// `sysinfo_ver`. Same value the heartbeat handler echoes via the
+/// `sysinfo: true` flag.
+pub async fn sysinfo_ver(Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>) -> String {
+    state.cfg.sysinfo_ver.clone()
+}
+
+/// Bare-string body: `"SYSINFO_UPDATED"` or `"ID_NOT_FOUND"`. The client at
+/// /Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/hbbs_http/sync.rs:212 does a literal
+/// `==` comparison on these — do not wrap in JSON.
+pub async fn sysinfo(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    // Step 1: signature gate. Verified → trust the id from the signed
+    // header. LegacyUnsigned → fall through but enforce that the body id
+    // isn't a managed peer (would be downgrade attempt).
+    let outcome = device_auth::verify(&state, "POST", "/api/sysinfo", &headers, &body).await?;
+
+    // Step 2: parse body.
+    let payload: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+    let body_id = payload
+        .get("id")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let uuid = payload
+        .get("uuid")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    if body_id.is_empty() || uuid.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("id and uuid required".into()));
+    }
+
+    // Step 3: bind the trusted identity to the body. For signed requests,
+    // the body id must match the header id — otherwise the agent is trying
+    // to write inventory for someone else.
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if body_id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, body_id).await?;
+            body_id.to_string()
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Tie sysinfo storage to a real rendezvous-registered peer. Without this
+    // gate, any caller could populate device_sysinfo for arbitrary IDs.
+    let peer = state
+        .db
+        .get_peer(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if peer.is_none() {
+        return Ok("ID_NOT_FOUND".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let version = parse_version_number(payload.get("version").and_then(|v| v.as_str()));
+    state
+        .db
+        .sysinfo_upsert(&id, uuid, &payload.to_string(), &state.cfg.sysinfo_ver, version)
+        .await?;
+    Ok("SYSINFO_UPDATED".to_string())
+}
+
+fn parse_version_number(s: Option<&str>) -> i64 {
+    let Some(s) = s else { return 0 };
+    // hbb_common encodes "1.4.2" as 1*1_000_000 + 4*1_000 + 2 = 1_004_002.
+    let mut parts = s.split('.').map(|p| p.parse::<i64>().unwrap_or(0));
+    let major = parts.next().unwrap_or(0);
+    let minor = parts.next().unwrap_or(0);
+    let patch = parts.next().unwrap_or(0);
+    major * 1_000_000 + minor * 1_000 + patch
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+//! `POST /api/2fa/enroll` — admin-only TOTP enrollment.
+//!
+//! Generates a fresh 20-byte (160-bit) base32 secret, stores it for the
+//! target user, and returns:
+//!   - `secret_b32` — the literal secret to enter into an authenticator app.
+//!   - `otpauth_url` — the standard `otpauth://totp/...` URL the same apps
+//!     accept as a QR-code or pasted-string.
+//!
+//! There is no client-facing UI for this in the desktop app; operators run it
+//! by curl after creating the user. M4's `--bootstrap-admin-username` admin
+//! is the natural caller.
+
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::Json;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use totp_rs::Secret;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct EnrollBody {
+    /// Either `user_id` or `username` is required. `user_id` wins if both
+    /// are present.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub user_id: Option<i64>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    /// Issuer name shown in the authenticator app. Defaults to "RustDesk".
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub issuer: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct UnenrollBody {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub user_id: Option<i64>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+}
+
+pub async fn enroll(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    caller: AuthedUser,
+    Json(body): Json<EnrollBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if !caller.is_admin {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("admin required".into()));
+    }
+    let user = resolve_target(&state, body.user_id, body.username.as_deref()).await?;
+
+    // 20 random bytes -> base32 (the standard size for SHA1 TOTP).
+    let raw = sodiumoxide::randombytes::randombytes(20);
+    let secret_b32 = Secret::Raw(raw.clone()).to_encoded().to_string();
+
+    state
+        .db
+        .totp_enroll(user.id, &secret_b32)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    let issuer = body
+        .issuer
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .unwrap_or("RustDesk");
+    // Build the otpauth:// URL manually rather than depend on totp-rs's
+    // URL helpers (their API has shifted between minor versions). Format
+    // per https://github.com/google/google-authenticator/wiki/Key-Uri-Format.
+    let otpauth_url = format!(
+        "otpauth://totp/{issuer}:{account}?secret={secret}&issuer={issuer}&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30",
+        issuer = url_encode(issuer),
+        account = url_encode(&user.username),
+        secret = url_encode(&secret_b32),
+    );
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "user_id":     user.id,
+        "username":    user.username,
+        "secret_b32":  secret_b32,
+        "otpauth_url": otpauth_url,
+    })))
+}
+
+pub async fn unenroll(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    caller: AuthedUser,
+    Json(body): Json<UnenrollBody>,
+) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
+    if !caller.is_admin {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden("admin required".into()));
+    }
+    let user = resolve_target(&state, body.user_id, body.username.as_deref()).await?;
+    let removed = state
+        .db
+        .totp_unenroll(user.id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Json(json!({ "removed": removed })))
+}
+
+/// Minimal percent-encoder for the otpauth URL fields. Encodes anything
+/// outside the unreserved URL set (`A-Za-z0-9-_.~`) — keeps the URL short
+/// and avoids pulling in `urlencoding` just for this single call site.
+fn url_encode(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for b in s.as_bytes() {
+        match b {
+            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
+                out.push(*b as char);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                use std::fmt::Write;
+                let _ = write!(out, "%{:02X}", b);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+async fn resolve_target(
+    state: &AppState,
+    user_id: Option<i64>,
+    username: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<crate::database::UserRow, ApiError> {
+    if let Some(id) = user_id {
+        return state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_id(id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound);
+    }
+    if let Some(name) = username.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        return state
+            .db
+            .user_find_by_username(name)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?
+            .ok_or(ApiError::NotFound);
+    }
+    Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+        "user_id or username required".into(),
+    ))
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+//! `POST /api/unattended-password` — agent-side reporting of the per-boot
+//! "permanent password" used for unattended access (no logged-in user to
+//! click the approval popup). hello-agent generates a random password
+//! every time the service starts and posts it here so the admin UI can
+//! surface it for support staff.
+//!
+//! Auth: same per-peer signed-API gate as `/api/sysinfo` and
+//! `/api/heartbeat` — see [`crate::api::device_auth`]. Managed peers
+//! (`peer.managed = 1`) must carry a valid Ed25519 signature; stock
+//! clients keep posting unsigned and the first valid signature TOFU-
+//! promotes the peer.
+
+use crate::api::device_auth::{self, AuthOutcome};
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::Extension;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// Body: `{"id": "...", "uuid": "...", "password": "..."}`
+/// Response (bare string, like sysinfo): `"OK"` or `"ID_NOT_FOUND"`.
+pub async fn unattended_password(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Result<String, ApiError> {
+    let outcome = device_auth::verify(
+        &state,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/unattended-password",
+        &headers,
+        &body,
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    let payload: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("invalid json".into()))?;
+    let body_id = payload
+        .get("id")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let uuid = payload
+        .get("uuid")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let password = payload
+        .get("password")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    if body_id.is_empty() || uuid.is_empty() || password.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "id, uuid, and password are required".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Bind the trusted identity to the body. For signed requests the body
+    // id must match the header id, or the agent is trying to overwrite
+    // someone else's displayed password. For unsigned requests we just
+    // need to ensure the peer isn't already locked down as managed.
+    let id = match outcome {
+        AuthOutcome::Verified { id: signed_id } => {
+            if body_id != signed_id {
+                return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
+            }
+            signed_id
+        }
+        AuthOutcome::LegacyUnsigned => {
+            device_auth::enforce_managed_for_id(&state, body_id).await?;
+            body_id.to_string()
+        }
+    };
+
+    let peer = state
+        .db
+        .get_peer(&id)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    if peer.is_none() {
+        return Ok("ID_NOT_FOUND".to_string());
+    }
+
+    state
+        .db
+        .set_unattended_password(&id, uuid, password)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok("OK".to_string())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+use crate::api::error::ApiError;
+use crate::api::middleware::AuthedUser;
+use crate::api::pagination::{Page, PageQuery};
+use crate::api::state::AppState;
+use crate::database::UserRow;
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Query};
+use axum::Json;
+use hbb_common::ResultType;
+use serde::Serialize;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct UserPayload {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub display_name: String,
+    pub avatar: String,
+    pub email: String,
+    pub note: String,
+    pub status: i64,
+    pub is_admin: bool,
+    /// The desktop client's OIDC poll loop deserializes the AuthBody using
+    /// the Rust struct in src/hbbs_http/account.rs, where `info` is a
+    /// REQUIRED field (no #[serde(default)]). Missing it makes serde fail,
+    /// the poll loop's `Ok(_)` arm fires, and the client polls forever
+    /// even though the OIDC session was successful. Emit an empty object
+    /// — the client's own UserInfo defaults handle the rest.
+    pub info: Value,
+}
+
+impl From<&UserRow> for UserPayload {
+    fn from(u: &UserRow) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            name: u.username.clone(),
+            display_name: u.display_name.clone(),
+            avatar: u.avatar.clone(),
+            email: u.email.clone(),
+            note: u.note.clone(),
+            status: u.status,
+            is_admin: u.is_admin,
+            info: json!({}),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn hash_password(plain: String) -> ResultType<String> {
+    Ok(
+        hbb_common::tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || bcrypt::hash(plain, 10))
+            .await??,
+    )
+}
+
+pub async fn verify_password(hash: String, plain: String) -> ResultType<bool> {
+    Ok(
+        hbb_common::tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || bcrypt::verify(plain, &hash))
+            .await??,
+    )
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/users` — paginated list of users visible to the caller. Admin
+/// sees all enabled users; non-admin sees themselves plus members of any
+/// device-group they share. Flutter decoder at common/hbbs/hbbs.dart:26.
+pub async fn list(
+    Extension(state): Extension<Arc<AppState>>,
+    user: AuthedUser,
+    Query(q): Query<PageQuery>,
+) -> Result<Json<Page<UserPayload>>, ApiError> {
+    let (total, rows) = state
+        .db
+        .users_list_accessible(user.user_id, user.is_admin, q.offset(), q.limit())
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.to_string()))?;
+    Ok(Json(Page {
+        total,
+        data: rows.iter().map(UserPayload::from).collect(),
+    }))
+}
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 use clap::App;
 use hbb_common::{
-    allow_err, anyhow::{Context, Result}, get_version_number, log, tokio, ResultType
+    allow_err, anyhow::{Context, Result}, get_version_number, log, tcp::listen_any, tokio,
+    tokio::net::TcpListener, ResultType,
 };
 use ini::Ini;
 use sodiumoxide::crypto::sign;
@@ -11,6 +12,27 @@ use std::{
    time::{Instant, SystemTime},
 };

+/// Bind a TCP listener for `port`. When `host` is empty (the default for
+/// every flag that accepts it), falls through to `listen_any` which binds
+/// the dual-stack `[::]` wildcard. When `host` is set, binds only to that
+/// address — used by deployments that put nginx/Caddy out front for TLS
+/// termination on the WS / HTTP ports and want hbbs/hbbr's plain sockets
+/// reachable only from localhost.
+pub async fn bind_tcp_listener(host: &str, port: i32) -> ResultType<TcpListener> {
+    if host.is_empty() {
+        return listen_any(port as u16).await;
+    }
+    let host_with_brackets = if host.contains(':') && !host.starts_with('[') {
+        format!("[{}]", host)
+    } else {
+        host.to_string()
+    };
+    let addr: SocketAddr = format!("{}:{}", host_with_brackets, port).parse()?;
+    let l = TcpListener::bind(addr).await?;
+    log::info!("listen on tcp {}", addr);
+    Ok(l)
+}
+
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) fn get_expired_time() -> Instant {
    let now = Instant::now();
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ fn main() -> ResultType<()> {
    let args = format!(
        "-p, --port=[NUMBER(default={RELAY_PORT})] 'Sets the listening port'
        -k, --key=[KEY] 'Only allow the client with the same key'
+        --ws-listen=[HOST] 'Bind address for the browser-facing WebSocket relay port (port+2). Default = wildcard. Set to 127.0.0.1 (or ::1) when a reverse proxy claims the public port for TLS termination.'
        ",
    );
    let matches = App::new("hbbr")
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ fn main() -> ResultType<()> {
        matches
            .value_of("key")
            .unwrap_or(&std::env::var("KEY").unwrap_or_default()),
+        matches.value_of("ws-listen").unwrap_or(""),
    )?;
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 mod rendezvous_server;
 pub use rendezvous_server::*;
+pub mod api;
 pub mod common;
-mod database;
+pub mod database;
 mod peer;
 mod version;
@@ -21,6 +21,26 @@ fn main() -> ResultType<()> {
        -u, --software-url=[URL] 'Sets download url of RustDesk software of newest version'
        -r, --relay-servers=[HOST] 'Sets the default relay servers, separated by comma'
        -M, --rmem=[NUMBER(default={RMEM})] 'Sets UDP recv buffer size, set system rmem_max first, e.g., sudo sysctl -w net.core.rmem_max=52428800. vi /etc/sysctl.conf, net.core.rmem_max=52428800, sudo sysctl –p'
+        --http-port=[NUMBER(default=21114)] 'HTTP management API port (0 disables)'
+        --http-listen=[HOST] 'Bind address for --http-port. Default = wildcard. Set to 127.0.0.1 (or ::1) when nginx/Caddy fronts this port for TLS.'
+        --ws-listen=[HOST] 'Bind address for the browser-facing WebSocket rendezvous port (port+2). Default = wildcard. Set to 127.0.0.1 (or ::1) when a reverse proxy claims the public port for TLS termination.'
+        --bootstrap-admin-username=[USERNAME] 'Username to seed on first startup if users table is empty'
+        --bootstrap-admin-password=[PASSWORD] 'Password to seed on first startup if users table is empty'
+        --ab-legacy-mode=[on|off] 'When on, /api/ab/personal returns 404 to force legacy single-blob AB'
+        --ab-max-peers-per-book=[NUMBER(default=100)] 'Surfaced via /api/ab/settings.max_peer_one_ab'
+        --recording-dir=[PATH(default=./recordings)] 'Root directory for /api/record uploads'
+        --recording-max-size-mb=[NUMBER] 'Optional ceiling per recording file; 0 or unset = unlimited'
+        --audit-retention-days=[NUMBER] 'Hourly task deletes audit rows older than N days; 0 disables'
+        --smtp-host=[HOST] 'SMTP host for email-code login; if empty, codes are logged to stdout (dev mode)'
+        --smtp-port=[NUMBER(default=587)] 'SMTP port'
+        --smtp-user=[USER] 'SMTP username (omit for unauthenticated relays)'
+        --smtp-pass=[PASS] 'SMTP password'
+        --smtp-from=[ADDR] 'From: address for outbound login emails (default: noreply@<smtp-host>)'
+        --smtp-tls=[on|off] 'STARTTLS on the SMTP connection (default: on)'
+        --public-base-url=[URL] 'Externally reachable HTTP base URL (e.g. https://rustdesk.example.com:21114) — required for OIDC redirect callbacks'
+        --oidc-config=[PATH] 'TOML file describing OIDC providers (upserted into oidc_providers at startup)'
+        --admin-ui-dir=[PATH] 'Directory of static admin-dashboard files served at /admin/ (default: ./admin_ui; empty disables)'
+        --unattended-pwd-visibility=[always|logged-out] 'When the admin UI shows a device unattended password. logged-out (default) = only when nobody is logged in; always = also while a user is logged in'
        , --mask=[MASK] 'Determine if the connection comes from LAN, e.g. 192.168.0.0/16'
        -k, --key=[KEY] 'Only allow the client with the same key'",
    );
@@ -31,7 +51,18 @@ fn main() -> ResultType<()> {
    }
    let rmem = get_arg("rmem").parse::<usize>().unwrap_or(RMEM);
    let serial: i32 = get_arg("serial").parse().unwrap_or(0);
+    let http_port: i32 = get_arg_or("http-port", "21114".to_string())
+        .parse()
+        .unwrap_or(21114);
    crate::common::check_software_update();
-    RendezvousServer::start(port, serial, &get_arg_or("key", "-".to_owned()), rmem)?;
+    RendezvousServer::start(
+        port,
+        serial,
+        &get_arg_or("key", "-".to_owned()),
+        rmem,
+        http_port,
+        &get_arg("ws-listen"),
+        &get_arg("http-listen"),
+    )?;
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const BLACKLIST_FILE: &str = "blacklist.txt";
 const BLOCKLIST_FILE: &str = "blocklist.txt";

 #[tokio::main(flavor = "multi_thread")]
-pub async fn start(port: &str, key: &str) -> ResultType<()> {
+pub async fn start(port: &str, key: &str, ws_listen: &str) -> ResultType<()> {
    let key = get_server_sk(key);
    if let Ok(mut file) = std::fs::File::open(BLACKLIST_FILE) {
        let mut contents = String::new();
@@ -82,10 +82,21 @@ pub async fn start(port: &str, key: &str) -> ResultType<()> {
    log::info!("Listening on tcp :{}", port);
    let port2 = port + 2;
    log::info!("Listening on websocket :{}", port2);
+    // The WS port (21119 default) is the only browser-facing endpoint at
+    // hbbr — operators put nginx/Caddy in front of it for TLS. Allow
+    // pinning it to localhost so the reverse proxy can claim the public
+    // port without colliding. The plain TCP relay port (21117) is for
+    // desktop clients and stays on the wildcard.
+    let ws_listen = ws_listen.to_owned();
    let main_task = async move {
        loop {
            log::info!("Start");
-            io_loop(listen_any(port).await?, listen_any(port2).await?, &key).await;
+            io_loop(
+                listen_any(port).await?,
+                crate::common::bind_tcp_listener(&ws_listen, port2 as i32).await?,
+                &key,
+            )
+            .await;
        }
    };
    let listen_signal = crate::common::listen_signal();
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use hbb_common::{
    futures::future::join_all,
    futures_util::{
        sink::SinkExt,
-        stream::{SplitSink, StreamExt},
+        stream::{SplitSink, SplitStream, StreamExt},
    },
    log,
    protobuf::{Message as _, MessageField},
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use hbb_common::{
        register_pk_response::Result::{TOO_FREQUENT, UUID_MISMATCH},
        *,
    },
-    tcp::{listen_any, FramedStream},
+    tcp::{listen_any, Encrypt, FramedStream},
    timeout,
    tokio::{
        self,
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ use hbb_common::{
    AddrMangle, ResultType,
 };
 use ipnetwork::Ipv4Network;
-use sodiumoxide::crypto::sign;
+use sodiumoxide::crypto::{box_, sign};
 use std::{
    collections::HashMap,
    net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr},
@@ -49,9 +49,14 @@ enum Data {

 const REG_TIMEOUT: i32 = 30_000;
 type TcpStreamSink = SplitSink<Framed<TcpStream, BytesCodec>, Bytes>;
+type TcpStreamSrc = SplitStream<Framed<TcpStream, BytesCodec>>;
 type WsSink = SplitSink<tokio_tungstenite::WebSocketStream<TcpStream>, tungstenite::Message>;
 enum Sink {
-    TcpStream(TcpStreamSink),
+    /// Plain or encrypted TCP. The optional `Encrypt` is only present after a
+    /// successful server-initiated `secure_tcp` handshake — see
+    /// `try_secure_tcp_handshake`. When `Some`, every outgoing message is
+    /// sealed with secretbox before being framed.
+    TcpStream(TcpStreamSink, Option<Encrypt>),
    Ws(WsSink),
 }
 type Sender = mpsc::UnboundedSender<Data>;
@@ -99,11 +104,62 @@ enum LoopFailure {

 impl RendezvousServer {
    #[tokio::main(flavor = "multi_thread")]
-    pub async fn start(port: i32, serial: i32, key: &str, rmem: usize) -> ResultType<()> {
+    pub async fn start(
+        port: i32,
+        serial: i32,
+        key: &str,
+        rmem: usize,
+        http_port: i32,
+        ws_listen: &str,
+        http_listen: &str,
+    ) -> ResultType<()> {
        let (key, sk) = Self::get_server_sk(key);
        let nat_port = port - 1;
        let ws_port = port + 2;
+        // Capture the bind addresses as owned Strings so the async move
+        // closures below can hold onto them across reconnect retries.
+        let ws_listen = ws_listen.to_owned();
+        let http_listen = http_listen.to_owned();
        let pm = PeerMap::new().await?;
+        // M1: build the HTTP API state and seed the admin user if requested.
+        // Done here (right after PeerMap::new) so the API server, the seeding,
+        // and the rendezvous loop all share the same Database connection pool.
+        let api_state = crate::api::AppState::new(pm.db.clone());
+        // M4: hand the same Ed25519 secret used for the rendezvous key
+        // exchange to the plugin-signing handler. Without this set,
+        // POST /lic/web/api/plugin-sign returns "plugin signing not configured".
+        if let Some(sk_ref) = sk.clone() {
+            crate::api::plugin_sign::set_signing_key(sk_ref);
+        }
+        // M4: load operator-supplied OIDC providers from --oidc-config (TOML).
+        // Errors are logged but don't kill the server — the operator can
+        // hand-insert into oidc_providers as a fallback.
+        let oidc_path = get_arg("oidc-config");
+        if !oidc_path.is_empty() {
+            let public_base = api_state.cfg.public_base_url.clone();
+            let db = pm.db.clone();
+            match crate::api::oidc::providers::load_from_file(
+                &db,
+                std::path::Path::new(&oidc_path),
+                &public_base,
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                Ok(n) => log::info!("oidc: loaded {} providers from {}", n, oidc_path),
+                Err(e) => log::warn!("oidc: failed to load {}: {}", oidc_path, e),
+            }
+        }
+        {
+            let bn = get_arg("bootstrap-admin-username");
+            let bp = get_arg("bootstrap-admin-password");
+            if !bn.is_empty() && !bp.is_empty() {
+                if let Err(e) = pm.db.bootstrap_admin(&bn, &bp).await {
+                    log::warn!("bootstrap admin failed: {}", e);
+                }
+            } else {
+                pm.db.warn_if_no_users().await;
+            }
+        }
        log::info!("serial={}", serial);
        let rendezvous_servers = get_servers(&get_arg("rendezvous-servers"), "rendezvous-servers");
        log::info!("Listening on tcp/udp :{}", port);
@@ -149,7 +205,11 @@ impl RendezvousServer {
        rs.parse_relay_servers(&get_arg("relay-servers"));
        let mut listener = create_tcp_listener(port).await?;
        let mut listener2 = create_tcp_listener(nat_port).await?;
-        let mut listener3 = create_tcp_listener(ws_port).await?;
+        // The WS port is the only browser-facing endpoint at hbbs — it's
+        // the one operators put nginx/Caddy in front of for TLS. Allow
+        // pinning it to localhost so the reverse proxy can claim
+        // `[::]:21118` without colliding.
+        let mut listener3 = crate::common::bind_tcp_listener(&ws_listen, ws_port).await?;
        let test_addr = std::env::var("TEST_HBBS").unwrap_or_default();
        if std::env::var("ALWAYS_USE_RELAY")
            .unwrap_or_default()
@@ -216,15 +276,37 @@ impl RendezvousServer {
                    }
                    LoopFailure::Listener3 => {
                        drop(listener3);
-                        listener3 = create_tcp_listener(ws_port).await?;
+                        listener3 = crate::common::bind_tcp_listener(&ws_listen, ws_port).await?;
                    }
                }
            }
        };
        let listen_signal = listen_signal();
+        // The HTTP API task. `pending()` keeps the select! arm well-typed
+        // when the operator disabled it via `--http-port=0` — that branch
+        // never fires.
+        let api_task: std::pin::Pin<
+            Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = ResultType<()>> + Send>,
+        > = if http_port > 0 {
+            let bind_host = if http_listen.is_empty() { "0.0.0.0" } else { http_listen.as_str() };
+            // Allow IPv6 / [::1] / hostnames — wrap bare IPv6 in brackets for the URL form.
+            let host_with_brackets = if bind_host.contains(':') && !bind_host.starts_with('[') {
+                format!("[{}]", bind_host)
+            } else {
+                bind_host.to_string()
+            };
+            let addr: SocketAddr = format!("{}:{}", host_with_brackets, http_port).parse()?;
+            log::info!("HTTP API listening on {}", addr);
+            let st = api_state.clone();
+            Box::pin(crate::api::serve(addr, st))
+        } else {
+            log::info!("HTTP API disabled (http-port = 0)");
+            Box::pin(std::future::pending::<ResultType<()>>())
+        };
        tokio::select!(
            res = main_task => res,
            res = listen_signal => res,
+            res = api_task => res,
        )
    }

@@ -562,6 +644,16 @@ impl RendezvousServer {
                    });
                    Self::send_to_sink(sink, msg_out).await;
                }
+                // M4: HTTP-over-rendezvous fallback. The client uses this when
+                // OPTION_USE_RAW_TCP_FOR_API=Y (locked-down networks where
+                // direct HTTPS is blocked). We dispatch the wrapped request
+                // through the SAME axum router as the HTTP listener.
+                Some(rendezvous_message::Union::HttpProxyRequest(req)) => {
+                    let resp = crate::api::http_proxy::dispatch(req).await;
+                    let mut msg_out = RendezvousMessage::new();
+                    msg_out.set_http_proxy_response(resp);
+                    Self::send_to_sink(sink, msg_out).await;
+                }
                _ => {}
            }
        }
@@ -831,7 +923,12 @@ impl RendezvousServer {
        if let Some(sink) = sink.as_mut() {
            if let Ok(bytes) = msg.write_to_bytes() {
                match sink {
-                    Sink::TcpStream(s) => {
+                    Sink::TcpStream(s, enc) => {
+                        let bytes = if let Some(enc) = enc.as_mut() {
+                            enc.enc(&bytes)
+                        } else {
+                            bytes
+                        };
                        allow_err!(s.send(Bytes::from(bytes)).await);
                    }
                    Sink::Ws(ws) => {
@@ -1185,9 +1282,70 @@ impl RendezvousServer {
                }
            }
        } else {
-            let (a, mut b) = Framed::new(stream, BytesCodec::new()).split();
-            sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a));
-            while let Ok(Some(Ok(bytes))) = timeout(30_000, b.next()).await {
+            let (mut a, mut b) = Framed::new(stream, BytesCodec::new()).split();
+            // Server-initiated secure_tcp handshake. Only attempted when the
+            // server has a signing key (the default — `--key=-` auto-generates
+            // one). Signs an ephemeral box public key and sends it to the
+            // client; the client may either reply with a sealed symmetric key
+            // (the secure path used by logged-in clients, see
+            // src/client.rs:427-431 and src/common.rs:1939) or send a regular
+            // protobuf message (plain mode). Plain-mode clients filter out
+            // unsolicited KeyExchange via get_next_nonkeyexchange_msg, so the
+            // KeyExchange we just emitted is harmless to them.
+            let mut decrypter: Option<Encrypt> = None;
+            let mut buffered_first: Option<BytesMut> = None;
+            if let Some(sk) = self.inner.sk.clone() {
+                log::info!("secure_tcp: handshake starting for {}", addr);
+                match try_secure_tcp_handshake(&mut a, &mut b, &sk).await {
+                    Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Secure(enc)) => {
+                        let send_state = enc.clone();
+                        decrypter = Some(enc);
+                        log::info!("secure_tcp: handshake completed (encrypted) for {}", addr);
+                        sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a, Some(send_state)));
+                    }
+                    Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Plain(bytes)) => {
+                        log::info!(
+                            "secure_tcp: client sent plain first message ({} bytes) from {}",
+                            bytes.len(),
+                            addr
+                        );
+                        buffered_first = Some(bytes);
+                        sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a, None));
+                    }
+                    Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Skip) => {
+                        log::info!(
+                            "secure_tcp: handshake window timed out (client never replied) for {}",
+                            addr
+                        );
+                        sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a, None));
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        log::warn!("secure_tcp: handshake error for {}: {}", addr, e);
+                        sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a, None));
+                    }
+                }
+            } else {
+                log::debug!("secure_tcp: no signing key configured; skipping handshake");
+                sink = Some(Sink::TcpStream(a, None));
+            }
+            // Replay the message we already consumed during the handshake
+            // window before entering the normal read loop.
+            if let Some(bytes) = buffered_first {
+                if !self.handle_tcp(&bytes, &mut sink, addr, key, ws).await {
+                    if sink.is_none() {
+                        self.tcp_punch.lock().await.remove(&try_into_v4(addr));
+                    }
+                    log::debug!("Tcp connection from {:?} closed", addr);
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+            while let Ok(Some(Ok(mut bytes))) = timeout(30_000, b.next()).await {
+                if let Some(dec) = decrypter.as_mut() {
+                    if let Err(e) = dec.dec(&mut bytes) {
+                        log::warn!("decryption error from {}: {}", addr, e);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
                if !self.handle_tcp(&bytes, &mut sink, addr, key, ws).await {
                    break;
                }
@@ -1369,3 +1527,85 @@ async fn create_tcp_listener(port: i32) -> ResultType<TcpListener> {
    log::debug!("listen on tcp {:?}", s.local_addr());
    Ok(s)
 }
+
+/// Outcome of the server-initiated `secure_tcp` handshake on a fresh TCP
+/// rendezvous connection. The matching client code lives in
+/// /Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/common.rs:1939 (`secure_tcp_impl`).
+enum HandshakeOutcome {
+    /// Client cooperated; the resulting `Encrypt` is shared between the
+    /// inbound decrypter and the outbound `Sink`.
+    Secure(Encrypt),
+    /// Client did not opt into encryption — first message we read is a
+    /// regular `RendezvousMessage`. We hand the bytes back to the caller so
+    /// they can be dispatched via `handle_tcp` before the read loop begins.
+    Plain(BytesMut),
+    /// No first message arrived within the handshake window. Fall through
+    /// to plain mode; the next `b.next()` in the main read loop will pick
+    /// up whatever the client eventually sends.
+    Skip,
+}
+
+/// Server-side counterpart to the client's `secure_tcp_impl`. Sends a signed
+/// ephemeral box public key, then reads the first message:
+///
+/// 1. If it's a `KeyExchange` carrying `[client_box_pk, sealed_sym_key]`,
+///    decrypt the sealed sym key with our box secret and return an `Encrypt`
+///    initialised from that key — ready to use on both directions.
+/// 2. If it's any other `RendezvousMessage`, return the bytes verbatim so
+///    the caller can dispatch them as if no handshake had happened.
+///
+/// Plain-mode clients (no API token configured) skip unsolicited
+/// `KeyExchange` via `get_next_nonkeyexchange_msg` on their side, so the
+/// `KeyExchange` we emit unconditionally is ignored when the client hasn't
+/// opted into encryption.
+async fn try_secure_tcp_handshake(
+    sink: &mut TcpStreamSink,
+    src: &mut TcpStreamSrc,
+    sk: &sign::SecretKey,
+) -> ResultType<HandshakeOutcome> {
+    // Ephemeral Curve25519 keypair for this connection only.
+    let (our_pk_b, our_sk_b) = box_::gen_keypair();
+    // Sign the public key with our long-lived Ed25519 sign key. The client
+    // verifies this signature using the public key the user pasted into
+    // their RustDesk settings.
+    let signed = sign::sign(&our_pk_b.0, sk);
+    let mut msg_out = RendezvousMessage::new();
+    msg_out.set_key_exchange(KeyExchange {
+        keys: vec![Bytes::from(signed)],
+        ..Default::default()
+    });
+    let bytes = msg_out.write_to_bytes()?;
+    log::info!("secure_tcp: sending KeyExchange ({} bytes payload)", bytes.len());
+    sink.send(Bytes::from(bytes)).await?;
+
+    // Wait briefly for the client's reply. 5 s is comfortably below the
+    // client's READ_TIMEOUT and the server-loop 30 s timeout, so a slow
+    // plain-mode client just falls through to `Skip`.
+    match timeout(5_000, src.next()).await {
+        Ok(Some(Ok(bytes))) => {
+            log::info!("secure_tcp: received reply ({} bytes)", bytes.len());
+            if let Ok(msg_in) = RendezvousMessage::parse_from_bytes(&bytes) {
+                if let Some(rendezvous_message::Union::KeyExchange(ex)) = msg_in.union {
+                    if ex.keys.len() != 2 {
+                        bail!(
+                            "invalid key exchange response: keys.len() = {}",
+                            ex.keys.len()
+                        );
+                    }
+                    let key = Encrypt::decode(&ex.keys[1], &ex.keys[0], &our_sk_b)?;
+                    return Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Secure(Encrypt::new(key)));
+                } else {
+                    log::info!(
+                        "secure_tcp: reply was a non-KeyExchange RendezvousMessage; treating as plain"
+                    );
+                }
+            } else {
+                log::info!("secure_tcp: reply did not parse as RendezvousMessage; treating as plain");
+            }
+            Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Plain(bytes))
+        }
+        Ok(Some(Err(e))) => bail!("read error during handshake: {}", e),
+        Ok(None) => bail!("connection closed during handshake"),
+        Err(_) => Ok(HandshakeOutcome::Skip),
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+node_modules/
+*.log
+.DS_Store
+
+# dist/ is INTENTIONALLY committed — see web_client/README.md.
+# The Rust hbbs binary serves dist/bundle.js via include_bytes!, so
+# committing it lets `cargo build` work without a Node toolchain.
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# RustDesk web client
+
+Browser-based RustDesk client embedded in `rustdesk-server`. Surfaced from the
+admin dashboard as a "Connect" button on the Devices page.
+
+## Architecture (one-liner)
+
+Plain TypeScript SPA → talks WebSocket directly to `hbbs:21118` (rendezvous)
+and `hbbr:21119` (relay) → `protobufjs` for wire format → `libsodium-wrappers`
+for crypto → WebCodecs for video/audio decode → `<canvas>` for display.
+
+No frameworks. ~1 MB minified.
+
+## Building
+
+```sh
+./build.sh        # bundles to dist/bundle.{js,css}
+git add dist/
+```
+
+`dist/` is committed so `cargo build -p hbbs` doesn't need Node. Anyone
+touching code under `src/` should re-run `./build.sh` and commit the new
+`dist/` files in the same commit.
+
+## Regenerating proto bindings
+
+Rare — only when `libs/hbb_common` bumps and proto fields change:
+
+```sh
+npm run protogen
+./build.sh
+git add src/proto/generated.* dist/
+```
+
+## Layout
+
+```
+src/
+  main.ts                 boot: read #custom-config, init transport
+  crypto.ts               libsodium wrapper
+  proto/                  generated protobufjs static modules (committed)
+  transport/              rendezvous WS, relay WS, secure handshake state machine
+  decode/                 video (WebCodecs VideoDecoder), audio (AudioDecoder)
+  input/                  mouse/keyboard capture → protobuf MouseEvent/KeyEvent
+  ui/                     canvas + toolbar + style.css
+  audit.ts                POST /api/audit/conn with admin cookie
+dist/
+  bundle.js + .css        committed esbuild output
+```
+
+## Wire-protocol references
+
+- `/Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk-server/libs/hbb_common/protos/{rendezvous,message}.proto`
+- `/Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/client.rs` — desktop-client connect/secure/login state machine
+- `/Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk-server/libs/hbb_common/src/tcp.rs:296-344` — secretbox nonce derivation (8-byte LE counter, separate per direction)
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Build the web client bundle.
+#
+# Outputs: dist/bundle.js, dist/bundle.js.map, dist/bundle.css
+#
+# Re-run after editing anything under src/. Commit dist/* alongside source so
+# `cargo build` doesn't need a Node toolchain.
+#
+# To regenerate the protobuf bindings (rare — when libs/hbb_common bumps):
+#   npm run protogen && npm run build
+
+set -euo pipefail
+cd "$(dirname "$0")"
+
+if [ ! -d node_modules ]; then
+  echo "Installing npm dependencies..."
+  npm install
+fi
+
+mkdir -p dist
+echo "Bundling JS..."
+npm run --silent build:js
+echo "Copying CSS..."
+npm run --silent build:css
+
+echo "Done. Bundle:"
+ls -lh dist/bundle.js dist/bundle.css 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/* RustDesk web client — minimal, dark theme to match the admin dashboard. */
+
+html, body {
+  margin: 0;
+  padding: 0;
+  height: 100%;
+  background: #0f172a;
+  color: #e2e8f0;
+  font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", system-ui, sans-serif;
+}
+
+#root {
+  height: 100%;
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: center;
+}
+
+.placeholder {
+  background: #1e293b;
+  border: 1px solid #334155;
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  padding: 32px 40px;
+  max-width: 540px;
+  text-align: center;
+}
+
+.placeholder h1 {
+  margin: 0 0 16px;
+  font-size: 20px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+}
+
+.placeholder p {
+  margin: 8px 0;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  color: #cbd5e1;
+}
+
+.placeholder code {
+  background: #0f172a;
+  padding: 2px 6px;
+  border-radius: 3px;
+  font-family: ui-monospace, "SF Mono", Menlo, monospace;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  color: #7dd3fc;
+}
+
+.muted { color: #64748b !important; font-size: 12px !important; }
+
+.pw-form {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  margin-top: 16px;
+  align-items: stretch;
+}
+.pw-form input[type="password"] {
+  flex: 1;
+  background: #0f172a;
+  border: 1px solid #334155;
+  color: #e2e8f0;
+  padding: 8px 10px;
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+}
+.pw-form input[type="password"]:focus {
+  outline: none;
+  border-color: #38bdf8;
+}
+.pw-form button {
+  background: #0284c7;
+  border: 0;
+  color: #f0f9ff;
+  padding: 8px 16px;
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.pw-form button:hover { background: #0369a1; }
+
+/* Separator between "waiting for approval / cancel" and the unattended-
+ * password override on the awaiting-approval screen. */
+.pw-divider {
+  border: none;
+  border-top: 1px solid rgba(148, 163, 184, 0.2);
+  margin: 20px 0 12px;
+}
+
+.error-inline {
+  background: rgba(220, 38, 38, 0.15);
+  border: 1px solid rgba(220, 38, 38, 0.4);
+  color: #fca5a5;
+  padding: 8px 10px;
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  margin-top: 12px;
+}
+
+/* ------- Live session ------- */
+
+.session {
+  position: fixed;
+  inset: 0;
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  background: #000;
+}
+
+.rd-canvas {
+  flex: 1;
+  width: 100%;
+  height: 100%;
+  /* Letterbox: keep aspect ratio while fitting the browser viewport. */
+  object-fit: contain;
+  display: block;
+  background: #000;
+}
+
+.hud {
+  position: fixed;
+  top: 8px;
+  left: 8px;
+  background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.55);
+  color: #cbd5e1;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-family: ui-monospace, "SF Mono", Menlo, monospace;
+  padding: 4px 8px;
+  border-radius: 4px;
+  z-index: 10;
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 8px;
+}
+
+.hud-fps {
+  pointer-events: none;
+}
+
+.hud-btn {
+  background: #334155;
+  border: 0;
+  color: #e2e8f0;
+  padding: 3px 8px;
+  border-radius: 3px;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.hud-btn:hover { background: #475569; }
+
+.hud-select {
+  background: #334155;
+  border: 0;
+  color: #e2e8f0;
+  padding: 2px 4px;
+  border-radius: 3px;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.hud-select:hover { background: #475569; }
+
+.reconnect-overlay {
+  position: fixed;
+  inset: 0;
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: center;
+  background: rgba(15, 23, 42, 0.65);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(2px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(2px);
+  color: #e2e8f0;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  font-size: 15px;
+  z-index: 20;
+  pointer-events: none;
+}
+
+.error {
+  background: rgba(220, 38, 38, 0.15);
+  border: 1px solid rgba(220, 38, 38, 0.4);
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  padding: 24px 32px;
+  color: #fca5a5;
+  max-width: 640px;
+}
+.error h1 { margin: 0 0 12px; font-size: 18px; }
+.error pre { white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 13px; }
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "name": "rustdesk-web-client",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "description": "Browser-based RustDesk client embedded in rustdesk-server admin dashboard.",
+  "type": "module",
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "./build.sh",
+    "build:js": "esbuild src/main.ts --bundle --minify --format=esm --outfile=dist/bundle.js --target=es2022 --sourcemap=external",
+    "build:css": "cp src/ui/style.css dist/bundle.css",
+    "protogen": "pbjs --target static-module --wrap es6 --es6 --keep-case -o src/proto/generated.js ../libs/hbb_common/protos/rendezvous.proto ../libs/hbb_common/protos/message.proto && pbts -o src/proto/generated.d.ts src/proto/generated.js"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "esbuild": "^0.21.0",
+    "protobufjs-cli": "^1.1.3",
+    "typescript": "^5.4.0"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@noble/hashes": "^2.2.0",
+    "protobufjs": "^7.2.6",
+    "tweetnacl": "^1.0.3"
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+// Crypto wrapper around tweetnacl.
+//
+// The byte-for-byte references for everything here are:
+//   /Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk/src/common.rs:2005-2031   (decode_id_pk, create_symmetric_key_msg)
+//   /Users/sn0/Desktop/rustdesk-server/libs/hbb_common/src/tcp.rs:296-344  (Encrypt + nonce derivation)
+//
+// tweetnacl exposes the same NaCl primitives the desktop client's
+// `sodiumoxide` uses:
+//   - Ed25519: nacl.sign.open  (verifies + unwraps a signed message)
+//   - Curve25519 box: nacl.box  (asymmetric one-shot — we use the all-zero
+//     24-byte nonce per the desktop client's create_symmetric_key_msg)
+//   - Secretbox: nacl.secretbox / nacl.secretbox.open  (XSalsa20-Poly1305,
+//     symmetric per-message — nonce derivation is per-direction 8-byte LE
+//     sequence counter || 16 zero bytes)
+//
+// Pure JS, ~50 KB minified, no WASM, no module-resolution drama.
+
+import nacl from "tweetnacl";
+
+// Resolved immediately — kept as a Promise so the call site doesn't change
+// when we swap implementations later.
+export const sodiumReady: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
+
+export const SIGN_PUBLICKEYBYTES = nacl.sign.publicKeyLength;     // 32
+export const BOX_PUBLICKEYBYTES = nacl.box.publicKeyLength;       // 32
+export const BOX_SECRETKEYBYTES = nacl.box.secretKeyLength;       // 32
+export const BOX_NONCEBYTES = nacl.box.nonceLength;               // 24
+export const SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES = nacl.secretbox.keyLength;       // 32
+export const SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES = nacl.secretbox.nonceLength;   // 24
+
+/** Verify and unwrap an Ed25519-signed message. Throws on auth failure. */
+export function signOpen(signed: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  if (publicKey.length !== SIGN_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`signOpen: bad pk length ${publicKey.length}`);
+  }
+  const out = nacl.sign.open(signed, publicKey);
+  if (!out) throw new Error("signOpen: signature verification failed");
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Generate an ephemeral Curve25519 keypair for the box handshake. */
+export function genBoxKeypair(): { publicKey: Uint8Array; secretKey: Uint8Array } {
+  const kp = nacl.box.keyPair();
+  return { publicKey: kp.publicKey, secretKey: kp.secretKey };
+}
+
+/** Generate a fresh symmetric key for the per-session secretbox stream. */
+export function genSecretboxKey(): Uint8Array {
+  return nacl.randomBytes(SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seal `msg` under the peer's Curve25519 public key with our secret key.
+ * All-zero 24-byte nonce — matches `sodiumoxide::crypto::box_::seal` in the
+ * desktop client's create_symmetric_key_msg.
+ */
+export function boxSeal(
+  msg: Uint8Array,
+  peerPublicKey: Uint8Array,
+  ourSecretKey: Uint8Array,
+): Uint8Array {
+  const nonce = new Uint8Array(BOX_NONCEBYTES);   // all zeros
+  return nacl.box(msg, nonce, peerPublicKey, ourSecretKey);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encrypt with secretbox using the per-direction nonce derivation:
+ *   nonce[0..8]  = sequence_counter as little-endian u64
+ *   nonce[8..24] = zeros
+ * Returns ciphertext (which includes the 16-byte Poly1305 tag).
+ */
+export function secretboxSeal(
+  msg: Uint8Array,
+  sequence: bigint,
+  key: Uint8Array,
+): Uint8Array {
+  return nacl.secretbox(msg, makeNonce(sequence), key);
+}
+
+/** Inverse of secretboxSeal — throws on auth failure. */
+export function secretboxOpen(
+  cipher: Uint8Array,
+  sequence: bigint,
+  key: Uint8Array,
+): Uint8Array {
+  const out = nacl.secretbox.open(cipher, makeNonce(sequence), key);
+  if (!out) throw new Error("secretboxOpen: authentication failed");
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Build a 24-byte nonce: little-endian u64 in [0..8], zeros in [8..24]. */
+function makeNonce(sequence: bigint): Uint8Array {
+  const n = new Uint8Array(SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES);
+  const view = new DataView(n.buffer);
+  view.setBigUint64(0, sequence, /*littleEndian=*/ true);
+  return n;
+}
+
+// Pure-JS SHA-256 from @noble/hashes — works in non-secure contexts
+// (browsers gate `crypto.subtle` to HTTPS / localhost only). Audited,
+// minimal, no WASM. The dashboard often runs on plain http for self-hosted
+// deployments, which would break SubtleCrypto.
+import { sha256 as nobleSha256 } from "@noble/hashes/sha2.js";
+
+/** SHA-256 of `data`. Used for the Hash/LoginRequest password challenge. */
+export function sha256(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  return nobleSha256(data);
+}
+
+/** Concatenate two byte arrays. */
+export function concat(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(a.length + b.length);
+  out.set(a, 0);
+  out.set(b, a.length);
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Standard base64 (with padding) → bytes. Used to decode the server pk. */
+export function base64Decode(s: string): Uint8Array {
+  const bin = atob(s);
+  const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
+  for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Bytes → standard base64 (with padding). */
+export function base64Encode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
+  let s = "";
+  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) s += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);
+  return btoa(s);
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// Audio pipeline using WebCodecs AudioDecoder.
+//
+// Wire format (from libs/hbb_common/protos/message.proto):
+//   Misc{audio_format: {sample_rate, channels}}    sent once at session start
+//   Message{audio_frame: {data: <opus frame>}}     periodic
+//
+// We feed each opus frame into AudioDecoder, get back an AudioData with PCM
+// samples, copy into an AudioBufferSourceNode, and schedule it on a single
+// AudioContext "playhead" timeline so consecutive packets play seamlessly.
+
+import { hbb } from "../proto/generated.js";
+
+export class AudioPipeline {
+  private decoder: AudioDecoder | null = null;
+  private ctx: AudioContext | null = null;
+  private playhead = 0;          // next absolute scheduling time, in ctx seconds
+  private timestamp = 0;         // monotonic counter for EncodedAudioChunk
+  private muted = false;
+  private gain: GainNode | null = null;
+
+  /** Configure on the first AudioFormat message. Throws if WebCodecs unavailable. */
+  configure(format: hbb.IAudioFormat): void {
+    if (typeof AudioDecoder === "undefined") {
+      throw new Error("WebCodecs AudioDecoder unavailable. Open via http://localhost or https:// — secure-context only.");
+    }
+    const sampleRate = format.sample_rate || 48000;
+    const channels = format.channels || 2;
+    if (this.decoder) this.decoder.close();
+    this.ctx = new AudioContext({ sampleRate, latencyHint: "interactive" });
+    this.gain = this.ctx.createGain();
+    this.gain.connect(this.ctx.destination);
+    this.playhead = this.ctx.currentTime + 0.05; // 50ms initial buffer
+    this.timestamp = 0;
+
+    this.decoder = new AudioDecoder({
+      output: (data) => this.onAudioData(data),
+      error: (e) => console.error("[rustdesk-web] AudioDecoder error:", e),
+    });
+    this.decoder.configure({
+      codec: "opus",
+      sampleRate,
+      numberOfChannels: channels,
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Feed one opus packet (raw bytes from AudioFrame.data). */
+  pushFrame(data: Uint8Array): void {
+    if (!this.decoder || data.length === 0 || this.muted) return;
+    try {
+      const chunk = new EncodedAudioChunk({
+        type: "key",                    // opus is all-key per packet
+        timestamp: this.timestamp,
+        data,
+      });
+      this.timestamp += 20_000;          // ~20ms per opus frame in microseconds
+      this.decoder.decode(chunk);
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.error("[rustdesk-web] audio decode failed:", e);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Resume the AudioContext after a user gesture (some browsers gate
+   *  audio playback to the first interaction). */
+  async resume(): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.ctx && this.ctx.state === "suspended") {
+      await this.ctx.resume();
+    }
+  }
+
+  setMuted(muted: boolean): void {
+    this.muted = muted;
+    if (this.gain && this.ctx) {
+      this.gain.gain.setValueAtTime(muted ? 0 : 1, this.ctx.currentTime);
+    }
+  }
+
+  isMuted(): boolean {
+    return this.muted;
+  }
+
+  close(): void {
+    if (this.decoder) {
+      try { this.decoder.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      this.decoder = null;
+    }
+    if (this.ctx) {
+      try { this.ctx.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      this.ctx = null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  private onAudioData(data: AudioData): void {
+    if (!this.ctx || !this.gain) {
+      data.close();
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      const numChannels = data.numberOfChannels;
+      const numFrames = data.numberOfFrames;
+      const sampleRate = data.sampleRate;
+      const buffer = this.ctx.createBuffer(numChannels, numFrames, sampleRate);
+
+      // WebCodecs opus output is typically `f32` (interleaved), not
+      // `f32-planar`. Detect the format and deinterleave when needed.
+      const format = data.format || "f32";
+      if (format.endsWith("-planar")) {
+        // Each plane is one channel — copy directly.
+        for (let ch = 0; ch < numChannels; ch++) {
+          data.copyTo(buffer.getChannelData(ch), { planeIndex: ch });
+        }
+      } else {
+        // Interleaved: copy all samples, then deinterleave into the
+        // AudioBuffer's planar channels.
+        const interleaved = new Float32Array(numChannels * numFrames);
+        data.copyTo(interleaved, { planeIndex: 0 });
+        for (let ch = 0; ch < numChannels; ch++) {
+          const dest = buffer.getChannelData(ch);
+          for (let i = 0; i < numFrames; i++) {
+            dest[i] = interleaved[i * numChannels + ch]!;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      const src = this.ctx.createBufferSource();
+      src.buffer = buffer;
+      src.connect(this.gain);
+
+      // Schedule on a sliding playhead so consecutive packets are gap-less.
+      // If we've fallen behind real time (network hiccup / decoder stall),
+      // re-anchor to "now + 50ms" to avoid scheduling a runaway pile-up.
+      const now = this.ctx.currentTime;
+      if (this.playhead < now) {
+        this.playhead = now + 0.05;
+      }
+      src.start(this.playhead);
+      this.playhead += numFrames / sampleRate;
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.error("[rustdesk-web] audio render failed:", e);
+    } finally {
+      data.close();
+    }
+  }
+}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More